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A b s t r a c t :
Plato’ s Use o f  Attic Oratory
The philosophical works o f  Plato are characterized by the Socratic dialogue, the 
dialectical style o f  conversation Socrates employs with his interlocutors. However, Plato 
also occasionally departs from the Socratic dialogue to experiment in genres outside his,
own. The Menexenus and the Apology are two o f  his works that feature ‘ inserted’ genres
/
o f  Attic oratory: the funeral oration and forensic oratory. W hile these two works are 
typically characterized as Plato parodying or criticizing oratory, this thesis examines 
philosophy and oratory in both the Menexenus and the Apology and argues that Plato 
deliberately uses Attic oratory to communicate his philosophy to the Athenians and the 
polls as a whole. Plato uses these genres not to parody them, but uses them in a serio­
com ic way to show that philosophy too, by means o f  oratory, can be capable o f  political 
action.
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1
In t r o d u c t io n
Plato’ s vast corpus o f  philosophical works and his intriguing character o f  Socrates 
have commanded the attention o f  scholars for centuries. The issue o f  authorial intent in 
these works is sometimes difficult to discern, since Plato never speaks any words in his 
own voice, rather it is Socrates who holds the main position in (most o f) the dialogues. 
This contributes to one o f  the most distinguishing factors o f  Plato’ s works: the Socratic 
interview. This is Socrates’ typical philosophical modus operandi, which he uses in 
pursuit o f  virtue and knowledge. Plato, as author, uses Socrates’ reasoned discourse with 
his interlocutors to communicate his philosophical ideas and commentary on 
contemporary society and its figures. W e see many significant political and intellectual 
figures o f  fifth century (b c e) classical Greece in conversation with Socrates, such as 
Alcibiades, Aristophanes, Critias, Gorgias, and Protagoras, among others. In this method 
o f  the Socratic interview (or elenchus), Plato’ s discourse is primarily a personal and 
private mode o f  communication. '
Plato, however, does not restrict him self to this particular elenctic genre. A t times, 
he experiments with other genres, but these experimentations occur within Plato’ s own 
particular genre. In this way, they are ‘ inserted’ genres. In the Menexenus and Apology, 
Plato uses two different forms o fpublic discourse, in contrast to his private elenchus. 
Specifically, Plato uses two genres o f  Attic oratory: the Athenian funeral oration 
(epitaphios logos) and forensic oratory. These two dialogues stand out from  the Platonic 
corpus, since they have the potential to stand on their own; that is to say, they could have 
been presented (by Socrates or not) without an interlocutor.
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Public oratory was an essential element in the 7i6A.iq. Jean-Pierre Vemant notes,
; “The system o f the polis implied, first o f all, the extraordinary preeminence o f
speech over all other instruments o f  power. Speech became the political tool 
par excellence, the key to all authority in the state, the means o f commanding 
and dominating others.... Speech was no longer the ritual word, the precise 
formula, but open debate, discussion, argument. It presupposed a public to 
which it was addressed, as to a judge whose ruling could not be appealed, who 
decided with hands upraised between the two parties who came before him.” 1 23
Even in Plato’ s time, the dichotom y between written and oral communication was still in
transition. In Plato’ s own works, there are treatments o f  oratory in contemporary
society. Plato, it seems, was not impressed with the orators o f  his day, who flattered the
crowds and aimed at gratification, caring nothing for the truth o f  their words.4 What,
then, is Plato’ s intent when he inserts genres o f  oratory into his Socratic dialogues? Plato
cannot possibly operate in the exact same way he does in the Socratic elenchus when
delivering a speech.
This ‘ discrepancy’ between Plato’ s apparent condemnation o f  the contemporary 
orators, and his subsequent use o f  oratory in his dialogues has led many scholars to label
the use o f  (inserted) oratory in the Menexenus and Apology as ‘parody’ , ‘ satire’ , or
\
‘ irony’ . They believe that Plato could not possibly be using oratory in earnest, or for any 
purpose other than as a demonstration o f  the sort o f  flattery the orators use, or a mockery 
in further condemnation o f  it. There are unfortunate implications o f  characterizing the 
inserted genres in the Menexenus and Apology as parody, or the like. It is clear that Plato 
is a very skilled and versatile writer, capable o f  writing in various prose styles.5 He is not
1 Vemant, Jean-Pierre. [trans.]1982 (1962). The Origins o f  Greek Thought, pp. 49-50
2 Guthrie, W .K .C. 1975. A History o f  Greek Philosophy, vol. 4. p. 58
3 Cf. especially Phaedrus, Gorgias, and Republic.
4 Grg. 462c, 464b-466a
5 Nothing shows this versatility better than the Symposium, where each symposiast 
delivers a speech fitting to his character.
trying to beat the orators at their own game, or simply show that he is just as capable o f  
writing prose oratory as his own Socratic dialogues. I f  the use o f  oratory in these two 
dialogues is relegated to parody and other non-serious uses, then the dialogues 
themselves are given a lower status: they are given less importance in relation to the rest 
o f  the (philosophical) Platonic corpus as a whole and do not contribute any further to our 
understanding o f  Plato as an author. M ost importantly, I submit, failing to properly 
account for Attic oratory in Plato removes him from  the social construct o f  the nokic, 
where he lived and operated, even i f  he was not ‘ active’ in the typical way o f  many 
Athenian citizens.
It is true, that in some cases o f  inserted genre, Plato does intend to parody.6 
However, “ each instance where Plato incorporates poetry (or rhetoric) into his 
dialogues... deserves a separate investigation.”7 8The label o f ‘parody’ , I submit, assigns to
o
the Menexenus and Apology a different purpose than I believe Plato intended. Plato 
consciously addresses his philosophy to the Athenians and the 7i6X,k; as a whole by means
o f  Attic oratory, thereby proving that oratory is not only the tool o f  the politician, but that
\
philosophy too (by means o f  oratory) can be capable o f  political action. Furthermore, I 
w ill argue, Plato intends his use o f  oratory to be taken seriously, and that it is a 
misunderstanding o f  Socratic sipcoveia (irony) that leads scholars to take the Menexenus 
and Apology as parodies. The terminology currently used to describe Plato’ s use o f  Attic 
oratory is insufficient and, in some cases, wrong. I w ill instead submit a new term to
6 Cf. The use o f  (Euripidean) tragedy in the Gorgias, 485e-494a.
7 Nightingale, Andrea. 1995. Genres in Dialogue, p. 92 n.84
8 Henderson notes that elsewhere in the Socratic dialogues, Plato does not hesitate to 
name the person he is parodying, e.g. Lysias in the Phaedrus. There is no such explicit 
mention o f  a target in the Menexenus or Apology. (Henderson, M .M . 1975. “ Plato ’ s 
“ Menexenos”  and the Distortion o f  History.”  AClass 18: 25-46. p. 28.)
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properly define how  Plato uses oratory in these two cases. In order to prove this thesis, I 
w ill first need to disprove specific beliefs about the Menexenus and then the Apology.9
Scholars have a hard time reconciling Socrates as an orator in the Menexenus with 
Socrates the philosopher that we see elsewhere in the Platonic corpus. The dialogue is not 
interpreted as philosophically significant in and o f  itself, but rather as simply showing
that philosophy is important for politics. I, on the other hand, argue (Chapter 1) that the
/
Menexenus is philosophically significant in its use o f  inserted oratory. It displays— and 
contributes to— many o f  the philosophical ideas expressed elsewhere in the dialogues. In 
dealing with the Apology, I argue (Chapter 2) that Plato has specifically com posed 
Socrates’ defense to be rhetorical and that it is, in many ways, consistent with other 
examples o f  forensic oratory. I also argue, in contrast to m odem  scholars, that Socrates’ 
use o f  oratory is consistent with his other opinions on oratory expressed elsewhere (as in 
the Gorgias and Phaedrus).
By proving that the Menexenus is philosophically significant, and that the 
Apology is rhetorically consistent, seeing both philosophy and oratory in both dialogues, 
it becom es possible to prove (Chapter 3) that Plato is using these inserted genres as a way 
o f  communicating his philosophy to the nokxc,. Plato has appropriated a new use o f  
oratory for his philosophy. Under this interpretation, these dialogues becom e an integral 
part o f  the Platonic corpus, not merely on e-o ff departures into inserted genres o f  oratory. 
This interpretation also brings into view  a more civic aspect to Plato, who, through the
9 Examining the Menexenus and Apology together, as examples o f  Attic oratory, is also a 
benefit to this thesis. To the best o f  my knowledge, they have not been studied together 
under the grouping I propose.
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inserted genres o f  Attic oratory, shows his concern for the TtoXu; and not merely 
condemnation.
A  ‘ S e r io u s ’ N o t e :
r /KAA: ei7te got, oa Xaipe(pdov, O7toi)5d^ei tai)Ta ScoKpaxiv; fj 
XAI: epoi pev Sokev, co KaXXiK^iq, vnepcpv&q ojcouSa^eiv
Callicles: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates serious about these things, or is he 
joking?
Chaerephon: He seems to me to be exceedingly serious, Callicles. (Grg.
481b)10
Whether or not we are to take Socrates (and Plato) as ‘ serious’ in the dialogues is a 
constant issue.11 Socrates often asserts that he is being serious about matters when his 
responses and actions provoke mirth in his interlocutors. Those that really know Socrates, 
like Chaerephon, recognize that Socrates is being serious in these moments. This is 
Plato’ s way o f  showing us— through the social interactions o f  the characters— that we too 
are to take Socrates as being serious. But when w e don’ t have direct confirmation from 
someone like Chaerephon, how can we recognize Socrates as being serious or joking? 
(Since he certainly jokes at times as w ell.)
There are certain Greek words that Plato employs that can be used as a sort o f  
diagnostic to whether or not Socrates (or his interlocutors) is being serious or playing. 
When we are to understand seriousness, we see words like cnrouSfj (cnrouSaTo«;, 
OTtooda^a)), Ttoiobpai 7tepi TuXeiovoq, and verbs o f  ‘ care’ or ‘ concern’ , like psXsco or kt|8©.
10 Translation my own.
11 Guthrie (1975 vol. 4) treats the issue o f  “ Play and Earnest”  in the dialogues as part o f  
his preamble to his study o f  the dialogues (pp. 56-66).
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In contrast, when we are to understand play, we see words like TtaiÇo), yekaa, yskoioq, or 
KaraysXaaxog (Karays^dco). A s w ill be discussed further in Chapter 3, the Platonic 
dialogues are a ‘ serio-com ic’ genre, in that they blend elements o f  seriousness and its 
contrastives. Over and over again in the dialogues, we see that the philosopher appears 
ridiculous to those who do not understand philosophy j even though he is in earnest about
his pursuits. Play has ultimate motives for Plato: it is a com ic means to a serious end.
■ /
Plato is seriously joking, or joking seriously, in his dialogues, and this serio-com ic 
(aîtouôoyéXoïoç) aspect o f  the dialogues is also present in his use o f  inserted genres. Plato 
‘plays’ with inserted genres for a serious ultimate purpose. Unfortunately, this aspect o f 
the dialogues in the case o f  the Menexenus and Apology (and their inserted oratory) has 
been either missed or misunderstood by scholars who label these works as ‘parody’ . They 
are selling Plato short o f  his intended purpose. After all,
“ Comedy is simply a funny way o f  being serious.”
-Peter Ustinov 12
12 Cf. R. 536e and the discussion in Chapter 3, p. 91 & n.69.
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A d d it io n a l  N o t e s :
It may seem at times in my writing that I am using the terms ‘ oratory’ and 
‘ rhetoric’ (or their adjectives and adverbs) indiscriminately. For me, these terms represent 
the Greek ‘ fj pt|TopiKn tsxvt)’ , and I have simply used whatever term felt natural to me in 
writing my prose. It is not my intent to cause any confusion in the reader.
/ '
A ll Greek texts used in this thesis are from Burnet’ s Oxford Classical Texts o f  
Plato, with the exception o f  Dodds’ (1959) superb edition o f  the Gorgias. A ll 
abbreviations for the dialogues o f  Plato (and other authors’ work) found in the text are 
those used in the LSJ.
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C h a p t e r  O n e
The Menexenus: Fragmentary in its Entirety
Too often scholars o f  history and literature are confronted with the complete loss 
o f  an author’ s work, or struggle with very few  fragments. It is extremely fortunate for 
scholars when a corpus as large as that o f  Plato is extant. What is even more rewarding 
for students o f  Plato is the wide range o f  his works and their characters. Indeed, the figure 
o f  Socrates is most prominent, along with his style o f  conversation: the Socratic 
interview. Plato, however, does not restrain him self to the Socratic interview, but 
sometimes experiments with other genres o f  discourse. Recognizing these departures is 
extremely valuable to understanding both the work in question and the author’ s own 
intentions. The Menexenus is an example o f  this experimentation, in which Plato employs 
the genre o f  the Attic funeral oration. This work is extremely valuable since it is one o f  
the very few  examples o f  the funeral oration that has been transmitted.1 Since the 
Menexenus does not include a Socratic interview, and is not otherwise overtly 
philosophical, scholars have struggled to place this dialogue in the greater scheme o f  
Plato’ s works. It has been described as a “ continual puzzle” ,2 the “most baffling 
dialogue” ,3 and “Plato’ s most confusing work, and among his numerous portraits o f  
Socrates,... his most paradoxical” .4 This difficulty is compounded by the fact that
1 Other examples include: Thucydides 2.34-46 (Pericles’ Funeral Oration), Gorgias, DK 
82, B5a, 5b, 6 (fragmentary), Hyperides 6 (many lacunae), Lysias 2, [Ps.] Demosthenes 
60. Some scholars often compare these epitaphioi to Isocrates’ Panegyricus and ; 
Panathenaicus.
2 Stem 1974: 503. S
3 Carter 1991:218. V,
4 Friedlander 1964: 216.
Plato’ s funeral oration, while displaying many o f  the conventions o f  the genre, does not 
com e across as serious,5 and is often labeled a parody6 or ironic.7 89
A s opinions on the Menexenus have varied, so has the direction o f  scholarship. 
Earlier scholarship was concerned with whether or not the dialogue itself was properly
A
attributed to Plato. Once the dialogue was firm ly placed in the Platonic corpus, scholars 
diverged on various topics. The link to Thucydides and his Periclean funeral oration has
9 /been explored, with varying conclusions. Some have tried to explain Plato’ s intent for 
the Menexenus as being a funeral oration for his dear Socrates,10 while others have 
focused on the anachronism— that is, that Socrates narrates events beyond his 
execution— o f  the dialogue for other reasons.11 12M ost recent scholarship has focused on 
the links presented by the play o f  philosophy in a rhetorical/political speech and the
9
5 Henderson 1975: 39.
6 Dodds 1959:24, Coventry 1983: 3.
7 Kahn 1963: 226, A llen 1984: 322. X
8 Huby, P.M. 1957. “ The Menexenus Reconsidered.”  Phronesis 2: 104-114. That
Aristotle cites this work twice (Rhetoric 1415b, 1367b), in the same manner he cites Plato 
elsewhere, is strong evidence for the inclusion o f  the dialogue in Plato’ s corpus, not to 
forget that Cicero {Orator 44.151) says the Athenians o f  his day recited Plato’ s funeral 
oration yearly. ,
9 Kahn, C.H. 1963. “ Plato’ s Funeral Oration: The M otive o f  the Menexenus.”  CPh 58: 
220-234 and Collins, Susan D, and Devin Stauffer. 1999. “ The Challenge o f  Plato’ s 
‘Menexenus’” . The Review o f  Politics 61: 85-115.
10 Stem, H.S. 1974. “ Plato’ s Funeral Oration.”  77ie New Scholasticism 48: 503-508.
11 Henderson, M .M . 1975. “ Plato’ s Menexenus and the Distortion o f  History.”  A Class 18: 
25-46, Dean-Jones, Lesley. 1995. “ Menexenus— Son o f  Socrates.”  CQ 45: 51-57, and 
Rosenstock, Bruce. 1994. “ Socrates as Revenant: A  Reading o f  the Menexenus.”  Phoenix 
48:331-347.
12 D uffy, B.K. 1983. “ The Platonic Function o f  Epideictic Rhetoric.”  Ph&Rh 14: 79-93; 
Coventry, Lucinda. 1989. “ Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Menexenus.”  JHS109:1-15; 
and Salkever, Stephen G. 1993. “ Socrates’ Aspasian Oration: The Play o f  Philosophy and 
Politics in Plato’ s Menexenus.”  The American Political Science Review 87:133-143. 
Duffy sees the Menexenus as confirming “ the importance o f  epideictic rhetoric as a tool 
not only o f  statescraft, but o f  popular philosophy”  (79), Salkever believes the Menexenus 
“presents a Socrates who influences politics indirectly, by recasting Athenian history [by
10
ritual aspects connected to the funeral oration. O f course, the Menexenus has been 
included in surveys o f  the Athenian funeral oration,* 134 in addition to studies o f  the 
different genres in Platonic works.15 That one dialogue can give rise to so many different 
discussions is impressive, especially since at first glance the dialogue seems quite simple. 
The Menexenus opens in the same way as many other Platonic dialogues: Socrates
chances upon a young companion, Menexenus,16 and they begin to engage in a dialogue.
/
One would not be surprised at this point i f  the dialogue progressed into an elenchus on 
virtue, courage, or the like. However, after a brief excursus on the orators and their 
abilities (Mx. 234c-235d), the two turn to discuss the upcoming funeral oration. Socrates 
says he heard Aspasia giving such a speech the day before (one partly com posed on the 
spot, partly made up o f  remnants from  Pericles’ epitaphios), and Menexenus implores 
him to repeat it (Mx. 236a-d). Reluctantly (or so he would have us believe) Socrates gives 
the oration (Me. 236d-249c), which is in many ways a typical epitaphios logos. He
11
means o f  the speech] and thus transforming the terms in which its political alternatives 
are conceived”  (133), that is to say that he believes philosophy is a tool o f  the politician. 
Coventry believes that the dialogue shows the “ necessity o f  philosophy to a state’ s w ell­
being”  (15). I w ill argue that the Menexenus (in and o f  itself) is using the political speech 
to communicate Plato’ s philosophical ideas, and noting the occurrence o f  these ideas 
elsewhere in the Platonic corpus allows better understanding both o f  the Menexenus and 
the compared dialogue.
13 Carter, M ichael F. 1991. “ The Ritual Functions o f  Epideictic Rhetoric: The Case o f  
Socrates’ Funeral Oration.”  Rhetorica 9: 209-232, and Wickkiser, Bronwen L. 1999. 
“ Speech in Context: Plato’ s ‘Menexenus’ and the Ritual o f  Athenian Public Burial.”  RSQ 
29: 65-74.
14 Loraux, N icole. 2006 (1981). The Invention o f  Athens: The Funeral Oration in the 
Classical City. Transi. Alan Sheridan, and Poulakos, Takis. 1990. “Historiographies o f  
the Tradition o f  Rhetoric: A  B rief History o f  Classical Funeral Orations.”  Western 
Journal o f  Speech Communication 54: 172-188.
15 Nightingale, Andrea. 1995. Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct o f  
Philosophy. Regrettably, Nightingale does not pursue the Menexenus in any great detail 
(it is mentioned, then subsequently set aside in the discussion o f  encomiastic speeches).
16 Menexenus also appears in the Lysis, at a much younger age, and is named by Phaedo 
as one o f  those present at the death o f  Socrates (Phd. 59b). See n. 44 below.
praises the ancestry o f  the deceased warriors, extols the virtue o f  the war dead and the 
polls, and consoles the parents and children left behind. However, his historical account 
o f  Athenian actions in war (and peace) is riddled with errors and has some glaring 
omissions (like Athenian imperialism, or Athens’ defeat at Aegospotami). He does speak 
a few  words in the character o f  the deceased themselves (Mx. 246d-248d), which appears
much more sincere than the rest o f  the speech. After he concludes the speech, Socrates
. /
and Menexenus exchange a few  more words, and Socrates ends on the promise to share 
many more fine political speeches with Menexenus (Mx. 249e).
Fine political speeches are not what one would expect o f  Plato, but the Menexenus 
is an example o f  ‘ inserted’ genre (as are the Phaedrus, Protagoras, Symposium, etc.). 
Nightingale notes that Plato has “ a positive hankering for the hybrid in so many o f  his 
texts: again and again, Plato mixes traditional genres o f  discourse into his dialogues and
17
disrupts the generic boundaries o f  both his own texts and the texts that he targets” . 
Nightingale refers to these types o f  works as “mixed”  or “hybrid** genres, but in truth 
(especially in the Menexenus), these genres are ‘ inserted’ into his ‘normal’ Socratic 
discourse. Often, Plato’ s intent with the inserted genre is parody or criticism, but in the 
non-parodic passages,17 8 he “remains open to the possibility that a genre may in fact make 
a positive contribution to the philosopher’ s enterprise” .19 This is indeed, I submit, what 
he intends to prove in the Menexenus. It is possible to see the links between this work and 
other Platonic dialogues that display his philosophical ideas (especially those that are
17 Nightingale 1995: 2.
18 Such as at the end o f  the Menexenus, after Socrates completes his historical treatment 
o f  Athens and turns his attentions to those (imagined) present at the delivery o f  the 
oration (Mx. 246a-249c).
19 Nightingale 1995: 12.
12
ethical) more plainly. It is also possible to see similarities in the Menexenus to other 
important Socratic ideas on oratory. Furthermore, I believe Socrates is doing something 
significantly philosophical, and not simply oratorical, by ‘ inserting’ the genre o f  the 
Funeral Oration into one o f  his own conversations. Recognizing the connections— and 
whether or not we are to take them seriously— to other areas o f  the Platonic corpus makes
it possible to elucidate the philosophy and ideas o f  Plato (and Socrates) from other
/
dialogues and to reinforce the connection o f  the Menexenus to the rest o f  the corpus.
It is the Athenian funeral oration (epitaphios) that Plato targets in the Menexenus. 
This is no real surprise as a selection, since Plato “ targets genres that have currency in 
classical Athens— genres which make som e claim to wisdom or authority” . The 
Athenian funeral oration was in fact a product o f  classical Athens. It came to be recited 
yearly as part o f  the Patrios Nomos. 21 Loraux dates the inclusion o f  the epitaphios to 461 201
20 Idem: 5.
21 It was a traditional ancestral custom o f  the Athenians to bring their dead home to bury 
in their own soil (except at Marathon and Plataea). Around 470 BCE, the Patrios Nomos 
was m odified, and the Demosion Sema was set up on the Academy Road as an exclusive 
public cemetery for the Athenian war dead. (Plato cites the war dead o f  Oenophyta [457 
b c e ] as the first to be buried here at Mx. 242b-c. He is the only one o f  our sources to 
suggest any date, but Loraux calls it a “ calculated error”  [Loraux 2006:101].) Soon 
afterward, the epitaphios logos was added, and epitaphioi agones follow ed (Skinner, 
Ashley. 2010. “ Death in Fifth Century Athens: Public Glory, Private G rief ”  p. 6. See 
also Clairmont [1983] Patrios Nomos, K ierdorf [1966] Erlebnis und Darstellung der 
Perserkriege.). Thucydides gives us our best description o f  the Patrios Nomos: “ In the 
same winter the Athenians gave a funeral at the public cost to those who had first fallen 
in this war. It was a custom o f  their ancestors, and the manner o f  it is as follow s. Three 
days before the ceremony, the bones o f  the dead are laid out in a tent which has been 
erected; and their friends bring to their relatives such offerings as they please. In the 
funeral procession cypress coffins are borne in cars, one for each tribe; the bones o f  the 
deceased being placed in the coffin  o f  their tribe. Am ong these is carried one empty bier 
decked for the missing, that is, for those whose bodies could not be recovered. Any 
citizen or stranger who pleases, joins in the procession: and the female relatives are there
BCE. W hile it is typically classed as an example o f  the epideictic genre, Loraux cautions 
not to merge the epitaphios with the epideictic genre or make it a set speech for an 
occasion. It is, in a way, its own genre, with its own tropes and themes. And although 
the war dead are the reason for the occasion, “ each epitaphios can easily be reduced to an 
encomium o f  Athens, in relation to which the praise o f  the dead becom es secondary” .2 34 256
Indeed, the focus on the polis is easily seen in the Menexenus, but the degree to which
/  25Plato’ s encomium o f  Athens is serious is doubtful.
Since Plato’ s seriousness is questionable, it is necessary to seek his underlying 
motive. Nightingale notes “whether it is bestowed upon one individual or the city as a 
whole, the discourse o f  praise is antithetical to the project o f  the philosopher” . By 
contrast, I would argue (along with others) that Plato uses the Menexenus to show that 
even the discourse o f  praise— in thé form  o f  the epitaphios— is able to aid the 
philosopher in communicating his ideas. B y using a genre that does have currency at the 
time o f  its com position, Plato is perhaps hoping to reach a wider audience than his 
Socratic dialogues would normally have. Coventry (JHS1989) notes various links to the 
other Platonic dialogues, whether similarities or differences: “ Apparent resemblances
s
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to wail at the burial. The dead are laid in the public sepulchre in the most beautiful suburb 
o f  the city, in which those who fall in war are always buried; with the exception o f  those 
slain at Marathon, who for their singular and extraordinary valor were interred on the 
spot where they fell. After the bodies have been laid in the earth, a man chosen by the 
state, o f  approved wisdom  and eminent reputation, pronounces over them an appropriate 
panegyric; after which all retire. Such is the manner o f  the burying; and throughout the 








[between the Menexenus and other dialogues] in practice and ideas need therefore to be 
examined carefully; they may prove to be superficial similarities which serve only to 
underline a basic opposition. This is true o f  the passages in Aspasia’ s speech which most
An
clearly recall ideas expressed in other dialogues” . She continues, “ where Aspasia’ s 
speech seems to recall Platonic ideas, the effect is ... to make apparent the gu lf between 
the Athens portrayed here and Plato’ s ideal state. In itself, the comparison points to the 
necessity o f  philosophy for statesmanship” .27 8 Indeed, Plato does believe philosophy is 
needed for one who is to properly engage in politics, but I believe that these links are not 
limited to the purpose Coventry suggests, nor are they as ‘ superficial’ as she believes. I 
w ill undertake to make a greater survey o f  the links between the Menexenus and the 
Platonic corpus. These links w ill help to clarify some o f  the questions which arise from 
the Menexenus in addition to allowing greater understanding (and scope) for the 
philosophical ideas expressed in other dialogues.
Socrates, upon learning where Menexenus is com ing from (the Council meeting), 
supposes that his young friend thinks he has com e to the end o f  schooling and philosophy 
and, since he is sufficiently educated, that he is now prepared to enter upon more 
important ventures (xa psi^co), namely politics (Mx. 234a-b). This progression o f  
philosophy into politics is seen elsewhere in the Platonic dialogues. Socrates makes the 
same charge o f  Alcibiades, telling him that he is “ rushing into politics before [he’ s] got 
an education”  (Ale. 1 118b). W hile the assumption that Socrates makes o f  Menexenus is 
not as serious as the accusation he makes o f  Alcibiades, it nevertheless has the same 
underlying tone that shows that Socrates thinks that neither o f  these young men is ready
27 Coventry 1989: 11.
28 Idem: 14.
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to enter into politics. Indeed, in the Alcibiades, Socrates goes so far as to say that he 
thinks most o f  the politicians (except perhaps Pericles) o f  Athens are in this same “ sad 
state”  (d7topia, Ale. 1 118b-c). Socrates takes this statement further in the Gorgias, when 
speaking with Callicles, concluding that Athens has not known any man who proved to 
be good at politics (Grg. 517a). From these passages, the inference is clear that politics,
for Socrates, is secondary to philosophy. He concludes the Gorgias by telling Callicles
/
that only after they have practiced excellence (acnceiv &perf[v) should they turn their 
attentions to politics, chastising Callicles for encouraging him to abandon philosophy 
earlier in their conversation (Grg. 527d-e). W e as readers know that Callicles’
■ v
exhortations fall on deaf ears; Socrates vow ed to never cease to practice philosophy (Ap. 
29d). This explicit link between politics and philosophy expressed in the opening 
exchange o f  the Menexenus focuses the attention o f  the reader: philosophy should come 
before politics, and in the political29 30 speech (and rest o f  the dialogue) that is to follow , the 
reader should be aware o f  philosophical ideas expressed. M oreover, the informed 
Platonic reader w ill be able to relate these ideas in the Menexenus with other Platonic 
philosophy.
<r ' 1 '' '
29 Callicles too, was young and eager to turn his attentions to politics. Dodds (1959: 23-4) 
notes both Callicles’ and Menexenus’ zeal for ta  peiÇcù as a similar theme to argué the 
Menexenus as an afterpiece to the Gorgias. Since the two dialogues were approximately 
contemporary (Henderson 1975: 25), I wonder whether this theme signifies Plato’ s 
intention to m ove to more important themes in his own works, as in the Gorgias and 
Phaedrus. Carter (1991:219) notes the link between the two by labeling the Menexenus 
as the “practical illustration”  to the Gorgias’’ “ theoretical discussion” .
30 See Loraux (2006) Introduction and Chapter 1 for the strong links between Athenian 
politics and the Patrios Nomos and Epitaphioi Logoi. The funeral oration is especially 
‘political’ as it has the praise o f  the polis as its ultimate topic.
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Once the topic o f  the upcom ing epitaphios is reached, Socrates explains the 
power o f  the orators. Through die power o f  their embellished words, they “ ensorcel the 
souls” 31 2 3(yor|xeoeiv zag \|/uxa<;, Mx. 235a) o f  the listeners, and Socrates, having been 
charmed (Kq^eiaOai), believes he has becom e greater in status and mien; the ringing o f  
the orators’ words along with a high and mighty feeling (aspvoxr|<;) remain for four or
five days until Socrates remembers him self (dvapipvficJKopai epauxob, Mx. 235c). These
/
terms o f  enchantment and witchcraft appear elsewhere in Plato where the effects o f  
certain types o f  speech are discussed. Both M eno and Alcibiades describe their 
experiences in a similar way when speaking o f  their participation in the Socratic 
elenchus. M eno says that Socrates ensorcels (yorixeueiv), beguiles (cpappdxxsiv), and puts 
him under a spell (KaxercqSeiv), making both his mind and tongue numb (Men. 80a-b), 
when he is questioned by him. Alcibiades explains that he feels simply out o f  place and 
confused (Ale. 1 116e) while being questioned, but in the Symposium he says that 
Socrates doesn’t need instruments like Marsyas to cast spells (Krjtaxv) on people, he does 
what Marsyas does with words alone (v|/iX,oi Xdyoi, Smp. 215b-d), and likens the effect o f  
his words to being drunk (peGueiv, Smp. 215e). The miopia induced by the Socratic 
elenchus is described in terms o f  the m agic and witchcraft that Socrates’ words embody.
31 He begins with speaking o f  the wonderful praise each man receives, regardless o f  his 
social status. However, even i f  Plato may not have respected the orators for their ‘knack’ 
o f  speaking on things they knew nothing about, the purpose o f  the genre must have 
appealed to him. In the Laws, Clinias and the Athenian determine that deceased citizens 
who have performed excellent achievements and have obeyed the laws during their 
lifetime are suitable subjects for panegyrics, whereas men should not be honoured while 
living (Lg. 7.801e-802a). Socrates also notes that the orators ascribe traits to the deceased 
that they may not have possessed (Mx. 234e-235a). Before he begins his speech in the 
Symposium, he notes that ‘ to praise’ is (rather, appears to be) to ascribe the most beautiful 
qualities to the thing praised, whether it displays them or not (Smp. 198d-e).
32 A ll translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.
33 A lso noted by Coventry (1989:10) and Salkever (1993:137).
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However, this type o f  description is not reserved for the Socratic elenchus, but is 
also applied to the effects o f  speeches and rhetoric in Plato (not only in the Menexenus). 
In the Gorgias, Socrates marvels that oratory itself (and not just its effects) is something 
“ supernatural”  (Saipovia, Grg. 456a). The power o f  oratory is also described as it is in 
the Menexenus. Protagoras is described as talking to groups o f  foreigners who follow  him
like a chorus, charmed (icr|XsTo0ai) by his voice {Prt. 315a-b),34 Socrates him self also
/
falls under Protagoras’ spell (icr|A,8Ta0ai, Prt. 328d), and Hades is described as perfect 
sophist, since he knows how  to speak such beautiful words that he is able to enchant 
(KaxaicnXetv) everyone— including the Sirens (Cra. 403e).35 W hile speeches are not what 
we would regularly associate with Socrates, he does call him self a lover o f  speech 
{(p&okoyoq, Phdr. 236e,36 spacrrij«; xtov Xoycov, Phdr. 228c). As he walks with Phaedrus 
outside the city, he says that Phaedrus, with speech in hand, has found a “ drug”  (to 
(pappxiKov) to make him follow , since Socrates w ill follow  Phaedrus anywhere i f  waves a 
speech in front o f  him {Phdr. 230d-e). O f the similar effects o f  wbrds, Socrates says he 
was “ almost carried away”  by the speech o f  his accuser (Ap. 17a), he says that the words 
o f  the Laws echo in his ears and resonate (PopPsiv), leaving him unable to recognize any 
other noise (Cri. 54d)37 and after Agathon’ s speech at the symposium, Socrates notes that 
he is at a loss (dutopeiv) and struck dumb (sKTcXiixxeiv) by his words (Smp 198a-199b). 
From these other exchanges, it would seem that the power o f  words is not limited to the 
Socratic elenchus.
34 A lso noted by Rosenstock 1994: 342 n. 18, and Vlastos 1981:189 n.3.
35 A lso noted by Dean-Jones 1995: 56.
36 OiXoXoyo«;, however, does not necessarily mean that Socrates is a lover o f  the orator’ s 
Xoyoi, but more likely his own Socratic 'koyoq, and the elenchus-style discussion with 
words.
37 A lso noted by Salkever 1993:142 n.27.
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However, in the case o f  the Menexenus, immediately after Socrates gives his 
account o f  the orators and their craft, Menexenus chides him for always making sport o f  
(7ipocr7taiÇeiv) the orators (Mx. 235c). In this way, Plato has signaled to readers that 
Socrates is not being serious about his ‘effects’ from  the orators’ speeches. This appears 
to be something not out-of-the-ordinary, judging by Menexenus’ reaction: he dismisses
Socrates’ making sport o f  the orators in five words, and moves right back to the subject at
/
hand. Indeed, in the Phaedrus, Socrates is again reproached for joking (îtaiÇetv) and for 
not being serious (pi) a7tou8aÇeiv) when saying he is in ecstasy38 after listening to 
Phaedrus recite Lysias’ speech (Phdr. 234 d-e). I f  Socrates is not taken seriously when he 
responds in this way to the orators, what does Plato hope the reader to take away from his 
inclusion o f  such a long response in the Menexenusl
A s informed readers o f  Plato, we know that elsewhere Socrates does not fall for 
the wiles o f  the orators and sophists, but instead turns them on their heads; Protagoras, 
Gorgias, and Hippias39 are all unable to maintain their opinions dr answer questions
satisfactorily in their discussions with Socrates. However, Plato does show us that this
\
type o f  hysteria isn’ t completely fabricated. In the Phaedrus, Socrates says he knows that 
Phaedrus kept after Lysias, begging Lysias to repeat his speech to him, and even after 
that, he read the speech again and again until he knew it by heart (Phdr. 228a-c). Socrates 
is therefore making light o f  those who fall prey to the charms o f  speeches. It is obviously
38 Vlastos 1981:189 n.93 also notes Socrates’ remarks about his frenzied response to the 
speech.
39 A ll three try to make their way through the Socratic interview in their eponymous 
dialogues.
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not a behaviour he approves of, since it would disregard the maxim prjdev dyav. The 
listeners should be able to resist the influence o f  the speakers on their souls.40
The ‘ sorcery’ language used to describe oratory and its effects recalls the 
discussion between Socrates and Glaucon in Republic X . Before moving on to further 
discussion o f  the soul, the two discuss (and confirm ) their earlier decision to exclude 
poetry when founding their city. ‘ Imitative’ (pijiTynicri) poetry is able to distort the 
thought (Siavoia41) o f  the listeners, unless one possesses a drug, to (pappaicov, to 
counteract its effects (R. 10. 595b). These imitative poets have no real knowledge o f  what 
is being imitated, and their imitation is a kind o f  game (iraiSid) that is not to be taken 
seriously (ou cncouSfj, R. 10.602b). The words o f  the imitative poet are most dangerous to 
the listeners when the listeners are in grief: in this state, they lose the capacity o f  rational 
deliberation (R. 10.604b-d).42 To protect oneself and one’ s soul from  the destructive 
effects o f  poetry, one must repeat a countercharm or incantation, srapSrj, o f  the truth 
about poetry, being on guard not to take it seriously (&  10.608a-b). However, Socrates
allows hymns to the gods and eulogies to good people into the city (R. 10.607a). W hile
\
the funeral oration could be classified as a eulogy to good people, the dangers are still 
there in the epitaphios. Although Socrates and Glaucon are discussing the effects o f  
poetry, in the Gorgias, Socrates and Callicles, when discussing oratory, determine that if  
one should strip away m elody, rhythm, and meter from  poetry, all one would be left with 
would be speeches, and that it is oratory that the poets practice in the theatres (Grg. 502c-
d).
40 [oi prjTopeq] yor|TSUoocnv i|pc5v zaq \|/U3£a<;, Mnx. 235a.
41 This is actually a part o f  the soul, and so poetry, like oratory, also harms the soul.
42 Presumably, the loss o f  ‘ rational deliberation’ would cause one to lose track o f  himself, 
be struck dumb, or be at a loss, all effects which are attributed to oratory as well.
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The danger o f  the epitaphios is now  clear: this oratory, as Socrates describes, 
ensorcels the soul, and since it is like poetry, it specifically ensorcels a very important 
part o f  the soul: the Sidvoia; Socrates him self is partaking in the act o f  pipricn^ by 
repeating Aspasia’ s words, and admits that by repeating them, he would be playing 
(mxi^siv, Mx. 236c); and the audience o f  the epitaphios is especially vulnerable since they
would be mourning, as would be expected o f  them by the Patrios Nomos and by
/
Athenian burial customs (and by mourning they would ignore the maxim jxrjSev dyav), 
and they would therefore lack the ability o f  rational discourse (to (pappaicov) to 
determine what is true and what is not in the speech. I f  the audience lacks the ability to 
discern the truth, then Socrates’ (Aspasia’ s) speech is especially troubling: riddled with 
anachronisms, omissions, and falsities, the ‘ truth’ about Athens’ history in his version is 
difficult to find. However, at the end o f  the speech, neither Menexenus nor Socrates 
appears to have been ensorcelled.43
With all these dangers present, how  is this possible? It is possible that since 
Menexenus is part o f  Socrates’ circle,44 he may know the dangers and how to repeat the 
countercharm (n eroaSrj) to himself to protect his soul. However, from Socrates’ defense
43 Carter (1991: 230) believes that Socrates has ensorcelled him self during the delivery o f  
his speech, and it is Menexenus speaking that snaps him back to reality. I believe that 
Socrates’ matter-of-fact statement at the end o f  his speech (“ There you have it, 
Menexenus, the speech o f  Aspasia the Milesian” , 249d) shows that he is quite aware o f  
himself, and indeed is able to carry on a conversation with Menexenus immediately 
afterwards. W ickkiser (1999: 70-1) agrees that neither Socrates nor Menexenus are 
overpowered by the speech. He instead notes the reason as the fact that they are outside 
o f  the ritual context: it is not a real epitaphios that Socrates delivers; these are words 
“ without attendant actions” .
44 A s proved by his attendance at Socrates’ last hours in the Phaedo (59b), although at 
this youthful age, Menexenus likely has not reached the end o f  his philosophical training 
(as indeed Socrates thinks at 234a) and may not be advanced enough to know the 
countercharm.
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in the Apology, we know he would never willingly put one o f  his ‘ follow ers’ into a worse 
state (Ap. 25e-26a), so he would be remiss to put Menexenus’ soul at risk without 
cautioning him about the dangers. The answer lies in how Socrates uses the oratory, and 
in its content. In the Gorgias, Socrates notes that oratory has two parts: the first is 
flattery, and the other is “ that o f  getting the souls o f  the citizens to be as good as possible
and o f  striving valiantly to say what is best”  (Grg. 503a). In the Apology, Socrates notes
/
that the greatest good (peyioxov ayaOov, Ap. 38a) is to discuss virtue daily— this indeed is 
the aim o f  philosophy. Plato has Socrates display the nobler part o f  oratory discussed in 
the Gorgias, using it to transmit philosophical ideas45 that w ill protect the soul from  the 
dangers o f  ‘ imitative’ discourse. This type o f  oratory, when coupled with philosophy, is 
safe and beneficial for the listener, and so Socrates has no reason to warn Menexenus o f  
what is to follow .
After Menexenus chides Socrates for making fun o f  the orators and brings their 
discussion back to the topic o f  the Council’ s selection for the epitaphios, he expresses 
how difficult it must be for a speaker to have such short notice to deliver a speech. 
Socrates responds notably, “For i f  it is necessary to praise the Athenians w ell among
l
Peloponnesians, or the Peloponnesians among Athenians, there would be need o f  a
r
persuasive and highly esteemed orator. But whenever someone competes among those 
men whom  he praises, it is no great thing to seem to speak w ell”  (Mx. 235d). In the 
Gorgias, when Socrates is examining Callicles, he says “ each group o f  people takes 
delight in speeches that are given in its own character, and resents those given in an alien
45 The philosophical ideas are tacit throughout the historical account o f  Athens, but once 
Socrates resumes speaking in his own (or Aspasia’ s) voice and in the voice o f  the 
deceased, this exhortation to virtue is stronger (Mx. 246a-249c).
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manner”  (Grg. 513c). It is likely for this reason, that people take delight in their own type 
o f  speeches, that Plato decided to experiment with the exclusively Athenian epitaphios to 
expound his feelings about Athens. It is also likely that the choice o f  the epitaphios has 
afforded Plato more freedom than other genres would. His history o f  Athens at first 
glance, although distorted, appears favourable to Athens. But upon closer examination,
Athens’ motives for actions are untrue, and she acts oppositely to ideals attributed to her.
/
(For example, at Mx. 242d, it is expressed that it is appropriate to fight those o f  thé same 
stock only to the point o f  victory, but to bring barbarians to utter destruction. However, at 
Mx. 246a, the Athenians have saved the Great King o f  Persia, but have driven the 
Spartans, fellow  Greek-speakers, clear out o f  the sea.) However, since Plato is speaking 
o f  Athens among the Athenians, it is not difficult to please them, and they are perhaps 
wont to hear only the “praise”  bestowed upon their polis.
Since it is apparently not difficult, according to Socrates, to com e up with a 
speech on short notice and praise Athenians among Athenians, Menexenus asks Socrates 
i f  he thinks he would be able to deliver the speech i f  the Council chose him (Mx. 235e). 
Socrates replies that it wouldn’t be a surprise i f  he could, since he has a fine teacher o f  
rhetoric (Aspasia). This response may com e as a bit o f  surprise for the informed reader, 
since elsewhere Socrates expresses his inability to make speeches. When speaking with 
Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles, Socrates asks many times for his interlocutors to keep their 
responses short (e.g. Grg. 46Id), asking them to respond how he prefers. In the 
Protagoras, Socrates almost ends the discussion since Protagoras does not want to 
engage in shorter discourse. Socrates claims he isn’ t able to make the long speeches and 
contend with Protagoras in paKpoXoyia (Prt. 335c), when in truth, he does outdo
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Protagoras in speech.46 In the Phaedrus, Socrates notes he has no art o f  speaking (oh 
T8xyn<; Tivoq too Xeyeiv jiexoxo«;, Phdr. 262d), and instead holds the local gods 
responsible for his delivery o f  the two earlier speeches. However, when they discuss 
Lysias’ speech, Socrates has more knowledge o f  the rhetorical techniques and technical 
terms than Phaedrus (Phdr. 266d ff.).47 I f  in actuality, Socrates is perfectly capable o f
paKpoXoyia and delivering rhetorical speeches, why does he profess inability in the
/
Gorgias, Protagoras, and Phaedrus? The answer lies in the interlocutors. As seen in 
other dialogues (e.g. the Hippias Minor), Socrates must be careful in how he interacts 
with his interlocutors48 lest they cease to participate in the discussion (as Protagoras 
threatens to do). Socrates is attempting to allow  them to preserve their social face by 
“ yielding”  to them in giving speeches. Gorgias is a famous orator, Protagoras, likewise, is 
a (self-admitted49) sophist, renowned at paKpoXoyia50, and although Phaedrus isn’ t in a 
position o f  losing his own social face, it is Lysias (although absent) who must be 
protected on behalf o f  Phaedrus, who looks up to and admires hiin.Tf Socrates bested his 
speeches and admitted to being able to produce finer works than Lysias, Lysias would 
lose social face to Phaedrus. In the Menexenus, however, there is no one other than the 
nameless orators who present a challenge. Here Socrates is able to safely show his 
rhetorical ability with Menexenus: they are alone, in a liminal situation, which is 
obviously secluded enough that Socrates would be obliged to strip naked and dance,
46 Coventry 1989:4.
47 Ibid.
48 At least those who are ‘esteemed’ . Indeed, those who have (the appearance of) 
knowledge are those that Socrates is the most interested in as interlocutors. Cf. Ap. 21b-c 
ff., where Socrates describes how  he attempted to refute the oracle by going to examine 
“ all those who had any reputation for knowledge”  (Ap. 21e).
49 Prt. 317b-c50 Prt. 335a
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should Menexenus ask him to (M t.236c-d). A lso, although he attributes the speech to 
Aspasia, it would appear that he is unable to foo l Menexenus (Me. 249 d-e) into thinking 
that he is not the real author o f  the speech.
Menexenus now  asks Socrates what he would say i f  he was chosen. Socrates says 
he heard Aspasia the day before giving an appropriate speech for the occasion (Me. 236a-
b). This attribution to someone else (while not necessary as discussed above), is
/
paralleled in the Phaedrus, where Socrates attributes his two speeches to Phaedrus and 
Stesichorus (Phdr. 244a). Menexenus asks Socrates i f  he would remember Aspasia’ s 
speech, and Socrates replies that he learned it from  her, and that he narrowly escaped a 
beating whenever he forgot the words (Me. 236b-c). A  forgetful Socrates also begs o f  
Protagoras to not speak at such lengths: “ I tend to be a forgetful sort o f  person, and i f  
someone speaks to me at length, I tend to forget the subject o f  the speech”  (Prt. 334c- 
d).51 *It would seem that Socrates would be a difficult student o f  rhetoric for Aspasia. 
Socrates does, however, bring out frustration in all his teachers. Connus, Socrates’ music
teacher, gets angry with him whenever Socrates doesn’ t give in to him, and he has less
\
effort to teach him since he thinks he’ s stupid (apaOrjc;, Euthd. 295d). Diotima, too, gets 
frustrated with Socrates, but does not call him stupid or strike him (Smp. 204b, 207c). 
Socrates is thus reluctant to engage in education in the manner prescribed to him by his 
teachers. Oratory and rhetoric were at the forefront o f  education o f  the sophists, not 
necessarily o f  philosophy. However, since the epitaphios provides a listening audience, 








by the criticism in the ‘historical’ account o f  Athens— but he is able to set it aside to 
encourage the Athenians to do better in future generations, reminding them o f  the glory 
o f  the past, and by inserting philosophical ideals so they can better serve Athens. Perhaps 
Plato was aware that he could catch more flies with honey as it were, by showing the 
Athenians the noble way to serve the polis through rhetoric and philosophy together.
Socrates is reluctant to repeat the speech for Menexenus, fearing that Menexenus
/
w ill laugh at him (Kaxayskav), i f  he seems to still play (exi rcai^eiv) when he’ s an old man 
(.Mx. 236c). Likewise, Phaedrus plays coy, pretending to not want to recite Lysias’ 
speech, when “he was going to recite it even i f  he had to force an unwilling audience to 
listen”  (Phdr. 228 b -c). Since Socrates is a “ lover o f  speeches” , it is possible to assume 
that Socrates also would love the opportunity to tell Menexenus the speech. Although, he 
does express the same sentiment at the start o f  his defense, saying “ it would not be fitting 
at my age, as it might be for a young man, to toy with words when I appear before you”  
(Ap. 17c).54 The use o f  Ttaî stv has led some to cite this as a reason why we should not 
take the follow ing speech seriously. However, there is yet another passage in Plato where 
there is a conversation on what is and is not ‘ age-appropriate’ which I believe to be more 
pertinent to this comment in the Menexenus.55 In the Gorgiás, Callicles is attempting to 
persuade Socrates to m ove away from  philosophy and towards politics. Callicles notes 
that philosophy is fine, so long as it is done in moderation, and at the appropriate time o f  
life, but i f  one pursues it beyond that appropriate time, he w ill be inexperienced in
54 A lso noted by Rosenstock 1994: 338 n. 12.
55 A lso in the Laches (201 a-b), Socrates, upon being asked who would make a good 
teacher for the young boys, determines that he and his interlocutors all are still in need o f  
education. He suggests that i f  anyone laughs at them for wanting to spend time in school 
at their age, they should confront them with a line o f  Homer (“Modesty is not a good 
mate for a needy man” , Od. 17.347).
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everything a man should know. He says it is not shameful to partake o f  philosophy while 
still a boy, but when one pursues it when they are older, it is ridiculous (icaxayeXaoxoi;). 
He believes that men who philosophize are very much like men “who speak haltingly and 
play (rcai^eiv) like children”  (Grg. 484c-485e). It is this passage that is more pertinent to 
the speech that follow s because the speech contains elements o f  Plato’ s philosophy. By
dismissing the speech as irony, parody, or play, thus taking away any serious credence
/
from  what follow s, we would sell Plato short.
Before Socrates obliges Menexenus’ requests to relate the speech, he notes that he 
must oblige, since they are alone— and that even i f  Menexenus bid him to strip naked and 
dance, he would have to oblige (Mx. 236c-d). In the Phaedrus, it is Phaednis who uses 
the fact that they are alone to force Socrates to deliver his speech (P/*dr. 236c-d). 
Although Socrates again claims that he w ill be ridiculous (yekoxoq), he does give in and 
deliver his speech. This aspect o f  liminality, I argue, (being alone, whether outside the 
city as in the Phaedrus, or in the city as in the Menexenus,) creates a ‘ safe’ environment 
for Socrates to let his own front o f  knowing-that-he-knows-nothing drop.
There are fewer links to the other Platonic dialogues through the first section o f 
the epitaphios, where Socrates recounts the historical exploits o f  the Athenians, but that 
is not to say that they don’ t exist. Early in the speech, Socrates utters the gnomic 
aphorism “men are good because o f  being bom  from  good men”  (ayaBoi 5e sysvovxo 8ia 
xo (puvai ayaOcov, Mx. 237a). Likewise, in the Alcibiades, Socrates and Alcibiades 
make the inference that those “who are bom  w ell w ill turn out to be perfectly virtuous” 
(Ale. 1 120e). Both dialogues go on to stress that it is not only because men are bom  well
that they are good, but they must also be nurtured w ell to be good.56 57In the Menexenus, 
Socrates gives the first men sprung from  the earth itself as an example, for who else is 
better to nourish mankind than the earth which provides their 7nyyfi xpo(pf|q (Mx. 237d- 
238a), and in the Alcibiades, Socrates speaks o f  the lavish upbringing o f  the Spartan and 
Persian royal children (Ale. 1 121b-122b). W e can therefore make a final inference
ourselves from  the similarities o f  Socrates’ (and ultimately Plato’ s) words: in order for
/
men to be good, it is not a question o f  good nature versus good nurture, but that it is 
necessary for men to be good by their nature and their nurture.
A s Socrates continues through the speech, there are more similarities to the 
Republic that com e up. Although Hie Republic is much later than the Menexenus, it is 
possible that the thoughts that occur in our dialogue are either still being formed by Plato, 
or were com pletely formed, but had not found their proper context until he wrote the 
Republic. Plato is not hesitant to include stories from  myth in his dialogues (e.g. the tale 
o f  Prometheus in the Protagoras). In the Menexenus, he relatesihe autochthonous origin 
o f  the Athenians (Mx. 237b-238b). This tale is more fitting for the poets than for the 
historians. In the Republic, Socrates again uses the tale o f  an autochthonous origin as a 
“ noble falsehood” . By persuading the city that he is founding that they were fashioned 
and nurtured by the earth, their true mother, he hopes that the citizens w ill more
C - J
vigorously defend and protect their land, which is their mother (R. 3.414d-415a).
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56 Perhaps this is the reason why Socrates stresses the proper education in philosophy for 
Menexenus (and for Alcibiades): we know he must be bom  from  good stock i f  his family 
always provides a guardian (£7ap£Xsxf|g) for the city, but it is his upbringing that is just as 
cm cial to his future actions.
57 Collins and Stauffer (1999: 98) also note the autochthonous story in Republic 3.
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The second reflection found in the Republic comes at Menexenus 242d. Socrates 
states that when warring against an enemy o f  the same stock, the war should be fought 
only to a point o f  victory, whereas when warring against a barbarian enemy, the war 
should bring the barbarians to utter destruction. When Socrates and Glaucon are 
discussing their soldiers, they com e to the same conclusions: “when Greeks battle with
barbarians or barbarians with Greeks, w e’ ll say that they’re natural enemies and that such
/  ■
hostilities are to be called war. But when Greeks fight with Greeks, w e’ ll say that they are 
natural friends and that in such circumstances Greece is sick (voosTv) and divided into 
factions (axaoid^eiv) and that such hostilities are to be called civil war”  (R. 470c-d).
This is similar terminology to that which is used to (euphemistically) describe the civil 
war in Athens in the Menexenus-. “ The civil war was fought by us in such a way that i f  it 
were fated for men to engage in strife (oxacnd^siv), in no other way would they pray for 
their own city to be sick (vooetv)”  (Me. 243e). For Plato, war is only just against foreign 
barbarians. Against one’ s own stock, that is, fellow  Greek-speakers, war is a sickness that 
is neither justifiable nor just.
After Socrates concludes relating Athens’ exploits, he turns to address the 
listeners o f  his speech (he is, o f  course, imagining that there is a proper audience as there 
would be at the Patrios Nomos, but all who read the dialogue can be counted among this 
number). He says that all who remember the deeds o f  die war dead ought to exhort the 
children “just as in war, not to leave the post (xaBp;) o f  their ancestors or fall back and 
yield to vice”  (Mx. 246b). Plato uses this turn o f  phrase frequently in discussions o f  
courage, which is by definition a part o f  virtue. In the Phaedrus, when Socrates is 58
58 A lso cited by Coventry 1989:13.
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speaking o f  the soul in terms o f  a charioteer and his team o f  winged horses, the phrase o f  
abandoning one’ s post describes the cowardice and unmanliness caused by the 
charioteer’ s (and the one horse’ s) fear (Phdr. 254c). In the Laches, where Socrates and 
his interlocutors discuss courage, “ to remain at one’ s post (xa^ic;)”  is Laches’ first 
definition o f  courage (La. 190e). During Socrates’ defense, he notes that “wherever a
man has taken a position (xa^u;) that he believes to be best, or has been placed by his
/
commander, there he must I think remain and face danger, without a thought for death or 
anything else, rather than disgrace”  (Ap. 28d-e).59 Plato has the Laws use similar diction 
in the CriYo, saying that i f  the city commands you to do anything at all, one must obey, 
and not leave one’ s post (xafyq) or retreat, since it is impious to bring violence against 
one’ s country (Cri. 5 lb -c). Since the speech is over the war dead, one would expect 
words on courage and valor to be spoken. However, Plato uses this terminology 
elsewhere when discussing virtue60 (and courage), so when it is mentioned here, we, the 
informed readers o f  Plato, are reminded o f  the different applications o f  the term xa^ic;.
Socrates continues in the next sentence, saying that for his part, for the rest o f
\
time, whenever he meets with (¿vxuyxdvsiv) anyone, he w ill remind and exhort them to 
be zealous to be the best they can be (dx; apiaxoi, Mx. 246b-c). Likewise, in the Apology, 
he vows that as long as he draws breath and is able to, he will always practice philosophy 
and exhort anyone he meets (svxoyxdveiv) to care for wisdom, truth, and the best possible 
state o f  their soul (6naq (bq (ieXviovT] earai,Ap. 29d-e).61 In the Menexenus, it is Plato
59 A lso noted by Coventry 1989:14, and Dean-Jones 1995: 54.
60 Cf. Grg. 506c-508b (esp. 506el-2 ), where Socrates asserts that virtue is a xo^iç (proper 
order/arrangement).
61 A lso cited by Coventry 1989:14, Dean-Jones 1995: 54, and Collins &  Stauffer 1999: 
105 n. 43.
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who gives Socrates the breath to carry on, continually practicing philosophy, and 
exhorting those who listen to him to care for their soul (knowing that philosophy is the 
care o f  the soul). In the Protagoras, exhorting the youth to be as good as they possibly 
can (cb<5 PsXtioxoi) is the work o f  the parents, nurse, and tutor o f  the child (Prt. 325d). In 
the Gorgias, as noted earlier, Socrates mentions the two parts o f  oratory, one o f  which is
getting the souls o f  the citizens to be as good as possible (dx; PsA/ciotoi, Grg. 503a). In
/
this way, Plato has chosen oratory to allow  Socrates to carry out his avowed work, 
making Socrates into an e7tipeA,Tyn!j<; o f  the citizens’ souls.
The connections from this point to the end o f  the speech com e closer together, but 
with not as many serious deductions being drawn. The references to Plato’ s philosophy 
com e fast and furiously as the speech winds down. When Socrates acts as a proxy for the 
dead men by relating what they would have wanted to tell their families and fellow  
citizens, he tells the children that there is no one who would be the friend o f  one who 
shames his own people, either on the earth when living or underihe earth when dead (.Mx. 
246d). Likewise, in the Lysis, just before Socrates ends his examination o f  Lysis, they 
make the inference that unless one is wise, useful, and good, he will have no friends, not 
even among close relatives (Ly. 210d). Both dialogues use examples o f  those who would 
be considered most likely to be a friend, namely family members or gods, and explain 
that even these figures would not be able to look  past what one does wrong in order to 
still care for them. And so, it is thus seen how  Socrates (and Plato) believes that one who 
is not good to his own people is also not good to himself; that man will lead his life alone 62
62 With regards to using the rhetoric o f  the Menexenus as a vehicle for philosophy, note 
Socrates’ words: “ isn’ t the rhetorical art, taken as a whole, a way o f  directing the soul by 
means o f  speech, not only in the law courts and on other public occasions, but also in 
private?”  (Phdr. 261a), and “ the nature o f  speech is to direct the soul”  (Phdr. 271d).
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and have no one to help him know what he does and does not know, giving no benefit to 
his ancestors. In this vein, Socrates encourages the children o f  the war dead that i f  they 
do anything at all, to practice it with virtue (ámcsTv ¡J£x’ápsxfj<;,63 Mx. 246e). The 
sentiment is repeated in the Gorgias, where Socrates concludes his story o f  the judgment 
o f  the souls in the Underworld. Socrates tells Callicles that “nothing terrible w ill happen 
to you i f  you really are an admirable and good man (icaXxx; icayaGó«;), one who practices 
virtue”  (ácncsív apstf|v, Grg. 527d). As far as Plato is concerned, “ only the virtuous can 
acquire philosophy” ,64 so the two (virtue and philosophy) go hand in hand. By exhorting 
the children to lead their lives with apexfj, he is exhorting them to lead the philosophical 
life. . ■ : ' ■ ,  /  ;; . :
The dead men continue to speak to their survivors through Socrates, encouraging 
them to surpass them in renown (eincAnia, Mx. 247a). In the Republic, when Adeimantus 
and Socrates discuss the education o f  the citizens, they note that once the city is started 
properly, it w ill continue growing in a pattern, since “ good education and upbringing, 
when they are preserved, produce good natures, and useful natures, who are in turn well 
educated, grow up even better than their predecessors, both in their offspring and in other 
respects”  (R. 4.424a-b). The consequence o f  a poor showing by the descendents is 
shame and ¿/^honour, since it is shameful for a man supposing he is something (xi sivai) 
to allow  him self to be honoured not for his own virtue, but for his ancestors’ (Mx. 247b). 
It is this shame that Socrates does not want to fall upon his own sons. In his defense
63 W hile apexi) in this context, com ing from  the mouths o f  the deceased warriors, could 
be interpreted by the audience as military virtue, i.e. bravery, like the application o f  the 
term xciZp;, apsxfj here would imply (philosophical) virtue for the informed Platonic 
reader.
64 Stem 1974: 508.
speech, he exhorts the citizens: “ when my sons grow  up, avenge yourselves by causing 
them the same kind o f  grief that I caused you, i f  you think they care for money or 
anything else more than they care for virtue, or i f  they think they are somebody (xi sivai) 
when they are nobody”  (Ap. 41 e).65 In actuality, Plato has allowed Socrates him self to 
exhort his own sons again66 (should they happen to meet with the Menexenus) by giving
him this address to the children o f  the men who died on behalf o f  Athens.67
/
Socrates continues, now  turning his attention to the parents o f  the war dead. He 
encourages them to bear their grief as easily as possible, by observing the maxim pr|8èv 
ayav (nothing in excess), because the man who depends on himself, and not on other 
people, is wise, courageous, and prudent (Mx. 247c-248a). This Delphic inscription 
provides a basis for the philosophic man according to Plato. For example, in the 
Republic, the decent man is most self-sufficient in living, and has the least need o f  
anyone else. He also w ill be the least likely to give way to lamentations (i.e. is not 
excessive), and he w ill bear his misfortunes most quietly (R. 3.387d-e).68 This man is the
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65 A lso noted by Rosenstock 1994: 340.
Dean-Jones (CQ  1995) sees the Menexenus in the Menexenus to be Socrates’ youngest 
son, and not the Menexenus that is an interlocutor in the Lysis and present in the Phaedo. 
This other ‘ identity’ o f  Socrates’ interlocutor would only be able to be apparent to the 
reader after Socrates describes historical events beyond his execution. I would like to 
believe that Plato would intend these two identities to coexist: on the main level, it is the 
Menexenus o f  the Lysis who Socrates ‘plays’ (itai^stv) with, inserting his philosophical 
ideas, whereas for his son Menexenus (a frame o f  identity behind the main level),
Socrates is more serious, giving direct advice to the son who was but an infant when he 
died.
< * < 7
Plato would have seen Socrates’ death as a death on behalf o f  Athens— he continuously 
worked to improve the souls o f  the citizens, like a gadfly, even though the Athenians 
were too ignorant to understand that his Socratic dialogue was not intended to shame and 
embarrass people, but to bring the participants closer to the “ Good” . Cf. Ap. 38c ff. where 
Plato has Socrates him self describe what fate w ill befall the Athenians follow ing his 
execution.
68 A lso noted by Collins and Stauffer 1999: 111.
type o f  man who does not fear death i f  it is necessary to die in the present moment (Mx. 
248b). Indeed, this man is truly wise, since “ to fear death is no other than to think oneself 
wise when one is not, to think one knows what one does not know. N o one knows 
whether death may not be the greatest o f  all blessings for a man, yet men fear it as i f  they 
knew that it is the greatest o f  evils”  (Ap. 29a-b). Socrates is encouraging the parents o f  
the deceased men to be the epitome o f  the philosophical man expressed elsewhere in 
Plato: he must be moderate, sensible, and wise— to know what he knows, and what he 
does not know.
Having reached the end o f  the dialogue, it is now  clear that the Menexenus cannot 
simply be a parody, nor is it only showing philosophy as necessary for politics (see n.
12). The Menexenus itself uses ‘ inserted’ genre to demonstrate philosophy that can be 
seen elsewhere in the Platonic corpus. Through the links to other dialogues (fourteen 
other dialogues, in fact), the content o f  the Menexenus and othefworks is made clearer,
thus putting the Menexenus squarely in a position o f  a ‘philosophic’ dialogue, and not
\
merely a on e-off departure into the Funeral Oration.
Since the Menexenus does not contain a typical elenchus as many o f  the other 
Platonic dialogues, where the same topics o f  virtue are wont to spur the same 
conclusions, the similar fragments from  the other dialogues occurring in the epitaphios 
are evident as they occur throughout the work. It is especially o f  note that the fragments 
that occur are specific examples o f  com m on themes: the need o f  education, rhetoric, 
nature versus nurture, courage, and virtue. These topics comprise some o f  the themes that 
are explored elsewhere in Socratic/Platonic philosophy. Even when he is working with an
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inserted genre, Plato consciously chooses to write the work specifically making mention 
o f  those topics that are critical to him, and ultimately to the character o f  Socrates. These 
reflections in the Menexenus from  other works in the corpus have, as demonstrated 
above, brought issues o f  the Menexenus into clearer view  in addition to clarifying things 
from  other dialogues. In this way, the Menexenus itself is like Aspasia’ s epitaphios:
partially com posed on the spur o f  the moment, and partially prepared by stringing
/
together bits and pieces from  other dialogues.
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C h a p t e r  Two
The Apology o f  Socrates: Plato as Logographos
In the previous chapter, I examined the Menexenus, and argued that it cannot be 
separated from  the philosophic Platonic corpus as a on e-o ff departure into the genre o f
the epitaphios. In that dialogue, Socrates (and Plato, by extension), is doing something
/
significantly philosophical, and not just rhetorical, by “ inserting”  the Funeral Oration 
genre. In this way, the Menexenus presents a philosophical orator. That is to say that 
Plato presents Socrates as delivering an oration for the sake o f  delivering an oration, but 
Plato simply does not allow his Socrates to deliver it without the typical philosophy that 
is critical to his character. In the Apology o f  Socrates, I argue, we are presented with an 
oratorical (rhetorical) philosopher.1 2In this work, Socrates presents him self as a 
philosopher, asking the jury to accept him speaking in his accustomed manner, since he is 
inexperienced in forensic oratory (axe'/y&q ouv ^svcoc; sx® T'l(5 “ I am
therefore simply a stranger to the manner o f  speaking here” , Ap. 17e). Again, as in the 
Menexenus, Plato has set aside the Socratic interview to present another “ inserted”  genre.
Similarly to the Menexenus, what is presented on the surface does not always hold 
true under scrutiny. The Apology is presented as a work (in the form o f  a speech, since 
for the majority o f  its duration, Socrates does not have an interlocutor) in which Socrates 
represents and defends his entire life ’ s w ork to the Athenians. O f course, Socrates’ life ’ s 
work has been his philosophy, and reality was kind enough to present to Plato an actual 
realm where he could have his literary Socrates explain his beliefs. Socrates claims that
1 “ In the proemium, the orator stands in for the philosopher.”  (Leibowitz 2010:13)
2 A ll translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.
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he will defend him self in his usual way, and indeed he does use a brief elenchus to refute 
Meletus, but is that claim able to hold true in a courtroom speech? Historical events 
aside, why would Plato insert a genre only to deny using it? Some have resolved this 
conflict by simply explaining the defense in the Apology as not to be taken seriously, and 
labeling it a parody.31 believe that Plato has indeed used many topoi and methods o f  the
orators in Socrates’ defense speech.4 Just as philosophy can be found in the Menexenus,
/
so too can strong links to forensic oratory be found in the Apology, in contrast to 
Socrates’ claim that he will speak in his usual way— the way he speaks in the 
marketplace and around the city. Plato, as seen in the Symposium, had a “masterful ability 
to imitate other prose stylists” ,5 67and the defense speech in the Apology has been described 
as a “ rhetorical masterpiece” . The Apology has also been described as a parody, like the 
Menexenus. In the first part o f  this chapter, I w ill argue that Plato has com posed Socrates’ 
defense to be rhetorical. Plato makes use o f  the traditional topoi o f  forensic oratory, and 
even employs specific intertextual parallels with Gorgias’ Defense o f  Palamedes—  
Socrates expresses similar beliefs to Palamedes, and in the same manner. These 
similarities show Plato seeking to fit into a literary tradition o f  written defense speeches. 
After demonstrating the strong oratorical presence in the Apology, I w ill then argue 
against the belief that Socrates has lied about his intentions (with respect to oratory) in 
his defense. Plato has Socrates redefine the terms o f  his engagement with oratory, and
3 Feaver, Douglas D. and John E. Hare. 1981. “The Apology as an Inverted Parody o f
Rhetoric.”  Arethusa 14:205-16. ^
4 Whether o f not Socrates him self used these topoi in his historical speech is beyond the 
scope o f  this work. The fact that Plato used them in his work is sufficient for my thesis.
5 Brickhouse &  Smith 1989: 51.
6 Ober 1998: 168.
7 Burnet 1924: 67, Feaver & Hare 1981: 205.
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therefore Socrates is consistent with his use o f  oratory in the Apology and his discussions 
o f  it elsewhere in the Platonic dialogues. Finally, because Socrates’ use o f  oratory is 
required to communicate with his audience that does not understand his philosophy, I 
argue that the label o f  ‘parody’ cannot be applied, and we are to take Plato’ s use o f  the 
inserted forensic genre as serious.
Although these two dialogues share a particular trait in the inserted genre o f  Attic 
oratory, the Apology8 differs from  the Menexenus in many other aspects. Whereas the 
Menexenus is one o f  the lesser-known works o f  Plato, the Apology has been widely 
studied.8 9 For the purpose and scope o f  this thesis, which does not undertake to make a 
complete and exhaustive study o f  the Apology, but a study o f  specific aspects o f  it, an 
entire survey o f  scholarship on the Apology is not appropriate: a general overview o f  the 
scholarship (with some specific works mentioned) w ill have to suffice.10 For many 
students o f  Ancient Greek, the Apology is one o f  the first texts o f  ‘real Greek’ that they 
encounter, and thus there are simple commentaries with basic grammatical notes.11 There
8 From this point on, I shall refer to the ‘Apology o f  Socrates’ , its full title, as simply the 
Apology.
9 This is not to say that the Apology is any less difficult than the Menexenus to 
understand, just that many more attempts have been made. Nor does it necessarily mean 
that the Apology is any more ‘ clear’ after all the scholarly discussion.
10 For large bibliographies on a variety o f  issues in the Apology, see especially 
Brickhouse & Smith (1989), Socrates on Trial. (For more recent bibliography, see M iller 
& Platter [2009], Plato’s Apology o f  Socrates?)
11A  selected list: Burnet, J. 1924. Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology o f  Socrates, and Crito; 
Helm, James J. 1981. Plato. Apology: Text & Grammatical Commentary, Miller, Paul 
A llen and Charles Platter. 2010. Plato’s Apology o f  Socrates: A Commentary, Riddell, 
James. 1877. The Apology o f  Plato.
are also countless translations, some with minimal or full commentary. Beyond this, 
there are works that present a full analysis o f  the dialogue, generally proceeding in a 
linear fashion through the text,12 34 sometimes also with a full commentary.15 There are also 
monographs that look at the Apology not as a whole, but at specific aspects o f  it, 
collections o f  essays,16 various topical journal articles, and works that use the Apology as
a means to explain Platonic philosophy as a whole, or various aspects o f  the Platonic
/
dialogues.17
There are nearly as many theories about and interpretations o f  the Apology as 
there are publications. Unlike the Menexenus, the Apology has not been questioned on its
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authenticity.18 The uncertain ‘ authenticity’ o f  the speech lies in Plato’ s account o f  it: has
he recorded what Socrates actually said, what he wished Socrates would have said, or, 
like Thucydides’ aim,19 has he written what he remembered and was appropriate to say? 
Plato deliberately tries to create an impression o f  historicity in this dialogue: there are no
. " ' v
12 E.g., Allen, R.E. 1984. The Dialogues o f  Plato (V ol. 1); West, Thomas G. and Grace 
Starry West. 1998. Four Texts on Socrates: P lato’s Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito, and 
Aristophanes ’ Clouds.
13 E.g., Stokes, Michael C. 1997. Plato: Apology o f  Socrates.
14 Brickhouse, Thomas C. and Nicholas D . Smith. 1989. Socrates on Trial, and 2004. 
Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Plato and The Trial o f  Socrates; Leibowitz, David. 
2010. The Ironic Defense o f  Socrates; West, Thomas G. 1979. Plato’s Apology o f  
Socrates: An Interpretation, with a new Translation.
15 Strycker, E. de. 1994. Plato's Apology o f  Socrates: A Literary and Philosophical Study 
with a Running Commentary. (Edited and completed by S.R. Slings).
16 E.g., Reexamining Socrates in the A pology. 2009. Eds. Patricia Fagan and John
Russon.
17 A  selected list: Nightingale, Andrea. 1995. Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the 
Construct o f  Philosophy; Ober, Josiah. 1998. Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: 
Intellectual Critics o f  Popular Rule; Schofield, M alcolm . 2006. Plato: Political 
Philosophy.
18 “ There is virtually universal agreement among scholars that Plato did indeed write the
Apology that has com e down to us under his name”  (Brickhouse &  Smith 1989: 1). 
19Thuc. 1.22
anachronisms (as in the Menexenus), he him self is present at the proceedings (Ap. 34a, 
38b), and it is narrated as direct action20 21(i.e., no ‘ story-within-a-story’ ). Although other
accounts o f  Socrates’ defense (Xenophon, Apology) differ in some aspects, they agree on
}
many main aspects, and other ancient sources seem to accept Plato’ s work as a reliable
account. A.E. Taylor suggests that Plato “revised”  Socrates’ speech as Demosthenes
01
would revise his own before publication, whereas W .K .C. Guthrie argues that i f  Plato
/
did alter the speech, it was to provide a fuller picture o f  “ what he saw in Socrates” , in 
order to defend his life “ as a whole” .22 23M . Schofield com es to the conclusion that I 
believe is the best guiding principle for a study o f  Platonic dialogues (and specifically the 
Apology) from  the aspect o f  Plato as an author :
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“It is obvious... that even if  Plato accurately reproduces the main topics 
covered in their original order, the detailed development each receives and its 
concrete literary and argumentative texture will have been at least as much 
Platonic as Socratic, however faithful to Socrates he intended to be. This is 
what makes it appropriate to treat Apology... as in some sense a crystallization 
o f Platonic reflection on Socrates, not simply Socrates’ self- 
characterization.”24
Other issues o f  debate on the Apology are the use and extent o f  irony in Socrates’
20 Leibowitz 2010: 6.
21 Taylor, A.E. 1960. Plato: The Man and His Work. p. 156
22 Guthrie, W .K .C. 1986. A History o f  Greek Philosophy, vol. 4: Plato: The Man and His 
Dialogues: Earlier Period, pp. 72-80. Leibowitz (2010: 6) adds that perhaps Plato’ s 
desire to defend Socrates made him conceal some o f  what he saw, rather than add more 
detail.
23 I.e., my main intent is not to examine the validity and claims o f  Socratic philosophy, 
but how  Plato went about presenting those claims. The fact that Plato is the author o f  this 
Socratic work is enough to examine my thesis o f  oratory in Plato’ s works.
24 Schofield 2006: 21.
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speeches,25 26how well he defends his charges (and the Delphic Oracle story), the structure 
o f  his speech(es), and how  the Apology can be used to understand other dialogues.
Unlike the funeral oration, forensic oratory cannot claim its roots in the city o f  
Athens. It was the democratic reforms in the fifth century and the democratization o f  the 
legal system that caused a demand for forensic oratory there. As Athens was
characterized by her democracy, and in turn, her system o f  litigation, forensic oratory
/
became therefore characteristic o f  Athens. For an Athenian citizen, it was not enough to 
be able to speak before assemblies (deliberative oratory), since actions taken in the 
political arena could easily find one in the courts, and failing to defend oneself 
successfully could have meant the end o f  a political career. The courts were staffed with 
citizen jurors, who were “ extensions o f  the community at large, sharing the same social 
values as the litigants” .27 In this way, forensic oratory answered a need for the 
democracy, and was always addressed to the democracy.
Aristotle, when classifying the three types o f  oratory (epideictic, deliberative, and 
forensic), distinguishes the three by their addressed audience and by their reXo<;.
V
Deliberative and forensic oratory are addressed to judges, whereas epideictic is addressed 
to spectators (Rhet. 1358b8-13). Deliberative oratory has the “expedient and inexpedient”
25 Leibowitz (2010), as one can tell from  his monograph’ s title (The Ironic Defense o f  
Socrates), believes that irony played a key role in Socrates’ defense, contra see 
Brickhouse &  Smith (1989), who believe that Socrates was earnestly trying to get an 
acquittal, and irony (because o f  its danger o f  being misunderstood) was only used where 
it did not affect the outcome o f  his case.
26 Cooper, Craig. 2007. “Forensic Oratory.”  Pp. 203-219 in ̂ 4 Companion to Greek 
Rhetoric, edited by Ian Worthington, p. 205
27 Idem 204. A lso Dodds (1959: 202): “ Greek juries were very large, and were thought o f  
as representing the whole body o f  citizens in its judicial capacity” . A lso, “juristic silence”  
was not expected in Athenian courts, jurors could voice their (dis)approval, and since 
courts were semi-open spaces, spectators could crowd around and watch the proceedings 
(Cooper 2007: 209); Athenian courts were very transparent.
)
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as its xskoq, forensic has “ the just and the unjust” , and the xskoq o f  epideictic is “ the 
honourable and shameful”  (i?/zeL1358bl3-29). Since forensic oratory was about justice 
and equity, and what is just is the truth, in order to succeed in court the “ truth sometimes 
needed rhetorical assistance” .28 *
Before I proceed to the defense itself, it is important to place Plato’ s 
representation o f  the event in the Apology in its proper historical context, since the
/  29
Apology relates a historical event that actually happened. In May/June 399 BCE, 
Socrates was indicted under a ypatpfj daeJ3eia<; (charge o f  impiety) by Meletus, with the 
support o f  Anytus and Lycon.30 Diogenes Laertius (2.40) has preserved the wording o f  
the indictment: “ This indictment and affidavit is sworn by Meletus, the son o f  Meletus o f  
Pitthos, against Socrates, the son o f  Sophroniscus o f  A lopece: Socrates is guilty o f  
refusing to recognize the gods the state recognizes, and o f  introducing other new 
divinities. He is also guilty o f  corrupting the youth. The penalty demanded is death” .31 32
The trial would have had a preliminary hearing o f  sorts (dvdKptov;) before the or chon 
basileus32 to determine whether the case was fit for trial,33 and both parties would have 
had to take an oath (dvTOopxxria) at the hearing to swear the truth o f  the case.34 Evidently,
28 Idem 214.
Given the inconsistencies and anachronisms o f  the Menexenus, it is not a possibility 
that Plato is relating the funeral oration how  Socrates actually would have told it.
Whether or not Socrates actually recited a funeral oration in a private conversation cannot 
explain why Socrates relates events after his own death.
30 For biographical information on Socrates’ three accusers, see Nails, Debra. 2002. The 
People o f  Plato: A Prosopography o f  Plato and Other Socratics.
31 Transl. Brickhouse &  Smith 1989: 30. For a discussion o f  the indictment, see 
Brickhouse & Smith 1989, pp. 30-36.
32 This is what Plato dramatizes Socrates heading to do in the Euthyphro.
33 Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 24-5.
34 Idem: 42. However, neither party was required to swear an oath in court to tell the truth 
(although Socrates claims he w ill) since peijury only applied to witness testimony. A t the
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Meletus’ indictment met the requirements o f  the av&Kpioiq, and the trial was forwarded 
to the Eliastic court (TlXiala), which heard cases o f  impiety.35 A  jury o f  50036 37was 
assembled and first the prosecutor and then the defendant each presented their cases by 
means o f  timed speeches.38 After the speeches, the jury cast their votes, and Socrates’ 
guilty verdict was announced. The ypa(pt| aosPsia«; was an aytbv xipr|T6<;, which meant
that the law did not have a fixed penalty. Thus, after the verdict was announced ‘ guilty’ , a
/
second stage o f  the trial began with the two parties each presenting competing proposals 
for punishment The jurors voted again on the proposed penalties, and Meletus’ proposal, 
death, prevailed.39 Socrates was taken to the state prison to await execution.40 Under 
normal circumstances, the execution would have been carried out as soon as possible, but 
Socrates’ trial was held in Thargelion (May/June). During this month the Athenians sent
preliminary hearing they were swearing to the truth o f  the charges brought or the 
innocence o f  the charges.
35 Idem: 24. .
36 There has been debate over the number o f  jurors (see Riddelhl877, introduction). 
Often an odd number (501) has been believed, but that odd number appears to be derived 
from  a system o f  jury selection from  later in the fourth century (Brickhouse & Smith 
1989:26: “ A ll we know ...is that Socrates addressed a sizable number o f  jurors.... Other 
sources give us other information, but attempts to render all such information consistent 
seem doom ed to fail” ).
37 Jurors were paid 3 obols per day, a low  rate compared to what an ‘ able-bodied’ man 
could earn in a day (approximately 1 drachma). This allowed for a fair representation in 
the jury o f  poorer citizens, but it also made a disproportionate representation o f  age 
groups: many men who volunteered for jury duty were old and no longer able to work (a 
sort o f  “ old age pension” , Brickhouse &  Smith 1989:26-7).
38 Ober 1998: 165.
39 Idem 165-66. It was rare for ypacpai to end in the death penalty; monetary fines o f  
various amounts, such as Socrates proposed, were more normal (Ober 1998:166 n.21). 
For a discussion o f  Socrates’ proposed counter-penalty o f  30 minas, see Brickhouse & 
Smith (1998: 226-230). Although some scholars have wrongly suggested that 30 minas 
was a relatively small sum (estimating its value by the current price o f  silver), in truth, 
the sum Socrates proposes would have equaled eight and a half years’ wages for a skilled 
artisan (1 drachma/day).
40 Plato places the Crito and Phaedo in this waiting period. The Phaedo ends with the 
death o f  Socrates.
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the sacred “ ship o f  Theseus”  to Delos (Phd. 58a-b), and execution in the city was 
forbidden until its return.41 And so, about a month after his trial, Socrates was executed 
by drinking hemlock.
Plato has Socrates present the two speeches that the litigation demands, his 
defense (Ap. 17a-35d), his dvraipTicng (Ap. 35e-38b), as well as a third speech (Ap.38c-
42a), which Socrates delivers to the jury before he is led away to prison. As mentioned
/
above, there is no framing dialogue to the Apology. It begins after the prosecutors have 
finished their speech. Socrates notes that they spoke persuasively, but not truthfully. He 
begs the jury to accept him speaking in his accustomed manner (i.e., not in the high 
rhetorical style o f  his opponents), and says that he w ill speak “ the whole truth”  (rcaaav 
xfjv dXfjGexav), and they, the jury, must judge according to the truth (Ap. 17a-18a). 
Socrates defends him self against the charges in two parts: first against his “ first”  
accusers,42 the slanders and misconceptions that have been attached to him for a long 
time, and then the charges at hand brought by Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon, the later 
accusers. His defense against the first accusers (Ap. 18e-24b) includes his denial o f  
natural philosophy (he is not the ‘ Socrates’ in the Clouds43), his denial that he is a sophist
41 Nails 2002: 322.
42 One must note that the slanders from  these accusers are not technically in the 
indictment brought by Meletus, but that for Socrates, these slanders are the source o f  the 
charges o f  the “ second”  accusers. He must dispel these preconceived notions so that the 
jury may judge him impartially and understand from  where the later charges arise.
43 As regards the “ first”  or “ earlier”  accusers, Socrates notes that one cannot even charge 
anyone specifically for these long-standing slanders, unless he happens to be a writer o f  
com edies (im plying Aristophanes, Ap. 18c-d). He also later specifically mentions 
Aristophanes’ character Socrates from  the Clouds', xauxa yap ¿copaxe Kai auxoi sv xfj 
Apioxocpavoxx; KcoprobiQt, ScoKpdxq xiva eksi rcepiipepopevov, cpdcncovxd xs aepo|3axeiv Kai 
dAlr|v rcoXlfiv (pXuapiav (pXuapouvxa, wv syro oubev ouxs peya obxe apixpov rcspi sjiaTm. 
(“For you yourselves have seen these things in the com edy o f  Aristophanes, some
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(he does not take money, nor teach virtue), his admission o f  “human”  wisdom, the 
Delphic oracle tale, and his interrogation/refutation o f  politicians, poets, and craftsmen, 
all o f  which explain why he is hated, why the youth follow  him (they enjoy hearing 
people questioned), and where Meletus’ charges arise from. His defense against the later 
accusers (Ap. 24b-34b) includes an elenchus refutation o f  Meletus,44 an imagined
questioning (“ someone might say...” ), the benefits o f  Socratic philosophy (gadfly
/
analogy), the explanation o f  his Saipdviov, an account o f  his service for the Athenians 
and reasons why he is not in politics, and his denial that he is a teacher o f  anyone, all o f  
which are designed to show that he has led a dangerous way o f  life in service to the god 
(and therefore is extremely pious), that he is not the type o f  man Meletus presents him to 
be, and that he has been continually working for the benefit o f  Athens and her citizens. 
He concludes his defense with a refusal to beg, supplicate, or seek the jurors’ pity in 
order to secure an acquittal (Ap. 34b-35d). The avTmjj.r|oi<; begins with Socrates 
expressing his surprise that the margin o f  votes for conviction Was so close to acquittal. 
He at first proposes his ‘punishment’ to be meals in the Prytaneum (Ap. 36d-e), since he 
has spent his life in service to Athens. He dismisses exile as a possibility for punishment, 
since he would simply go elsewhere, perform his philosophy, and be met with the same 
reaction as in Athens (trial), and at first proposes a fine o f  one mina, before Plato, Crito, 
Critobulus, and Apollodorus bid him to raise his proposal to thirty minas. At last, after he 
has been condemned to death, Socrates addresses his third speech to the jury. At first he 
addresses those who voted for his death (Ap. 39c-d), saying that they may be rid o f  him,
Socrates being carried about there, saying that he was walking on air and talking a lot o f  
other nonsense about things o f  which I know nothing at all.”  Ap. 19c.)
44 Not only is Plato inserting the genre o f  forensic oratory into his Socratic dialogues, but 
he inserts a Socratic dialogue into forensic oratory!
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but there w ill be more people to test them. He then addresses those who voted for his 
acquittal, calling them friends (Ap. 39e-41c), saying that death (since it is unknown) is 
not to be feared— perhaps he w ill find him self in the afterlife, being able to converse with 
great men o f  myth. A t last he exhorts the jury to care for his children (41 d-42a), spurring 
them to virtue as he has Athens, before he is led away.
What counted as rhetorical in forensic speeches? A s with the funeral oration,
/
there were specific stylistic methods and topoi that were expected by the audience. 
Traditionally, ancient speeches were divided into four parts.45 The introduction 
(7tpooipiov) should set out the matter at hand, seize the attention o f  the audience, and 
secure its goodw ill. The narrative (8ifjyri<TK;) should display the speaker’ s version o f  
events clearly and persuasively. The p roof (7cioTu;) should give witness to the narrative,
i
and the epilogue (sjr&oyoi;) should summarize the argument and make an emotional 
appeal to the audience.46 Many speeches o f  Attic oratory deviate from this four-part 
structure, e.g., the narrative is sometimes combined with the arguments (7ticm<;),47 but the
techniques and topoi for each section consistently occur— even in Socrates’ defense.48
\
The Apology's first speech, Socrates’ defense speech proper, can be roughly divided into 
these categories49: introduction, 17a-18a; (proposition 18a-19a); two-part narrative, (old
45 In the Phaedrus (266d-267d), there are also 4 parts: introduction, narrative, proof, and 
recapitulation (¿7tdvo8oc;).
46 de Brauw, Michael. 2007. “ The Parts o f  the Speech.”  Pp. 187-202 in A Companion to 
Greek Rhetoric, edited by Ian Worthington, p. 187. De Brauw further notes: “ The 
scheme... is best suited to judicial speaking.”
47 Idem: 193,199.
48 This is not to say that Socrates’ entire speech is rhetorical, but that from time to time he 
uses these commonplaces, contrary to his claim to speak in his usual fashion.
49 Other divisions see: Burnet 1924: 66-149, Strycker 1994:22-24.
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accusers) 19a-24b, (new accusers) 24b-28a50; proof (digression), 28b-34b; epilogue, 34b- 
35d. ■ . : 1 - ■- . ■ ' : . - i -
The Jtpooi juov is perhaps associated with most o f  the rhetorical topoi.51  523Here we 
find speakers flattering the jury, claim ing their inexperience or ineptitude as a speaker, 
their disadvantages from  status (age, poverty) or character, their opponent’ s advantages 
(preparation, cleverness, lack o f  danger), giving motives to their opponent, and
52 /emotionally appealing to the jury. Indeed, we do see some o f  these topoi in Socrates’ 
introduction. He notes the advantage that his opponents have in their persuasive speech 
(outod jnGavmg skeyov, “ they spoke so persuasively” , Ap. 17a3) and high tones 
(KeKaAli£7cr| pevouq koyou«;. ..prjpaoi te Kai ovopacnv KEKoaptipsvouq, “ using high 
language...stylizing with phrases and words” , 17b9-c2), and his disadvantage due to his 
age (err) ysyovdx; ¿pSopfiKovra, “being at the age o f  seventy” , 17d2). Although Socrates’ 
refusal to deviate from his standard methods is seen elsewhere, and is characteristic o f  
him, here his request for the indulgence o f  the jury to tolerate his usual speech (sav 8ia 
tc5v am&v Xoyov aKOutyts pou a7iokoyoupevou...pfixe Oaupa^eiv prjTS OopuPeiv, “ i f  you
v
hear me defending m yself in the same w ords.. .do not be surprised or raise a ruckus” , 
17c7-dl) is also a standard topos o f  the rcpooipiov. W hile Socrates does not flatter the 
jury, or appeal to them emotionally, he does ask that they give him a fair hearing, and 
judge based on the truth o f  the matter (Ap. 18a3-5).
50 Socrates at times blurs his narrative and proof.
51 de Brauw 2007:192.
52 Usher, Stephen. 1999. Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality, pp. 22-23
53 E.g., Socrates insists on his elenctic style o f  discussion rather than paxpokoyia with 
Protagoras (Prt. 335b-c), Gorgias (Grg. 449c), and Polus (Grg. 461d-462a).
These topoi, so critical to the orators, have been recognized by scholars before in 
the 7ipooijj,iov o f  the Apology. Riddell notes the links, saying in his introduction that the 
Apology “may be completely paralleled, piece by piece, from  the Orators” ,54 but we do 
see that Socrates has refused other commonplaces o f  the Orators (e.g. the emotional 
appeals) seen elsewhere. These links spur Burnet to conclude that the introduction is a
parody, and Socrates’ disclaimer o f  knowledge o f  forensic oratory is a piece o f  Socratic
/
irony, “ to be taken cum grano salis” , since Socrates would naturally use the orators’ own 
topoi to m ock them.55 Other scholars have inferred from  the 7tpooipiov that the entire 
speech is a parody.56 However, even though the similarities exist between the Platonic 
work and the inserted genre, it does not necessarily follow  that Plato intended to write a 
parody. To simply categorize the Apology as a parody o f  a forensic defense would be to 
do it the same disservice as those scholars who have dismissed the Menexenus as a 
simple parody on the funeral oration. A fter all, “ parodies cannot be so close as to be 
indistinguishable from what they parody” .57 And again, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, while Plato may intend to parody or criticize the inserted genres, he “ remains 
open to the possibility that a genre may in fact make a positive contribution to the 
philosopher’ s enterprise.” 58 What, i f  any, benefit oratory has for the philosopher’ s 
enterprise w ill be examined in the final chapter o f  this thesis. For now, however, it must
47
54 Riddell 1877: xxi.
55 Burnet 1924: 67.
56 Feaver &  Hare 1981:205. Specifically, a “parody inverted. For whereas parody is 
usually a lesser piece than its object, in this case Socrates intends his speech to succeed in 
a way that no traditional piece o f  rhetoric could ever do.”
57 Brickhouse &  Smith 1989: 51.
58 Nightingale 1995:12.
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be noted that the npoolpiov o f  the Apology, with its traditional rhetorical topoi, is neither 
straightforward nor necessarily merely parodie.
After the 7tpooipiov, Socrates inserts a proposition (Ap. 18a-19a), a section not
normally included in the traditional theoretical sections o f  a speech. However, Lysias,
Isaeus, and Demosthenes used the proposition relatively frequently. Its function was a
type o f  partition between the introduction and narration. It is generally short (no more
than ten lines), but it can be longer.59 The proposition (rcpôOecnç) should state the case
that the speaker w ill attempt to prove.60 Here Socrates says that he w ill defend him self in
two parts, first against the earlier accusers, and then against the current accusers:
Sixxouç pou xoî>ç KaxTiyôpouç yeyovévai, éxépouç (xév xoùç apxi 
KaTTiyopfjaavxaç, éxépouç 8è xoi>ç îcàA,ai ouç èya> Xéya), ical oifi&rixe Seïv 7tpôç 
sksîvouç Jipwxôv pg à7toXoYiiaaa0av
My accusers are o f two kinds: those accusing me now, and those who have 
been accusing me for a long time, which I mention, and I think it fit to defend 
myself first against the latter. (Ap. 18d-e)
After the proposition, Socrates proceeds to his narration (Ap. 19a-28a), in which 
he often mixes his proofs. The “narrative”  is typically a “ continuous, discrete narrative” , 
which is often introduced by a “ formulaic transition sentence”  (e.g., T wish to recount 
these matters from  the beginning’ ), and then begins with the particle yap.61 Indeed, this is 
just how  Socrates begins his narrative: àvotXdp©pev ouv êÇ àpxfiçtîç f| Karnyopia 
eariv... (19a8), but he substitutes ouv for yap. For Aristotle, the narration should deal 
with the interpretation o f  the facts (since the prosecutors will have already displayed the
59 Strycker 1994: 44-5.
60 Idem 43. The proposition is a sort o f  metadiscursive feature, which is not unlike many 
Socratic dialogues, where Socrates discusses with his interlocutors about how they should 
ask/answer questions (e.g., Grg. 449b-c). This feature would also serve a practical role in 
assisting the jury to follow  along with the defense speech.
61 de Brauw 2007: 193.
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“ facts” ) while displaying the speaker’ s moral character (rj0o<;) and his moral purpose 
(rcpoaipeou;), since the “ quality o f  the purpose determines the quality o f  character” .62 63For 
Isocrates, the narration should tell the event, to  7tpaypa, what preceded it, xa 7ipo xou 
Ttpaypaxo«;, and what follow ed it xa pnxa xo npaypa, and make the intention o f  the 
parties’ actions clear. Socrates’ narration conform s to this Isocratean pattern, rather than
the style o f  narration in the Orators.64 Socrates makes his refutation o f  those reputed to be
/
wise his ‘ event’ , the Delphic oracle is ‘what preceded it’ , and the slander, hatred, and 
misconceptions o f  the Athenians is ‘what follow ed it’ . The way that Socrates reports his 
actions is intended to lead the jury to think that his actions must have been as he says, 
since that is the kind o f  person he is— likewise he must be that kind o f  person because his 
actions prove it. In this way, “ the narrative functions as a form  o f  p roof in and o f  itse lf’ .65
This is why the p roof (7riaxiq) seems to overlap with the narrative.66 Socrates’ 
digression (Ap. 28b-34b) is indeed further proof for his argument. It is in this section that 
he explains his actions (“ I exhort people to care for their soul” ),''he explains how his 
8aipow ov is his reason for leading a private life, and gives an account o f  his personal 
actions. These all conform  to the two species o f  p roof in oratory: biographical p roof and 
character types.67 Socrates is using his biographical account to give o ff  an impression o f  
his character. Socrates also uses proofs in the forms o f  “ argument/argumentative
62 Strycker 1994: 59 (Arist. Rhet. 1417a). Interestingly, after Aristotle makes this 
assertion, he cites the Socratic dialogues as an example that depicts character, since they 
are concerned with moral questions (1417al9-23).
63 Idem: 60.
64 Ibid.
65 de Brauw 2007:195.
66 Ibid.: “ The means o f  persuasion that rhetoricians describe as pistéis, such as arguments 
from probability or citations o f  documents, do indeed cluster in the proof section. But 




formulae”  and “ figures o f  thought”  which are typical in Greek oratory. He uses a 
dilemmaton68 9 argument when he is examining Meletus and he comes to the refutation: 
“ either I do not corrupt [the young], or i f  I do it is unwillingly, so that you are lying in 
either case”  (aXk' ij ou 8ia«p0eipca fj, si SiacpGeipco, aiccov, (Sots ou ye Kax’ apxpoxspa 
\|/su8p, 25e6-26a2). In this conclusion, Socrates also somewhat uses a reductio ad
absurdum, since it would be ridiculous (ignorant) for Socrates to harm one o f  his
/
associates deliberately. O f course, the refutation itself is an interrogation, which is 
another form  o f  argumentative proof. From the interview, Socrates shows that Meletus is 
uPpumiq Kdi aKokaoToq, wanton and licentious, and that he brought his indictment out o f  
“ insolence, intemperance, and youthful folly ”  (26e-27a). Therefore, his charges cannot be 
trusted or taken seriously. In addition, Socrates uses “ figures o f  thought”  proofs, such as 
rhetorical questions (e.g. 28d, |xtj auxov [Achilles]70 oisi (ppovxioat Gavaxou xai 
kivSuvou; “ do you think he gave thought to death and danger?” ) and a question and 
answer o f  his own (28b, icon; 8 ’ av oov eutoi xiq..., “ perhaps then, someone would 
sa y ...” ).71 W hile Socrates does avail him self o f  his usual method o f  proof and
68 Idem: 24-5.
69 A  dilemmaton ( ‘ double-catch’ ) argument presents “ two conditions, one o f  which must 
be fulfilled, though the fulfillment o f  either is bad for the speaker or his opponent”  (Usher 
1999: 365). He gives the example o f  Tisias and Corax: Tisias would pay Corax, his 
oratory teacher, for his fees after his first successful case, but then refused to do so. Corax 
brought a case against him, and argued that i f  Tisias managed to persuade the jury, he 
would be absolved from  payment, and i f  he failed to persuade them, Corax’ s teaching 
would have been proven useless, and then no fee was due (1999: 3).
70 The Achilles reference is itself a paradeigma (“ example or precedent, usually 
historical, to illustrate or justify an argument” , Usher 1997: 366).
71 In his counterproposal for punishment, Socrates uses another rhetorical form o f  
argumentative proof: a “pathetic paradox” . This is Usher’ s original term for an argument 
that com bines emotion and logic. E.g., “ is it not (would it not be) shocking (shameful, 
terrible, absurd) if, when X , which is undesirable, is not allowed to happen, Y , which is 
far more undesirable, is allowed to happen?”  (1999: 367). Cf. Ap. 37e-38a, where
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refutation,72 73the Socratic interview, in his narration and p roof he also employs the 
typically rhetorical methods o f  refutation, thus showing that he is capable o f  using styles 
o f  refutation more suited to forensic oratory.
The epilogue (¿7ri^oyoq), according to Aristotle, has four functions: to earn the 
favour o f  the audience (and turn the audience against one’ s opponent), to magnify or
minimize the facts, to rouse up the emotions (7cd0t|) o f  the audience, and (most
/  73
importantly) to recapitulate the main points o f  the speech (Rhet. 1419M 0-13). Although 
Socrates has used rhetorical techniques through the rest o f  his defense, his £7iiA,oyo<; (Ap. 
34b-35d) does not aim to do any o f  the functions listed by Aristotle, although he may 
inadvertently have achieved one function. Socrates does not seek to gain the favour o f  the 
jury, since they should not be relying on favour to determine their verdict: “He 
[individual juror] swore not to grant justice as a favour to those who seem good to him, 
but to judge according to the laws.”  (icai opropoKsv on xdpisiaOai olq av 8oicfi aura», akXa 
Sncaaeiv Kara xouq vopoug, 35c). He does not attempt to maximize, minimize, or even
recapitulate the facts. Instead, he spends his epilogue denouncing those who try to rouse
\
the emotions o f  the jury by weeping or bringing his family and friends into court to rouse
Socrates is explaining that exile is not a possibility for him: i f  it is impossible for him to 
remain in Athens and keep quiet (i.e. not philosophize), how could he possibly go to 
another city and not philosophize?
72 This small example o f  the Socratic interview itself could be interpreted as a piece o f  
evidence displayed to the jurors, to show what it is that he professes to do.
73 De Brauw notes that epilogues are not always this succinct in reality: emotional 
appeals are not always limited to the end o f  the speech and the length o f  the epilogue is 
not always proportional to the speech (2007:198).
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pity.74 756*Indeed, since this was a typical feature o f  the courts, his refusal to follow  the 
traditional trope may have aroused the emotions o f  the jury against him.
This rhetorical analysis o f  Socrates’ defense speech in the Apology shows that 
Plato did have his Socrates include the traditional topoi o f  forensic oratory in his 
deliverance. However, we are also able to read a certain intertextuality or allusion with 
another defense speech. Gorgias’ Defense o f  Palamedes,15 a hypothetical defense speech 
for the wrongfully condemned Homeric hero, provided potential students with a series 
o f  good legal arguments. There are elements o f  the Palamedes that are similar to the 
Apology. I f  allusions to the Palamedes can be established, we can gain a greater 
understanding o f  how Plato intended Socrates’ defense to be read. I believe a significant 
reason why the Palamedes was targeted for allusion is because it is a literary (that is, 
written) defense speech, as Plato’ s Apology is. Plato then attaches him self to this 
(relatively new)79 literary tradition and one o f  the most famous orators in fifth-century 
Athens (albeit that he was a ‘ flattering’ orator). These allusions'are not intended as
74 But he does acknowledge that he has a family with young children while denying that 
he w ill seek the pity o f  the jurors. Could this not be a minor form o f  praeteritiol
75 This is one o f  the two works by Gorgias that are extant in their entirety (the other being 
the Helen). They have been transmitted in the Attic dialect, but that is most likely due to 
an Athenian editor or transcriber (Usher 1999:4-5). Scholars generally accept these works 
as Gorgias’ own. The Greek text used is Gorgias, Frag. 1 la , Diels-Kranz (Pre-Socratic 
Philosophers).
76 For the story o f  Palamedes, see [Apollodorus], Epitome 3.7-8, Hyginus, Fabulae 105, 
Vergil, Aeneid 2.81-85.
77 Cooper 2007:204. Cooper notes that technically the Defense o f  Palamedes was an 
epideictic speech.
7® From here forward, I shall refer to the "Defense o f  Palamedes' as simply ‘Palamedes'.
79 Cf. Introduction on the relation o f  oratory in the noXu; and the advent o f  writing.
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parody, or critique, but are meant in earnest by Plato, who, at the start o f  his career, is 
seeking to fit into a tradition o f  works o f  literary discourse.
I w ill not proceed through all the noted similarities to the Palamedes, but I w ill 
note ten allusions. The first is that Palamedes also makes a m ove in his speech that would 
have the potential to work w ell in his favour, were it not for prejudices against him. He
calls the jury as witnesses to his claims, since they know his past life: “ That I am telling
/
the truth, I present my past life as a witness, and to this you yourselves can be witnesses.”  
(cog 8 ’&A,r|0fi Ley©, papxupa 7Uc t 6v  rcape^opai xov 7tapoi%opevov ptov- X© 8e papxopi 
papxupeg bpeig qxe, Pal. 15). Likewise, Socrates calls the jury to be witnesses to the fact 
that he does not discuss the things that the Socrates o f  the Clouds does (papxupag 8s 
among bpcov xong 7ioLLoi>g itapexopai, “ I present the majority o f  you as witnesses,”  Ap. 
19d). A lso with respect to witnesses, both men challenge their accusers to bring forward 
witnesses against them.80 12 This m ove would likely be detrimental to their respective cases,
v
80 Calogero (1957) believes that these similarities show Socrates’ debt to Gorgias as a 
teacher (which I find baffling), Coulter (1964) believes Socrates is rejecting Gorgianic 
oratory, Seeskin (1982) is convinced that Plato is parodying Gorgias. However, (as will 
be argued below ), Socrates has redefined the terms o f  his use o f  oratory, and he is using 
the Palamedes in support o f  his defense. Since the Apology is one o f  Plato’ s first works, 
i f  not the very first, I believe it would make sense for Plato to look for examples o f  his 
intention (a written defense speech on behalf o f  a wrongly accused man), and make use 
o f  them in accordance with his beliefs.
81 For other surveys see: Calogero, C. 1957. “ Gorgias and the Socratic Principle Nemo 
suasponte peccatP JHS 77 :12-17 ; Coulter, J.A. 1964. “ The Relation o f  the Apology o f  
Socrates to Gorgias’ Defense o f  Palamedes and Plato’ s Critique o f  Gorgianic Rhetoric.”  
HSPh 68:269-303; Seeskin, K. 1982. “ Is the A pology o f  Socrates a Parody?”  PhilLit 6: 
94-105; Feaver &  Hare 1981.
82 Ei 8e xou pexexovxog aKoucag, oaxtg eaxiv, auxog eL0ex©, (pavfjx©, papxupqaax©. 
7naxoxepov yap oux©g saxai xo Kaxqyopripa papxopqGev (“But i f  you heard [the facts] 
from  a collaborator, who is he— let him com e forward, reveal himself, and bear witness. 
For the charge w ill be more credible i f  there is a witness.”  Pal. 22); Kai aLLoug TtoXkotq 
ey© ex© upiv eksTv, ©v xiva expfiv paLiaxa pev ev xfij eauxou Adycp mpaa%eaQai 
MeA,rixov papxupa- ei 8e xoxe e7ieXa0exo, vuv rcapaoxsaO© (“And I can name many
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were they not both telling the truth.
A s to the charges at hand, both men find issue with the accusation itself, and how 
they must go about defending it. That is, both Socrates and Palamedes find that the 
charge their respective accusers bring is self-contradictory, and present the logic, 
Palamedes by hypothetical questions, Socrates by elenctic refutation, that proves it. 
Palamedes puts the contradiction clearly: Kaxr|yôpr|aaç 8é pou 8ià xœv sipqpévœv Xôyav
/
8uo xà évavxubxaxa, aocpiav Kai paviav, ©7tsp où% oîov xe xôv aûxôv àv0pamov s^siv (“ In
the proceeding speech, you have accused me o f  two most contradictory things: wisdom  
and madness, both which the same man is not able to have.”  Pal. 25). After his 
hypothetical questioning, he concludes: oukouv 8T ap<poxspa av sirjg v|/st>8fj<;
(“ Therefore, you are wrong on both counts.”  Pa/. 26). Socrates, as so often in his other
refutations o f  interlocutors in other dialogues, states that there is a contradiction before he 
proves it through the elenchus. Here he tells the jury: ouxoç yàp êpoi çaivsxai xà évavxia 
Xsysiv aùxôç éaoxâ> év xfj ypacpfj (“ For he seems to me to be saying self-contradictory
statements in the indictment.”  Ap. 27a). Socrates too concludes that his accuser is simply 
wrong.83 On defending the charges at hand, both men also plead for more time, since in 
the little time allotted they are not able to sufficiently persuade the jury o f  their 
innocence.84
others, some o f  whom surely Meletus ought to have brought in as a witness in his own 
speech. But i f  he forgot to do so then, let him bring the witness forward now.”  Ap. 34a).
83 IQg psv sycb ouk dSucfij Kaxa xqv MeXqxoo ypatpfjv, ou 7toMijg poi 8ok£i eivai 
&7toXoyiag (“ It does not seem to me to require an extended defense to prove that I am not 
in the wrong according to Meletus’ charge,”  Ap. 28a.)
84 xo psv ocopa xoupov cpuXd^axe, xov 8s 7iXsi© ypovov smpsivaxs, psxa 8s xfjg dXt|0siag 
xrjv Kpicnv 7toifjoaxs (Put a guard on m y body, wait a longer time, and make the
judgement on the basis o f  truth), Pal. 35; stisî, èq  sycppat, si rjv upiv vôpoç, ©arcsp Kai 
aAloiç àv0p©7toiç, 7cspi 0avàxon pfj piav fipspav pôvov Kpivsiv àKkà noXkaq, £7csia0rixs
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Both speakers, in trying to show their character (a rhetorical topos o f  gaining the 
trust o f  one’ s audience), profess similar beliefs. Both Socrates and Palamedes claim 
apexrj is the source o f  good things for mankind. For Palamedes, dpsxf| brings about 
honour (which would be the best thing in an honour-focused society and culture): an 
dpsxfjg yap ook cord KaKoxqxoq ai xipai (“ For honours com e from  virtue, not from
wickedness.”  Pal. 16). Socrates is a bit more general, in that virtue brings ypripaxa Kai xa
/
aXka ayaOa xoiq dvGpoimoic; ajtavxa Kai i8ia Kai 8r|poai^ (“money and all other good 
things for men both privately and publicly,” 85 86Ap. 30b). Both men also profess their belief 
in obeying commands. For Palamedes, he says he does what is commanded, obeying 
those who are in power (rcotcov xo xaoaopsvov, 7tei0o|xevo<; xotc; apxoocnv, Pal. 32), for 
Socrates, a man must remain in the position he thinks best or has been commanded to 
hold, without considering any risks or the chance for death (Ap. 28d). One o f  Socrates’ 
most quoted beliefs from the Apology (6 8e ave^exaaxog pioq on Picoxdq avGpdmcp, “ The 
unexamined87 life is not worth living for a man,”  3 8a) is also paralleled by Palamedes.88 
For Palamedes, (Mo<; 8e on Piooxoq maxscoq eoxepripevtp (“ Life is not worth living for the
av- vuv 8 ’ od pqSiov ev xpovtp 6Xiyq> peyaXac; Siapolaq d7roXoea0ai (Since, as I suppose, 
i f  we had a law on capital cases, just as many other men do, that they are not decided in 
one day but many, you would be persuaded. But now, as it is, it is not easy to refute great 
slanders in only a little time), Ap. 37a-b. (A lso noted by Feaver &  Hare 1981: 208, 
Seeskin 1982: 97.)
85 Or, alternatively: “ virtue makes wealth and everything else good for men, both 
individually and collectively.”  Trans. G .M .A. Grube. (In [ed.] Cooper, John M . 1997. 
Plato: Complete Works.)
86 (on av xi<; eanxov xd£p i|yr|odpsvo<; PeXxiaxov eivai q w t’dpxovxoq xa^Gfi, evxahGa Set, 
raq epoi 8okeT, pevovxa iav8nveneiv, pqSev n7toXoyi^opevov pfjxe Gavaxov pfjxs aKko 
pt|8ev jrpo xoh aiaxpou.) Although this b elie f holds true for Socrates at Potidaea, 
Am phipolis, and Delium, and for his insistence on being true to his philosophy no matter 
the situation, he notes that he does not obey the oligarchs (read: oi apxpvxeg) when they 
commanded him to take Leon into custody (32c-d).
87 Meaning, a life without elenctic refutation.
88 A lso noted by Feaver & Hare 1981: 208.
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one who has lost his credibility.”  Pal. 21).89 Thus, not only does Plato show Socrates 
expressing some o f  the same beliefs as Gorgias has Palamedes express, but they express 
them in similar ways.90
Furthermore, Palamedes and Socrates have some similarities in the way they 
present the potential outcome o f  their trials to the jurors. Both men, after styling
themselves as suepysxai for their fellow  countrymen (Pal. 30, Ap. 36c-d), proceed to
/
claim that i f  they are convicted, it w ill harm the reputation o f  those who condemned 
them.91 92Palamedes notes that, “ for [the jurymen] who appear unjust, there is a great 
danger o f  losing their reputation (So^a) and acquiring another” , and says, “ i f  you kill 
me unjustly, it w ill becom e known to many; for I am not unknown, and your wickedness
89 In his commentary, Strycker (1994: 374-5) does not think that this link is significant at 
all (or the majority o f  similarities found between the Apology and Palamedes). He argues: 
“ i f  [Palamedes] had been a traitor to the Greeks, his life would have been ruined.... The 
sentence in the Apology means something quite different: it is a concise formulation o f  
the Socratic ¿TaxfiSsupa as set out in the whole o f  the Apology. The passage from  the 
Palamedes is one o f  the numerous arguments attesting to the defendant’ s innocence; it 
has nothing to do with Palamedes’ conception o f  life ...” . W hile I understand the point 
Strycker is making, here I believe the similarity is significant. It is the loss o f  the greatest 
personal value for each man (for Palamedes, honour; for Socrates, philosophy arid 
refutation) that makes life not worth living. Strycker thus ignores the reference to 
philosophy, when Plato is having Socrates say something substantive, but in the fashion 
o f  oratory.
90 Seeskin (1982: 97) sees Palamedes also exhibiting the “ Socratic Paradox”  ( ‘no one 
willingly does evil’ , Ap. 25d-e), when he says “ ouSeig yap PouXexai itpoiKa xorig 
peyiaxoug KivSuvoug KivSuveuetv ouSs xfjv peyiaxr[v KaKoxr|xa etvai Kaiaaxog”  (Pal. 13). 
However, this point o f  comparison runs backwards in time, since certainly we cannot 
credit Gorgias with the innovation o f  one o f  Socrates’ oddest beliefs. This belief for 
Socrates (or, perhaps more correctly, for Plato) com es proven though dialectical 
refutation (cf. Socrates’ and Polus’ discussion in the Gorgias, 461 b-48lb).
91 A lso noted by Feaver & Hare 1981: 208 and Seeskin 1982:97.
92 'YpTv psv yap peyag 6 idvSovog, aSixoig (paveim 8o^av xqv gsv KaxapaMv, xfiv 8e 
KxaaaaOai (Pal. 35).
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will be w ell known and conspicuous to all the Greeks” .93 Socrates also prophesies (after 
his condemnation to death) that the Athenians w ill gain ill fame (ovopa) and guilt (avria) 
for having sentenced him to death.94 It is interesting that with these statements, both 
Socrates and Palamedes imply that it is their fate that can control the reputation o f  all 
Athens or Greece. In addition to this response to the jurors, the two characters also deny 
something that was characteristic o f  courtroom defenses. Both men forego any emotional 
appeals,95 since they feel it is not proper to persuade the jury by anything other than the 
truth o f  the case. Palamedes notes that he w ill rely upon the clearest justice, and avoid the 
charge by means o f  the truth alone, and not deception.96 97Likewise, when Socrates begins 
his case, he notes that he w ill speak all the truth (upsTq 8s poo otKouosaGs Ttaaav xriv 
aArjGeiav, Ap. 17b), since he believes that what he says is just (mcxeu© yap Sucaia stvai a 
Xtfd), Ap. 17c). A ll o f  these allusions are difficult to discount as nothing, especially when 
some (such as the refusal to see the jurors’ pity) are fairly unique to the Palamedes and 
Apology.97 v
93 ’Eav 8b aSiKcog diroKxeivrjxe ps, 7toM.oic; yevrjoexai rpavepov- ey© xs yap <ouk> ayvdx;, 
uucov xs 7tacnv "EX^qai yv©pipo<; f| KaKoxn? Kai tpavepa (Pal. 36).
94 'O vopa s^sxs Kai aixiav xmo x©v PouXopsvcov Tqv TtoXtv XoiSopsTv dx; E©Kpaxr| 
&7teKxovaxs (Ap. 38c).
95 Pal. 33, Ap 34b-35c.
96 Kklh xtp aacpsaxaxq) SiKaicp, 8i8a^avxa xdA,riGŝ  ouk a3taxfiaavxd ps 5si SiatpuysTv xijv 
aixiav xauxqv (But it is necessary for me to escape this charge by relying on the clearest 
justice, explaining the truth, not by deception. Pal. 33).
97 In turn, it seems that Isocrates borrows from  the Apology in his Antidosis, but that is 
outside the scope o f  this thesis. For discussions o f  the Antidosis, see Nightingale 1995 
(Chapter 1: “ Plato, Isocrates, and the property o f  philosophy” ) pp. 13-59, and Allen, R.E. 
1980. Socrates and Legal Obligation, pp. 33-6.
So what do we make o f  these allusions? When Socrates mentions Palamedes98 9as 
another wrongfully convicted soul at the end o f  his third speech (Ap. 41b), is Plato trying 
to signal to the jury (and readers) what he has referenced throughout his speech?" Plato 
treated Gorgias as the “fans et origo o f  the influence o f  rhetoric on his 
contemporaries” ,100 and Plato is no stranger to alluding to or even quoting other 
authors.101 1023A s mentioned above, these allusions have led some scholars to interpret Plato 
as parodying the Palamedes, or that his use o f  oratory is ironic. Other scholars 
simply do not believe the allusions to be significant in the least.104 While Plato does 
elsewhere parody the genres he is inserting,105 that is not necessarily the case with 
forensic oratory in the Apology. Nightingale notes: “ ‘Each instance where Plato 
incorporates poetry (or rhetoric) into his dialogues...deserves a separate investigation” .106 
From the above investigation it is clear that not only has Plato inserted the genre o f
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98 Palamedes is only mentioned three other times in the dialogues, and once in Plato’ s 
letters, but he is nowhere else mentioned for his wrongful conviction. At Laws 611d  he is 
mentioned for his mythical inventions/discoveries, at Phaedrus 261b-d his name is used 
as a sort o f  pseudonym for other intellectuals, at Republic 522d he is noted for being a 
wise warrior (one who stands up to Agamemnon), and in the Second Letter, he is 
mentioned as being coupled with Odysseus by the poets.
99 The actual historical jury probably would not have been aware o f  any allusions (since it 
is possible that it is only in Plato’ s Apology that the allusions are present), but Plato’ s 
readership may have been more aware o f  what he has put in Socrates’ speech (Usher 
believes the Palamedes to belong to the very early years o f  the fourth century 
[1999:363]).
100 Feaver &  Hare 1981:207.
101 E.g., Homer, Hesiod, Euripides, Aristophanes, Thucydides, etc.
102 That is, all o f  his use o f  oratory throughout the Apology, not just that which can be 
paralleled in the Palamedes.
103 Feaver &  Hare 1981.
104 Strycker 1994. ,
105 Cf. Nightingale 1995, Chapter 2: “Use and abuse o f  Athenian tragedy.”  pp. 60-92.
106 Nightingale 1995:92 n. 84.
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1A7forensic oratory in the Apology, but he has also used typical rhetorical topoi and even 
has Socrates allude to one o f  the most famous rhetoricians o f  the time in Gorgias. I will 
now  turn to the second part o f  this examination o f  oratory in the Apology: are Socrates’ 
claims (with respect to oratory) true, how  can he em ploy oratory in good conscience 
(since elsewhere he condemns it), and i f  the Apology cannot be labeled as ‘parody’ , what 
are we to say about the insertion o f  forensic oratory?
Socrates claims he will make his entire defense based on the truth alone. He 
denies that he is 8eivo<; Xsyetv, and instead says, “ But you will hear from me the whole 
truth.. .for I believe that what I say is just”  (upcig 8e poo dKonosoGs mxaav xf|v 
aXijGeiav.. .maxed© yap Sucaia eivai a Xey©, Ap. 17b-c). Thus, it is clear that Socrates’ 
defense lies in his true account o f  him self, since the truth is just. But this is the truth as 
defined by Socrates himself. In the preceding sentences we have seen him redefine a 
claim made by his accusers: he is Ssivoq Xeysiv, i f  by ‘ clever speaking’ they mean 
speaking the truth. 107 809 This approach is in contrast to what Socrates and Phaedrus note is 
regular for the courtroom orator. They say that in court, no one cares (psXeiv) for the 
truth, but they only care about what is convincing (xov mGavov), and this is called the
107 “ [Plato] portrays a Socrates thoroughly familiar with the commonplaces o f  judicial 
oratory.”  (Kennedy, George. 1963. The Art o f  Persuasion in Greece, pp. 151-2) Kennedy 
reasons that this is due to the fact that “ traditional”  rhetoric was so ingrained in the Greek 
consciousness that it was impossible to deviate from  it. However, in general, “ traditional” 
rhetoric was what was the problem for Plato (in that it was flattery). I f  Plato is then using 
oratory in the Apology, Plato deliberately includes it for a specific purpose— he would 
consciously avoid “traditional”  rhetoric otherwise, lest it harm his ultimate purpose.
108 Contrast the Gorgias, where Socrates and Callicles are discussing the philosophical 
and political lives. Here, i f  self-preservation is the goal (as winning the court case would 
be, since Meletus has set the penalty at death), sycophancy is the only option for the 




“ likely”  (to sixog, Phdr. 272d-e). Leibowitz believes that this claim to the truth is 
immediately unraveled, since in the opening o f  his defense, Socrates lies four times: he 
lies in saying he will speak the truth haphazardly (since he speaks ‘ cleverly’ ); he lies in 
saying that his accusers lied in calling him 8eivd<; Isysiv; he lies when he said they would 
be refuted by him in deed; and he lies when he claimed the virtue o f  an orator is to speak
the truth.110 However, Leibowitz fails to account for the fact that Socrates has redefined
/
the pertinent terms: he is speaking the truth according to himself, which means that he is
only 5eivo<; Xeysxv in as much as he speaks the truth, which in turn means the accusers
w ill be refuted in deed (since he w ill not use the fancy turns o f  phrases111 12), but will speak
as things com e to him (which could refer to how  he chooses to arrange his thoughts, not
1 1
only his turns o f  phrases, etc.).
Indeed, for Socrates, telling the truth is the virtue (dpexf|) o f  the orator, and it is 
the virtue o f  the juror to determine i f  the orator speaks justly (abxo 5s xobxo otco7T81v Kai 
tootg) tov vouv 7cpoosxsiv, si Siicaia key® fj pfj- Sucaaxou psv yap auxri dpsxrj, prjxopot;
110 Leibowitz 2010:12. Leibowitz also muses whether Socrates may tell “not the whole 
truth, but only the truth”  and thus conceal any condemning information ( 1 1 ), but then we 
would have to deal with the naaax dX.rj0£uxv that Socrates claims. James Crooks (2009. 
“ Inventing Socrates: Truth, Jest, and Care in Plato’ s Apology.”  Pp. 102-114 in 
Reexamining Socrates in the Apology, eds. Fagan and Russon) refers to Heidegger’ s 
concrete meanings o f  key words. By taking the alpha as privative in aXfjGeia, it means 
“ dis-closure”  or “ unforgetting” : “ The essence o f  truth, Heidegger claims, is revelation”  
(104-5). I f  this aspect is present at all in Plato’ s use o f  aAijOsia, we cannot believe that 
Socrates would be concealing anything in his account o f  himself.
111 Socrates does not deny any knowledge o f  forensic oratory. Strictly, he says that he is a 
“ stranger”  to it (¡qsvaq e%siv), which would imply that he knows what it is, but does not 
have much experience o f  it. W hile it is his first appearance as a party to a case, he does 
admit to some knowledge o f  standard courtroom practices (as those defendants who bring 
in their pitiable families to secure acquittal, 34c ff.).
112 I f  Socrates is lying here, I can only think that he would be using a ‘ noble’ falsehood 
(as is discussed in Republic 389b-d), one that will help the jurors to understand his 
innocence o f  the charges against him. After all, to have any falsehood in one’ s soul is a 
bad thing (R. 382a ff.), and Socrates would never willingly harm anyone (Ap. 25e-26a).
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5s xdXr|0fj Xeystv, Ap. 18a). By this definition, Socrates has made it clear that i f  all parties 
(defendant and jurors) perform their proper duty, he should be acquitted. It is evident, 
however, that Socrates is not certain that all o f  the jurymen will adhere to the virtue o f  
their position. Throughout his speeches, he avoids addressing the jurors as such, and 
instead addresses them by © avSpeg, or © av&psq AGrjvaToi. It is not until his third and
final (prophetic) speech to the jury, when he addresses them in two groups, those who
/
voted to condemn, and those who voted to acquit, that he addresses them as co dvSpeq 
Sucaaxai.13 14 It is this second group who have performed their dicanic duty properly 
according to Socrates. They have judged Socrates’ account o f  his ¿mxrjSsupa (which is 
his philosophy115) to be just, and therefore true. A s for the other jurors, who, perhaps for 
their lack o f  understanding, voted to condemn Socrates, they remain dv8pe<; AGqvaioi 
(38c).
These uneducated jurors made Socrates’ case very difficult to plead. H ow could 
he successfully present the truth o f  his philosophy to an uneducated jury? From what he 
says, we know that the prejudices that came about for him were because his philosophy 
was misunderstood.116 The danger for Socrates is that Meletus, while he knows nothing 
o f  the truth, w ill prevail before a jury who doesn’ t know any better since he spoke
113 Strycker 1994: 35.
114 © avSpeg SiKaaxal—ujia<; yap Sucaaxa«; KaXcov op0©<; av KaXoiqv, 40a (and further at 
40e, 41b, 41c). There is one exception at 26d, where Socrates addresses the jury as 
8ucacjxai, as he voices his astonishment at Meletus’ responses (M a AT, © avSpeg 
Sucaaxai... Ava^ayopou oiei Kaxqyopeiv, to cpiXe MsA-qxs;). Perhaps this instance is due to 
his emotional outrage.
115 Many scholars (e.g., Strycker 1994: 45) see Plato making the Apology as a defense o f  
Socrates in general, since his philosophy (which was misunderstood and therefore 
brought about false charges) is the reason he is under fire.
116 The bystanders to his refutations believed he possessed the wisdom that his 
interlocutors did not have, nor did they see that his aim was not to best his opponent, but 
to show him to care for his soul (Ap. 23a).
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mGavmg with his oratory. It is just as in the analogy o f  the pastry baker, who aims at
pleasures, and the doctor, who knows what is best for the body:
... el §¿01 ev 7caiol Siaycovi^eoGai o\i/ojioiov ts Kal iaxpov, ij ¿v dvSpamv ouxcoq 
avofjxoiq (BGTtep oi 7taT5e<;, Ttoxepoq ercatei rcepi trov xpriaxtov cnxioav Kal 
7tovT) prov, 6 iaxpo^ f) 6 oyoTtoiog, ?apcp av ajcoGavsTv xov Iaxpov.
“ i f  it were necessary for a pastry baker and doctor to compete in front o f 
children, or in front o f  men just as senseless as children, to decide which o f 
the two, the doctor or pastry baker, was the expert in matters o f  wholesome 
and worthless foods, the doctor would die o f  starvation.”  (Grg. 464d-e)
/  . . ,
The point o f  Socrates’ analogy is that orators, who do not have real knowledge o f  the 
matters about which they speak, can prevail over those who truly have knowledge before 
an ignorant group, since orators do not instill knowledge in their listeners, but conviction 
(xo maxeustv) . 117 And so, Meletus, who spoke mGavcog, will surely prevail over Socrates 
and the truth in court.
In order for the jury to correctly deem Socrates’ actions just, they would need to 
know that he is telling the truth. But, i f  Socrates and Meletus are in the same shoes as the 
doctor and the pastry baker, what chance does Socrates have ofacquittal? He is not able 
to examine each o f  the jurors as interlocutors and bring them to realize his innocence for 
themselves. However, in the Gorgias, when Socrates is speaking with Callicles, they 
com e to the distinction that there really are two parts to oratory: the one part is flattery 
(KoXaKsia) and shameful popular oratory (8ruJX|yopia), and the other part is admirable 
(kcxXov), which gets the citizens’ souls to be as good as possible, and tries to say the best,
117 (Grg. 454e:) Socrates: W hich type o f  persuasion, then, does oratory produce in law 
courts and in other gatherings concerning just and unjust things? The one that results in 
being convinced without knowing or the one that results in knowing? Gorgias: It’ s clear, 
I presume, that it is the one that results in conviction.
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regardless o f  the feelings o f  its audience (Grg. 503a).118 It is in this second part o f  oratoiy 
that Socrates finds his deliverance. Without an interlocutor (save the brief refutation o f  
Meletus), Socrates is able to retreat into (the right kind of) oratory,119 since his only aim 
is to encourage his fellow  citizens (and jurors) to care for wisdom, truth, and the best 
possible condition for their souls (Ap. 29e, 38a).
Socrates denies that he w ill use the stylized phrases o f  his accusers, but will speak 
sucfj, “ at random” , and in the manner he is accustomed to in his regular life .120 Given that 
his defense rests on the jury understanding his philosophy, something that has been 
misconstrued and parodied121 previously, it is in Socrates’ best interests to keep his 
methods o f  explanation simple. In the Phaedrus, Socrates and Phaedrus determine that 
recognizing the soul o f  the audience is crucial in order to successfully (and artfully) 
deliver a koyoq. First, the author o f  the speech must know the truth o f  everything he tells, 
and second, he needs to understand the “nature o f  the soul”  o f  the listener, and com pose
V
118 si yap Kai xobxo eaxi SmAouv, xo psv exepov 7too xouxou KoXctKsia av svr| Kai aiaxpa 
8 rijj.riyopia, xo 8 ’sxepov Kokov, xo TiapaaKsud^siv O7tox; ax; PsXxiaxai saovxai xcov 
7toX,ixdav at \(n)xai, Kai SiapaxeaGai Xsyovxa xa PeXxiaxa, sixs fjSicD sixs arjSsaxepa eaxai 
xoig aKououCTiv.
119 Cf. Nightingale 1995: 83: “ Callicles’ refusal to participate in the conversation [in the 
Gorgias] forces Socrates to retreat into rhetoric” .
120 It seems to me that many scholars may have misinterpreted Socrates as saying that he 
w ill only use com m on language to deliver his speech, since he says, “ I f  you hear me 
making my defense in the same Xoyoi as I am accustomed to use in the agora by the 
bankers’ tables, where many o f  you have heard me, or elsewhere, do not be surprised or 
create a ruckus on account o f  this”  (17c). However, even in his usual A,6yoi, he is able to 
pick up on other styles in his conversations in public. E.g., Grg. 467b (d) Xq>oxe ncoXe), 
where he imitates the Gorgianic style (cf. also 476d, xoiouxov xo xpfjpa xspvexai xo 
xejrvopevov oTov xo xepvov xepvei;), and although the Menexenus places the epitaphios in 
a private setting, this too would have likely occurred in a public place. His accustomed 
manner o f  taking up aspects as they com e along in discussions may also apply to his 
defense speech, unlike his opponents who have taken time and thought carefully 
(cleverly) about what they w ill say; Socrates w ill simply proceed in his usual manner.
121 Cf. the “ first”  accusers, and Aristophanes’ Clouds.
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his Xóyoq accordingly: an embellished and elegant Xóyoq for the com plex soul, and a 
simple and straightforward Xóyoq for a simple soul (Phdr. 277b-c). Thus, it is crucial, I 
submit, for Socrates, who now must use the noble part o f  oratory to plead his case, to 
ensure that he tailors his Xóyoq to the understanding o f  his audience. In this case, since 
the jury is unacquainted with the real purpose and cause for his philosophy (except, 
perhaps, through hearsay or other false reports), Socrates must use simple language to 
explain122 123the com plex nature o f  his ercixiiSeopa.
N ow  we can understand that Socrates did not lie when he said he would speak in 
plain terms (since this does not necessarily mean he w ill not use oratory), that he can use 
oratory ‘ safely’ because his Xóyoq has to do with philosophy (which is getting one’ s soul 
to be in the best possible condition), and that his deceptively simple method o f 
presenting his defense is in the best interests o f  his uneducated audience. This, then, 
explains why Socrates presents him self as trying to persuade (neiGeiv) the jury on a 
number o f  occasions.124 Socrates’ self-acknowledged efforts to persuade the jury in and 
o f  themselves should be a clue to us, the educated reader, that he actually is using 
oratory. For oratory’ s general aim is successful persuasion that leads to conviction, but 
conviction without knowledge.125 But Socrates is using the ‘noble’ part o f  oratory. Does 
this mean that he is able to produce conviction that com es from knowledge?
122 Using regular, ordinary language for his arguments is what Alcibiades charges 
Socrates with in the Symposium’, ovouq yap Kav0T|Xiooq Xsyei xai yaXiceaq xivàq icai 
aKOTOTÓpouq kcxì PopooSéyaq, xaì àeì 8ià  xrov aòxcov xà aura cpaivexai Xéyeiv (“ For he 
goes on about pack-asses, blacksmiths, cobblers, and tanners; he always seems to say the 
same things in the same ways,”  2 2 le ).
1231 say ‘ deceptively’ since it takes some investigation, as above, to see all the rhetorical
topoi and methods in the Apology.
n%Ap. 30e, 31b, 36c, 37a, 38a
125 Cf. on Gorgias 454e above, n. 117.
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I do not find this to be the case. I f  the jury truly understood the truth in Socrates’ 
defense, he would have been acquitted. Indeed, Socrates failed to even persuade the 
majority o f  the jury. However, his surprise that the case was so narrowly decided (Ap.
t
36a-b), implies that he did not believe he could have convinced the jurors o f  the truth. 
Socrates denies that he has ever been anyone’ s teacher (33a), but instead his philosophy 
encourages individuals to care for their souls themselves. It is a self-realization (or 
revelation) that must happen in order for the individual to com e to true understanding and 
knowledge. Leibowitz sees Socrates’ effort to achieve this self-realization as an example 
o f  irony, which he believes is a necessary requirement for any speech.126 27 128He says that 
Socrates’ speech to the jury is “ spoken in a double fashion so as to be understood one 
way at first, another upon reflection, as their vulgarity diminishes” . And Socrates 
knows that this w ill be the outcome: he prophesies that after he is gone, those who voted 
to convict him will com e to the realization o f  what they have done (ou 7toM no y' eveica 
Xpovou, © avSpeg AGqvaioi, ovopa sfjsxs xai aixiav...©<; E©kpaxr| arcsicxovaxe, avSpa 
ao(p6v. “ For the sake o f  a short time, men o f  Athens, you will acquire the reputation and 
guilt o f  having killed Socrates, a wise man” , Ap. 37c).
However, I argue that, as with labeling the Apology a ‘parody’ , to leave the 
Apology as ‘ irony’ alone is not sufficient. Strycker argues:
126 Or, that he knew that in this case, it was not possible to bring about the conviction 
with knowledge, since it is not easy to achieve this (xa 8e zyyx psv ouxcoq, ©q ¿y© cpr|pi, © 
av8pe<;, rcsiOetv 8e on pqSiov, 38a), nor did he have sufficient time to bring about 
conviction on the crucial points o f  his case (pXka upa<; xouxo on 7tsi0©- oXiyov yap 
Xpovov aMrjXoK; Sie&eypeOa, 37a).
127 For the reasons Socrates states in the Phaedrus: it is not fitting to say the same things 
to everyone. Leibowitz believes that even the educated listener still begins “ under the 
spell o f  vulgar prejudice”  (2010:18). I believe that this is not always the case for the 
educated listener, but certainly for the uneducated one.
128 Leibowitz 2010: 18.
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“Truly, [Socrates] is an axojtog...one is never sure whether one has 
understood him; not, however, because he conceals anything: on the contrary, 
he always says what he means, at the risk o f offending influential people. His 
most characteristic feature is eipooveia, that curious blending o f cmouSfi and 
rcaiSid, o f assurance and self-deprecation, o f exquisite manners, and a delight 
in almost vulgar illustrations o f his ideas...” 129 130
That “ curious blending”  o f  OTrouSfj and jraiSia is exactly the serio-com ic aspect to this 
dialogue. Socrates goes to great lengths, especially in his refutation o f  Meletus, to show
that Meletus (whose name implies care, psXstv, and seriousness) cannot be taken
. ■ /  ,
seriously, since he has no care for the youth, and therefore cannot seriously bring 
charges on their behalf.131 Whereas Socrates acknowledges that he may com e o ff  as 
joking (xai iaax; psv 86 4© Tiaiv opc&v rcai^stv, and perhaps I will seem to some o f  you to 
be playing, 2 0 d), he is very serious about the truth and especially the truth o f  his 
philosophy.132
What then, may we conclude about the Apology, and the genre o f  forensic oratory 
inserted into it? Plato has indeed used some o f  the traditional topoi o f  Athenian forensic 
oratory, that much is clear. He has also had his Socrates blatantly refuse other topoi o f  the 
Athenian courtrooms, since they are in conflict with his philosophical beliefs and his way
129 Strycker 1994: 73.
130 “ I say, men, that Meletus jests (xapisvTi^soOat) in serious matters (a7iob8rj), that he 
brings men to court lightly, that he claims to be serious (orcooS&^eiv) and care for 
(icrjSeiv) matters about none o f  which he has ever been concerned (obSsv 7t©3iOTE 
spe^rioev)” , 24c. Cf. 7tsp i7tXsiaToo 7toifj, 24c-d; psXov ys a o i...c o i obSsv pspsXiiKSV, 
24d; oa(p©q ditocpaivsiq xfjv aaoxob apsAstav, o n  obSsv aoi pspsAriKsv, 25c; outs psya 
outs apucpov 7t©7iOTS spsA,T]asv, 26b; (in Meletus’ voice:) spou xapisvn^opsvou xai
svavri’ épaut© Xsyovxoç, 27a; Kaixoi xoûxô so n  îraiÇovxoç, 27a; xoux av sitj o ey© cpr|pi 
os aivixxeoGai xai xapisvxi^saGai, 27d.
131 Ober (1998:170) and Feaver & Hare (1981:211) also note the lack o f  care attributed 
to Meletus.
132 Socrates attaches the greatest importance to carrying out (his interpretation of) the 
oracle’ s directive (i.e., his philosophy): ôp©ç 8s àvayKatov sSoksi sivai to too Osou 7tspi 
7tXsioxou 7coisîa0ai (2 le ).
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o f  life. Scholars have seen a defense o f  Socrates and for Socrates m the Apology,
Plato’ s portrait o f  Socrates, and an exhortation to philosophy.13 34 A ll these interpretations 
are possible, depending on how  one reads the Apology. However, the argument that the 
Apology is a simple parody o f  forensic oratory (or o f  Gorgias’ Defense ofPalamedes) 
cannot remain. This reading rests on the belief that Socrates has lied about his intentions
in the speech. M oreover, it fails to account for oratory as Socrates defines it. Oratory is
/
able to have a ‘noble’ use, which fits perfectly with what Socrates is trying to defend. His 
way o f  life, cp&ocjoqna, has been misunderstood, and in seeking to prove its (and his) 
worth for the city, he is able to make use o f  this ‘noble’ oratory, one that does not require 
a qxxppaicov in the souls o f  the listeners.135 On this reading, Socrates does not contradict 
his claims to speak naaav Tqv aXrjOsiav, in contrast to other interpretations where his 
intentions have been misunderstood by scholars. Even though Socrates is misunderstood 
by the jury as joking (rcai^eiv), it is a serious use o f  forensic oratory that Plato intends: a 
serious use (misunderstood as com ic) for serious ends— that o f  getting one’ s soul to be in 
the best condition possible. I agree with Brickhouse and Smith, who believe that Socrates 
is earnestly trying to gain his acquittal, and w ill do so by any means consistent with his 
beliefs.136 Plato shows us that Socrates’ ultimate aim is to gain acquittal (likely so that he 
may continue to philosophize in Athens), and that Socrates is not making light o f  the 
Athenian legal system, in contrast to Meletus. However, in having Socrates make his
1
133 The genitive in the title ÂîtoXoyia ZcoKpaxouç could be objective as well as subjective, 
which could allow it to mean “A pology o f  Socrates”  (i.e., “ Socrates’ own defense 
speech), or “ Plato’ s A pology o f  Socrates”  (i.e., “ Plato’ s speech in defense o f  Socrates” . 
West 1979: 219.)
134 Strycker 1994: 8-13.
135 See Chapter 1, pp. 19-20 above.
136 Brickhouse &  Smith 1989: 9.
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defense, Plato has Socrates use oratory. And while Socrates condemns oratory elsewhere, 
in this case, Socrates cannot be charged with being self-contradictory and not agreeing 
with him self, since in the Apology, Socrates has (re)defined oratory to fit consistently 
with his (and Plato’ s) beliefs.
/
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e
Plato and the Polis: Plato’ s Use o f  Attic Oratory
The previous two chapters have argued against some o f  the inadequate or 
insufficient interpretations o f  the inserted genres in the Menexenus and Apology currently
held by scholars. Many students o f  Plato have had a hard time reconciling Socrates as an
/
orator in the Menexenus with Socrates the philosopher that is seen elsewhere in the 
Platonic dialogues. From the survey in Chapter 1, it is clear that the Menexenus is 
philosophically significant with its oratory, as it displays— and contributes to— Socratic 
philosophy expressed elsewhere in Plato’ s dialogues, and as such, it cannot simply be a 
parody or satire not to be taken seriously. Chapter 2 demonstrated the counterpart to the 
Menexenus: in the Apology, which has been traditionally read as Socrates’ simple 
profession o f  his philosophic way o f  life, Plato has com posed Socrates’ defense to be 
rhetorical. The traditional topoi and themes o f  forensic oratory are found in the Apology, 
in addition to a specific intertextuality with the Defense o f  Palamedes, one o f  the extant 
works from  Gorgias, the most influential orator at die end o f  the fifth century BCE. But, at 
the outset o f  his speech, Socrates denies that he is an orator or that he will speak in any 
way other than his usual manner. Because Plato has Socrates use some typical methods o f  
oratory, the Apology has also been seen as a parody, satire, or ironic version o f  this 
inserted genre. However, that is not necessarily the case. Plato composes Socrates’ words 
in such a way that Socrates’ claims anent oratory can be true: he redefines the terms for a 
“ clever speaker”  so that he can em ploy oratory in good conscience, when he elsewhere 
condemns it. From this investigation it is clear that the Apology cannot simply be labeled
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as a ‘parody’ or ‘ satire’ o f  forensic oratory— this reading rests on the belief that Socrates 
has lied about his intentions in the speech and it fails to account for oratory as Socrates 
(re)defines it.
In this final chapter, the frame o f  focus w ill be widened in order to examine how 
Plato, as an author, intends his use o f  (A ttic) oratory in these two dialogues. I have 
already determined that the Menexenus and Apology make use o f  both philosophy and 
oratory. Examining the claims put forward and agreed upon by Socrates in the Gorgias 
w ill determine whether there is a virtue at all for oratory, since it’ s evidently not a true 
TEXyn. Is i| pTixopiKfi xexvTj good, bad, or in between, neither good nor bad? I argue that 
oratory in and o f  itself is neutral ( ‘ in between’ ) for Plato— whether it is good or bad 
depends on the manner in which it is used. In Plato’ s case, he has inserted oratory in the 
Menexenus and the Apology to present a critique and commentary on Athens, and to 
relate his philosophy to the 7iokiq. This final chapter w ill also return to the question o f  
‘ seriousness’ , and argue that in these two cases o f  inserted genre, the categories o f  
‘parody’ , ‘ satire’ , and ‘ irony’ , as currently defined cannot be appropriately applied, since 
these interpretations rely on the view  o f  only seeing oratory or philosophy in the works, 
and not necessarily both. It is the serio-com ic nature o f  the dialogues that has been 
misinterpreted with respect to these two dialogues. In conclusion, as I shall argue, in the 
case o f  these two works, which focus on the raft-iq as a central character, Plato 
consciously uses Attic oratory to communicate messages consistent with his philosophy 
to the Twftiq, thereby proving that oratory is not only the tool o f  the politician, but that 
philosophy too (by means o f  oratory) can be capable o f  political action.
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In a discussion o f  oratory in Platonic works, I would be remiss not to include the
Gorgias,1 2especially because o f  the links to the Menexenus and Apology in particular. The
Menexenus has been described as an afterpiece to the Gorgias and a satyr-play to the
tragic trilogy o f  the Gorgias.3 It is also very hard to ignore the dramatic irony inherent in
the Gorgias when Callicles says to Socrates,
vuv yap ei Tig oou A,a|36p£vog ft aÂ ou oxououv x©v toioutqv sig to 
5eo[uovf\piov curayoi, cpdcKCov aSucsiv aSiKOuvxa, oic0’5xi oinc av 8%oig
5xi xprjaaio oaux®, dXA,’iX,iyyui)Tig av Kal xaopxpo oinc excov 5xi EiTioig, Kaieig 
t6 SiKaaxrjpiov avafldg, Kaxtiyopou xux©v 7idvo (pabAou Kal pox^npoo, 
djioGavoig av, ei PouXoixo Gavdxou aoi xipaoGai.
Now as it is, if  someone got hold o f you [Socrates] or o f anyone else like you, 
and led you away to the prison on the charge that you’ve acted unjustly when 
you haven’t, know that you would not know what to do with yourself. You’d 
become dizzy, and your mouth would gape open because you wouldn’t know 
what to say. And having come up for trial, meeting with some petty and 
entirely rascally accuser, you would be put to death, if  that’ s what he wanted 
to set as your penalty. (Grg. 486a-b)4
The fact that oratory in the Gorgias is investigated in relation to the rcoAig and Sfjpog—
oratory addressed to audiences making decisions— also makes its discussion especially
x
pertinent to the current study o f  Attic oratory. The Gorgias itself has been studied many 
times over, on various aspects o f  the dialogue.5 However, for the purpose o f  this
11 also realize that the Phaedrus includes a discussion o f  oratory, but in a way it is more 
technical in its treatment o f  oratory, and it is mainly on epideictic oratory and persuasion. 
In contrast, the Gorgias discusses the use o f  oratory in connection with the 7côAiç, as the 
epitaphios would be, and specifically addresses the use o f  oratory in the Athenian courts.
2 Guthrie 1986 [vol. 4]: 317.
3 Dodds 1959:24. Because it is generally assumed that the Gorgias and Menexenus were 
written by Plato in a close period o f  time, it is also possible ( if  not probable) that many o f  
Plato’ s contemporaries may not have read the Gorgias prior to reading the Menexenus 
(Henderson 1975: 25). While it remains possible that Plato could have intended the two 
dialogues to be read closely together, I do not believe that the reason for the Menexenus’ 
com position can be simply boiled down to a practical demonstration o f  the Gorgias, 
discussion on flattering oratory, as Dodds argues (1959: 24).
4 A ll translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.
5 A  selected list would include: on the dialogue as a whole, Dodds’ 1959 commentary in 
many ways remains unsurpassed; both Guthrie 1975, History o f  Greek Philosophy, vol. 4
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argument, the discussion w ill focus on what is actually asserted about oratory in order to
determine i f  there is a virtue at all for oratory as far as Plato is concerned.
Like the Menexenus, the Gorgias is unclear about its dramatic date.6 It seems to
have been written in the early 380s,7 roughly around the same time that Plato wrote the
Menexenus. What we can infer is that Plato is commenting on a more generalized Athens,
one free o f  “ chronological specificity” ,8 9and that the situation the reader is supposed to
/  9
understand is a “ generic post-Periclean democratic Athens” . The freedom o f  the dates 
puts the characters in a (temporal) liminal situation, and thus allows Socrates, Gorgias, 
Polus, and Callicles to carry out their discussion o f  oratory on a more general basis, 
which in turn allows us to apply the inferences from  the Gorgias to Plato’ s philosophy 
from  other works. What does Plato have Socrates assent to or assert in the dialogue? I 
have com piled a summary o f  thirteen points as follow s:
1. Oratory (p) is used for defense/self-preservation and to boast (Grg. 448e).
2. p and its actions’ validity rely on subjectivity (45 ld-e,~ whereas Gorgias asserts it 
is the greatest good, peyioxov ayaOov, 452d).
3. p is the ability to produce persuasion about what is just and unjust in die souls o f  
the audience (452e, 454b).
4. p produces conviction without knowledge (454e).
(pp. 284-311) and Rutherford 1995 The Art o f  Plato (pp. 141-178) present summary 
overviews with discussion on specific issues; on its relation to Athens and her 
democracy, Schofield 2006 Plato: Political Philosophy (esp. pp.51-99), Ober 1999 
Political Dissent in Democratic Athens (pp. 190-206), and Yunis 1996 Taming 
Democracy (pp. 117-171) are the most authoritative and useful; in a condemning 
response to the Gorgias’ ‘attack’ on rhetoric, Vickers 1988 In Defense o f  Rhetoric (pp. 
83-147) presents the alternative side to the case (although I cannot agree with much o f  his 
argumentation, I appreciate that he attempts to take Plato on from another angle).
6 For a concise discussion o f  the expressed dates, see Dodds 1959:17-18.
7 Yunis 1996:117.
8 Ober 1999: 191.
9 Idem 192. Likewise, Yunis describes the significance as “ Pericles is gone and disaster 
loom s”  (1996:119).
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5. p makes the oratorappear more persuasive before those who don’t have 
knowledge, but does not make the orator knowledgeable about what he persuades 
(459a-c).
6 . p is a knack (éprteipía) for producing gratification and pleasure (462c).
7. p is apart o f  flattery; specifically it is the spurious version o f  justice (SiKaioaúvrj), 
the genuine corrective xsxyn o f  the soul (463a, 463d).
8 . p ought to be used to justly obtain punishment for oneself and others i f  necessary
(480c-d). '
9. p is what the poets practice in the theatre (poetry without rhythm, meter, m elody = 
8r)pr|Yopia [popular oratory/claptrap] = prixopucrj, 502c-d).
1 0 . p has two parts: ( 1) flattery and shameful popular oratory, and (2 ) the admirable 
part, which aims to make the souls o f  the citizens to be as good as possible by 
saying what’ s best for them (503a).
11. The skilled and good orator w ill only make use o f  the admirable part o f  p, to bring 
justice, temperance, and excellence into the souls o f  the citizens (504d-e).
12. The good orator w ill be just and knowledgeable in what is just (508c).
13. p a n d  e v e r y  o th e r  a c tiv ity  is to  be u s e d  in  su p p o rt o f  w h a t is  ju s t , n a m e ly  to
p r a c t ic e  v irtu e  (a o K s iv  apexfiv, 527c-d). ~~" ~
From the conclusion, [10] that oratory has two parts for Socrates, a bad part, which 
flatters, and an admirable part, which improves souls, all the other inferences about 
oratory can be classed into these two parts. When oratory produces something bad (or 
‘ bad’ as Plato would see it), as in [l]-[7 ] and [9], it can be explained as being part o f  the 
flattering oratory. When oratory is beneficial, as in [8] and [11-13], it can be explained as 
being part o f  the ameliorative oratory. But this is not what the typical Athenian (or 
visiting Greek) would think o f  oratory, as is shown by the reactions o f  Socrates’ pro­
oratory interlocutors: no one is convinced by his refutation. Socrates’ argument that 
“public speech caters indiscriminately to the desires o f  the many (thereby corrupting
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them) while simultaneously serving to corrupt the speaker and to enslave him to the 
multitude” 10 would ruin Gorgias’ and Polus’ business as teachers o f  oratory, and would 
rob Callicles o f  the future power he believes he can gain. The craft that these three men 
believe to be source o f  power for their social position, according to Socrates, is a base 
knack that corrupts both the orator and his listeners.
I f  Plato does not follow  the traditional view  o f  oratory, is there, then, a virtue at
/
all for oratory as far as Plato is concerned? Despite its label, (fj pr|Topiicf| [xsxyq]) Plato 
does not allow  it the status o f  a xexyn: “ the systematic, scientific application o f  a body o f 
knowledge to reliably achieve the highest degree o f  excellence in a practical task” .11 
Socrates explicitly labels oratory ‘ ejmeipia’ , a ‘knack’ (Grg. 462c), but since it has two 
parts, is oratory itself able to be classed as something good, bad, or in between, neither 
good nor bad? On this point it appears that scholars are somewhat divided. Yunis 
believes that Plato insists no political discourse is neutral in its effect on the listeners’ 
souls,12 and thus agrees with what Socrates presents in [10], thakoratory has two parts. 
These two parts are described as shameful and admirable— there is no third, ‘ neutral’ , 
part. Colaiaco argues that Plato is not opposed to oratory per se, but that he is opposed to 
the sophists’ use o f  it, and instead he has created a new rhetoric.13 This statement would
10 Ober 1998:190.
11 Yunis 1996:122. Tsxvn is a notoriously difficult word to translate, since ‘ craft’ , ‘ art’ , 
or ‘ skill’ in English does not quite cover the entire meaning o f  the word.
12 Idem 121.
13 Colaiaco, James A . 2001. Socrates Against Athens: Philosophy on Trial, p. 31-33. 
Colaiaco terms this different kind o f  rhetoric “philosophical rhetoric”  (32). He also 
considers whether Plato would have regretted the fact that his “beloved mentor”  did not 
use rhetorical devices by whatever means necessary (while maintaining his integrity) to 
secure his acquittal (31). However, Plato would not have wanted Socrates to act in any 
other way than he did; to see his “mentor”  betray his own personal standards and use
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account for Plato’ s (apparent) condemnation o f  oratory, but not his use o f  it elsewhere in 
his works. Another view  o f  Plato’ s opinion on oratory is that Plato simply sees the value 
o f  oratory being dependant on its subject matter, that it is, in a way, a tool that is 
‘neutral’ .14 For Plato, oratory in and o f  itself is indeed ‘ neutral’ , that is, neither good nor 
bad, but, I argue, it is not a new rhetoric that he presents in the Gorgias; rather, Plato 
submits a new use o f  rhetoric. This interpretation allows the philosopher to appropriate 
oratory for his own purposes. It is the philosopher who can truly use it justly, because it is 
the philosopher who truly knows the just (and doesn’ t ju stappear to know). Attributing a 
new use o f  oratory to Plato follow s on the conclusions [12] and [13] above. The good 
orator must be just and knowledgeable in what is just, and this knowledge, in Plato’ s 
opinion, cannot be gained without philosophy. A lso, this interpretation is supported by 
Socrates’ closing words to Callicles, [13] that oratory and every other activity are to be 
used in support o f  what’ s just (to practice virtue, àcncétv apexfjv), that is, oratory is to be 
used as a means to an end. Oratory itself is not able to achieve or affect a just soul.
However, in the hands o f  a philosopher like Socrates, we can now see that in the
\
Menexenus and Apology, oratory is used with a final purpose in mind.
Before I leave the Gorgias behind to turn to Socrates’ methods and use o f  oratory 
in the Menexenus and Apology, there is a specific issue that appears in the Gorgias that is 
traditionally interpreted as a contradiction to the Apology. Socrates tells Callicles that i f
flattering oratory w ould not leave Plato to describe him  as apioxoi;, (ppovipcbraroq, 
SiKaioxaxoq, “the best, wisest, and m ost ju st man”  (Phd. 118a).
14 Kennedy 1975: 75, Vickers 1988:147. Kennedy adds the caveat that the best oratory is 
in the dialectic o f  the philosopher. Vickers notes that Plato views oratory as corrupt 
because the Sfjpoq uses it corruptly.
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he does com e to trial, he will be at a loss, that he w on’t be able to point out any benefits
he has provided to the court, and says,
edv xs xiq pe ij vecoxepouig <pfj 5ia<p08ipeiv ajtopeiv Ttoiouvxa, rj xoix; ;
7tpeaPuxepou(; KaKriyopeiv Xeyovxa 7ciKpoi>g Xoyoix; fj iSig fj Sripoaia, ouxe x6 
aA,r|0e<; e§co ewtsiv, 6xi “Ancaiax; jr&vxa Tauxa eyd) Xsyro Kai npaxxco”— to 
ijpexepov 8f| xaoxo— “© dvSpsq Sncaoxai” , ouxe aXko ou8ev-
I f someone charges that I either corrupt younger people by causing them to be 
at a loss, or slander older people by speaking bitter words against them either 
publicly or privately, I will not be able to tell the truth by saying, ‘I say and do 
all these things justly, men o f the jury’ (to'use your expression), nor will I be 
able to say anything else. (Grg. 522b-c)
This passage has been interpreted as Socrates professing that he w ill be silent at his trial.
Schofield concludes from  this passage that Socrates cannot say anything, because
“In this revised version o f his trial [the Gorgias\...he will recognize that it 
would be pointless to do so [i.e., show concern for the Athenians’ true good] 
even before he begins to speak—and so will be unable to say anything. That 
(Plato is now saying) is how a Socrates who perceived his true situation at his 
trial— and more generally assessed realistically the situation o f philosophy-— 
would have to have behaved.” 15
According to Schofield, Socrates is silent because he realizes his defense would be 
hopeless when he considers how  the Athenians perceive philosophy. Ober presents 
another interpretation: Socrates defends him self in court in the Way that he wanted, not
V
because o f  how he would have been constrained to speak through a lack o f  oratorical 
skill. It is Callicles’ prediction that is flawed: “ i f  Socrates is not the pathetic com er- 
huddler o f  Callicles’ imagination, perhaps he is not a helpless victim either” .16
However, as is often the case in Plato’ s prose, what one speaker says is closely 
related to the exchanges preceding or immediately follow ing. Just after Socrates makes
t
the above comment o f  having nothing to say, he remarks, “ I f  I should com e to my end 
because o f  a lack o f  flattering oratory, I know w ell that you would see me bearing my
15 Schofield 2006: 29-30.
16 Ober 1998: 202-3.
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death with ease.”  (ei 8e KokaKuciĵ  pt|xopiKfiq evSeiqi xeXeuTcprtv eycoys, eu 018a oxi p<?8i(D<; 
ISiog av jxs «pepovxa x6v Gavaxov, Grg. 522d) It is entirely possible that when Socrates 
says he w ill have nothing to say, he does not necessarily mean that he will be silent, but 
instead that he w ill simply have nothing rhetorical to say. In this way, Socrates redefines 
the terms, just as he does at the beginning o f  his actual defense. The discussion that
com es before this particular exchange should also influence the interpretation o f  the
/
passage. Socrates again has returned to the image o f  a doctor and pastry baker on trial in 
front o f  children, saying that even i f  the doctor told the truth, the children would make a 
great, loud uproar (avapoav) and the doctor would be at a loss (m iopia) o f  what to say 
(Grg. 522a-b). It is this same situation that Socrates means would happen to him : the 
“judges”  would laugh at him, and he then wouldn’ t know what to say. It is possible that 
Plato here means that Socrates wouldn’t be able to speak the truth in court without his 
judges causing an uproar. Socrates him self in his defense begs the judges not to shout or 
cause an uproar during his defense (Ap. 17c, 20e, 21a), and recognizes that although he is
telling the truth, the judges may think he’ s joking (Ap. 20e). In this way, the assertion
Socrates makes in the Gorgias does not necessarily contradict Plato’ s presentation o f  him
in the Apology, but rather is consistent with and reinforces Socrates’ defense speech in
1 8
the terms that he has defined. 178
17 xoiouxov pevxoi xai ey<b oi8a oxi 7ia0og 7td0oipt av eiasXGrav siq Sncaaxipiov. “ I know 
just such an experience would happen to me too, i f  I came to court.”  (Grg. 522b)
18 One must note that scholars see Plato as having a ‘ darker’ or ‘harsher’ view  o f  Athens 
in the Gorgias, and see this as supporting the view  o f  Socrates’ futility on trial for his 
life. I cannot imagine though that Plato would have rather had his Socrates be silent— this 
would be contradictory to the Socrates presented elsewhere, who shows no concern for 
what others think o f  him, but stays true to his love, philosophy.
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Having concluded from the Gorgias that Plato has a new use o f  oratory in mind, it 
is now possible to examine how  he has Socrates use oratory in the Menexenus and 
Apology, since these particular uses are o f  the admirable part o f  oratory.19 20Yunis notes 
that in the Gorgias, Socrates rejects Periclean oratory, but proposes no other solution to 
mass political education. However, although Plato may not propose an explicit solution,
he has, I argue, proposed a new use o f  oratory that w ill allow him to bring about
/
education. Scholars have noted that Socrates redefines oratory in a very similar way to 
the traditional Socratic dialectic: it aims to improve the audience without regard to their 
desired wishes.21 2Summarized in a most basic statement, the two previous chapters have 
shown how  Plato has Socrates encourage his audience to lead the philosophical life in 
both examples o f  inserted genre. On a wider scale, all Socratic discourse (not just 
oratory) avoids flattery, unless ironic, and aims at the improvement o f  the audience. The 
goal o f  the Socratic elenchus is refutation in order to improve oneself— to make one 
agree not necessarily with Socrates, but with oneself. From the Gorgias we see that 
oratory only has power before an audience that is ignorant,23 since a knowledgeable 
audience w ill be able to recognize that the speaker only possesses a means o f  persuasion. 
Since the intended audience in Socrates’ epitaphios and defense speech is ultimately the 
7tó^ig o f  Athens, what does Plato think she is ignorant o f? H ow is she out o f  tune and not
19 See above, Chapter One, pp. 21 ,30 , Chapter Two, p. 62.
20 Yunis 1996:146.
21 Rutherford 1995: 156; Sedley, David. 2009. “ Myth, punishment and politics in the 
Gorgias.”  pp. 51-76 in Plato ’s Myths, edited by Catalin Partenie. pp. 59,65
22 Rutherford 1995:157.
23 Grg. 459a-c, see also Yunis 1996:128.
in agreement with herself? What does Socrates hope his audience to understand from  his 
actions as a pfyrap?24
Socrates has always noted that he is a ‘private’ citizen, that is, he does not 
normally involve him self in the political affairs o f  the city, preferring to carry on his 
private refutations in search o f  one wiser than he. However, this is not to say that
Socrates is unaware o f  and disengaged from  the political affairs o f  Athens: he took part in
/
battles o f  the Peloponnesian War (Potidaea, Amphipolis, Delium, Ap. 28e), and served on 
the prytany when it was his tribe’ s allotted time (Ap. 32a-b). Socrates also admits that he 
heard Pericles advising the Athenians on the middle wall (Grg. 455e). It is clear then, that 
when Socrates is critical o f  Athens and her citizens, he does not do so from  ignorance or 
indirect knowledge.25 Plato and his Socrates have sometimes been interpreted as an anti­
democratic,26 but when this issue is examined, that is not found to be the case.27 While
79
24 Writing on the Apology, Ober notes, “ Socrates portrays him self as a civic-m inded 
activist who seeks to improve the polis and him self (3 Id) through verbal engagement 
with his fellows. Thus his position initially appears quite analogous to that claimed by the 
ordinary Athenian politician, the rhetor”  (1998: 168). I f  Socrates is acting in a typical 
manner o f  the politician, then by his critique and exhortations to Athens, he is fulfilling 
that role in his own terms.
25 Ober 1998: 195.
26 Vickers 1988:102. Dodds (1959 :13) notes that Callicles is “ anti-democratic in 
principle” , and speculates that Plato has crafted Callicles to represent him self had he not 
chosen to abstain from  politics, an “ unrealized Plato”  (14).
27 See Vlastos, G. 1983. “ The Historical Socrates and Athenian Democracy.”  Political 
Theory 11: 495-516. (A  discussion on the Platonic vs. Xenophonic portrayals o f  
Socrates.) Vlastos concludes that in contrast to Xenophon’ s Socrates, the Platonic 
Socrates “never attacks any other Athenian institution, never says a word against election 
by lot, never says, or directly implies, that knowledge o f  statecraft is a condition o f  
legitimate civic authority.... He does not question the moral authority o f  the court which 
condemned him even though he thinks its verdict most unjust.”  (511). He also points to 
the fact that Socrates had a close and longstanding friendship with Chaerephon, a 
staunchly loyal democrat, and that he kept the admiration o f  Lysias, who also identified 
with the democratic cause (ibid.). One also notes the discussion Socrates has with the 
Laws in the Crito, where he accepts their authority, even to his own destruction.
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Socrates may have been (theoretically) critical o f  democracy, “whether his theoretical 
critique o f  democracy was matched by a desire for a practical alternative seems 
doubtful” . If, then, Socrates was in favour o f  democracy, and was aware o f  Athenian 
political affairs, what did he disagree with about Athens’ actions? The limits o f  this thesis 
do not allow  for a complete and in-depth study o f  the commentary on Athens that Plato
provides in the Menexenus and Apology. A  few  specific observations and general
/
comments w ill suffice for the purposes o f  the present study.
< J Q
The Menexenus has often been interpreted as a critique o f  Periclean Athens or 
Periclean oratory.28 930 This is a more general way o f  interpreting the dialogue as a whole, 
and indeed, for most citizens o f  the late fifth century BCE, Periclean Athens was their 
Athens.31 However, Plato does make some more specific comments on Athens in his 
epitaphios. Certainly, his account o f  Athens cannot be matched in the degree o f  errors, 
omissions and distortions,32 but one must remember that in the epitaphioi that we possess 
it is typical to see defeats remembered as victories,33 and unpleasant aspects o f  Athens’ 
history glossed over.34 Plato consciously omits mention o f  the Athenian (naval) empire,
28 Strauss, Barry S. 1993. Fathers and Sons in Athens, p. 200
29 M onoson 2000 (205), Collins &  Stauffer 1999, Salkever 1993.
30 Yunis 1996:136 (specifically, Periclean oratory as represented in Thucydides).
31 Pericles was the lead statesman in Athens from  the late 460s BCE until his death in 429 
(Nails 2002: 223-7). It was his expansionist policies that lead to the Athenian empire and 
her involvement in the Peloponnesian War. Likely, even as late as the 380s (when the 
Menexenus was likely written), his leadership would have characterized and defined the 
generation immediately preceding, and Athenians would have seen lasting effects o f  his 
demagogy daily in the magnificent works o f  his building programme. W hile Plato 
questions Pericles’ political leadership (Grg. 516b), he does elsewhere praise Pericles’ 
rhetorical abilities (Phdr. 269a, e; Smp. 215e).
32 Henderson 1975: 40.
33 Thomas 1989:203,216.
34 Plato portrays Athens’ whole history as based upon the defense o f  safety and freedom 
(242a, 244c, e).
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but when speaking o f  Spartan hegemony after the Peloponnesian War, they are described 
as “ enslaving”  the other Greeks (KaxaSouXouoGai, Mx. 244c). Along with the sentiment 
from  242d, we can conclude that Plato did not see any benefit to Athenian imperialism, 
and considered this to be a fault for Athens. Another specific example o f  critique o f  
Athens is at 246a, where he praises the (Athenian) men who saved the Great King, and
drove the Spartans clear out o f  the sea. Here Athens acts in clear contradiction to the
/
ideal attributed to her: to fight against barbarians to a point o f  destruction, but only fight 
fellow  Greeks to the point o f  victory (Mx. 242d). At 246a, Athens has provided aid to the 
barbarian Persians, and destroyed the Spartans at sea. Thus we can see how Plato sees a 
discrepancy between how  Athens appears and how  she actually is: Athens is not in tune 
with herself.
Doubtless, Athens would not be able to defend her contradictions i f  she engaged 
in dialogue with Socrates. This is indeed what Plato intends to show the Athenians in his 
epitaphios. By pointing out her self-contradictory actions, and exhorting her to 
philosophy, he is showing the proper remedy for her actions, since philosophy will never 
lead one to be self-contradictory.35 But until Athens recognizes the folly o f  her ways, she 
w ill remain reproachable in Plato’ s eyes. Perhaps one o f  the most common complaints 
from  Plato against Athens com es in the opening dialogue between Socrates and 
Menexenus. When Socrates speaks o f  the orators o f  his day, who attribute both deserved 
and undeserved praise, thus ensorcelling the souls o f  their audience ([prixopeq] oT ouxcog 
KaX<»<; 87taivouow, raaxe xai xa 7tpoaovxa xa i xa pfj rcspi SKaaxou Xeyovxs^ ... 
yoqxeuooaiv f|jud&v xa<; yu/a^, “ they praise so very admirably that they ensorcel our souls,
35 Cf. Grg. 482a-b.
(
attributing to each man both praise he merits and praise he does n ot...”  Mx. 234c-235a). 
These orators are the same men who advise Athens on public affairs (Grg. 456a), and 
they are leading by falsities and persuading with flatteries. In the Menexenus, then, Plato 
is presenting an Athens whose appearances do not match with her actions: she is out o f  
tune with herself, she has engaged in activities that brought temporary glory,36 but
ultimately brought her harm, and she has placed herself at the mercy o f  those who lead by
• /  
flattery and do not care for the truth.
In the Apology, our other example o f  inserted genre, Plato launches a critique o f  
Athens based upon her legal actions. Although Socrates does follow  along with some o f  
the topoi o f  typical forensic oratory, he explicitly rejects other courtroom antics that 
would have been expected by the Athenians: throughout his whole defense he refuses to 
address the jurors as “judges”  (Sucaaxai),37 and refuses to make an emotional plea for 
his acquittal by bringing in the (weeping) members o f  his family to arouse pity (Ap. 34b 
ff.), noting that the jurors should convict the man who does this because he makes the 
city into a laughingstock (KaxaysXaoxoq,Ap. 35b). Plato criticizes the Athenians for not 
only partaking in these unjust actions, but for actually expecting them; in his view  (and in 
Socrates’ ), those men are not truly judging based on what is just, and therefore do not 
deserve the title o f  ‘ Sucaaxai’ . During the refutation o f  his accuser, Meletus asserts that 
the politicians38 improve the young men o f  Athens and it is Socrates alone who corrupts 
them (Ap. 24e-25b). However, in carrying out his duty to the god o f  Delphi, Socrates has
36 As the (unexpressed) Athenian Empire would have.
37 Instead he refers to them as “Athenian men” . See above, Chapter Two, pp. 60-1.
38 Specifically Meletus says the jurymen, Council members, and the assemblymen all 




pro ved that the politicians, who appear to be wise, have no actual wisdom, but just think 
they are wise (Ap. 21c-22a). Since these men are the instructors o f  the young, the 
implication is that the Athenians are in actuality corrupting the youth themselves, because 
for Plato, even i f  these young men are bom  well,39 they cannot becom e good men without 
a good education. The Athenians, plainly, do not care for their own souls (Ap. 29e), and
instead spend their time and effort in the pursuit o f  power, wealth, and status. This is
/
why, according to Plato’ s portrait, the Athenians put Socrates, who spends his time in 
pursuit o f  virtue and knowledge, to death. In this way, the Athenians act as the tyrant in 
the Gorgias, who does what he wants, and does away with those who stand in his way 
(Grg. 513a).40 Plato again stresses that the Athenians are not consistent in their actions, in 
contrast to Socrates, who is ever consistent,41 since they changed their minds and 
regretted their actions at the trial o f  the generals from  Arginusae (Ap. 32a-b), and 
Socrates prophesies that they w ill regret killing him in time too (Ap. 38c). Through these 
comments on the Athenians, Plato shows that they perform (and expect) unjust actions, 
that they harm their own citizens with their ignorance, that they make the 7coA,iq into a 
tyrant, and that they are not consistent in their actions (i.e., they are out o f  tune with 
themselves).
3 Q
See above, Chapter One, pp. 26-7 for the discussion on the need for good nature and 
good nurture for men to be good.
40 ei yap ofea0s ouroKxeivovxsi; dvGpdmou«; smoxrjaeiv too 6vei8i£etv n v a  opiv o n  ook 
op0co<; £fjxe, oo Ka^coq 8iavosTa0e- (For i f  you think that by killing men you will stop 
anyone from  reproaching you for not living properly, you ’re thinking wrongly.), Ap. 39d.
41 aXk' eyo) 8ia 7tavxd<; too (Koo Sppoau? xe si 7too n  srcpa^a xoiooxoi; cpavoopai, xai iSia 
6 aoxo<; ooxo«; (But through my whole life, i f  I engaged in any public activity, I am that 
same man in my private life.), Ap. 33a.
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W hile Athens and her democratic constitution were renowned in the Greek world 
for their parrhesia , 4 2  and no one exercised that right more than Socrates,43 one wonders 
how  the Athenians would view  these criticisms o f  her ‘noble’ actions. W ould the 
Athenians seriously contemplate the criticisms, or would they just chalk it up to Plato 
being Plato (or Socrates being Socrates)? Certainly, much o f  what is criticized in the 
Apology would have been along the same lines o f  commentary (the historical) Socrates
■ " : ■ . ; ;  y : '. ■ ■■. ; . "■■■
would have made, that is, the same kinds o f  comments that landed him in court on trial 
for his life.44 Although the Athenians may have ended up regretting sentencing Socrates 
to death, the fact that Plato refuses to actively enter into Athenian politics in his life likely 
shows that the Athenians, while regretful, were not shamed into changing their political 
ways. For the 8fjpo<;, fickle as ever,45 is always concerned with the present pleasures, and 
does not care to undergo the difficult (and perhaps painful) changes necessary in order to 
becom e truly just. From the case o f  Socrates and the Apology, it is clear how the 
Athenians received these kinds o f  criticism. It was easier for thenj to put an innocent man 
to death than to turn towards themselves and seek to better their souls.
42Cf. Grg. 461e-462a, Socrates (to Polus): ôetvà pevxdv rcàGoiç, co PsA/tiais, si ÂÔfjyaÇs 
oupiKÔpsvoç, ou xfjç 'EXXaSoç îiXsiaxri éaxiv éÇoucria tou Xéystv, sirevra où évraôOa 
toutou pôvoç àTUxnaaiç. (It would be a horrible thing for you, my good man, i f  upon 
com ing to Athens, where there is the most freedom o f  speech o f  all o f  Greece, you alone 
should miss out on it here.)
43 Schofield 2006: 70 (“ .. .one Athenian who stuck true to his democratic parrhesia to the 
end was Socrates him self...” )
44 On the Athenian reception o f  Socrates’ trial see: Hansen, Mogens Herman. 1996. “ The 
Trial o f  Sokrates— From the Athenian Point o f  V iew .”  pp. 137-70 in Colloque 
International Démocratie Athénienne et culture, edited by M . Sakellariou.
45 Cf. Grg. 481d-e.
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But what about the Menexenus, an epitaphios oration with the history that 
displayed the Athenian official tradition?46 It would appear that the Athenians chose to 
hear the praise Plato bestowed upon the city more than the criticism. Cicero tells us that 
the Athenians o f  his day, perhaps as part o f  the Genesia,47 recited Plato’ s epitaphios 
every year.48
nec solum in iis sermonibus qui SidXoyoi dicuntur ... sed inpopulari oratione, 
qua mos est Athenis laudari in contione eos qui sint in proeliis interfecti; quae 
sic probata est, ut earn quotannis, ut scis, illo die recitari necesse sit.
(Cicero is saying that like Thucydides, Plato permits hiatus:) not only in those 
speeches which are called ‘dialogues’ , but also in his popular/democratic 
oration, which is the custom o f the Athenians in an oration (before an 
assembly) to praise those who are killed in battles; this [oration o f Plato’s] is 
so esteemed that, as you know, it has to be recited every year on that day.
(C/c. Or. 44.151)
Although Cicero stands a few  centuries removed from  the Athenians o f  Plato’ s day,49 i f  
the criticisms im plicit in the Menexenus were seen as the defining factor o f  the speech, 
surely the speech would not have been recited yearly. Even i f  Plato’ s account o f  Athens’ 
history includes errors, omissions, and distortions, his work achieves all the aspects o f  a 
successful funeral oration: he praises the ancestry o f  the war dead (and citizens), recounts 
the historical actions o f  Athens in favourable terms,50 and consoles the parents and
46 On the epitaphios as official tcoXk;  tradition, see Thomas 1989, Chapter 4 (“ O fficial 
Tradition? Polis Tradition and the Epitaphios” ), pp. 196-238.
47 The Genesia (Annual Celebrations) were annual commemorative rites in honour o f  the 
deceased (not necessarily war dead, but family members).
48 Dean-Jones notes, “ The claim may not be true, but the important point is that Cicero 
thought it could be”  (1995: 51 n.3), Huby (1957: 105-7) takes the claim to be true 
(apparently along with Jacoby).
49 Cicero was apparently in Athens in the winter o f 79/78 BCE, and again in 51 and 50 
(Huby 1957: 106,106 n. 3).
50 It is interesting to note that the only other epitaphios extant that covers roughly the 
same amount o f  historical detail is that o f  Lysias, which is believed to have been written 
at about the same time as the Menexenus (see Henderson 1975).
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children left behind. Since people enjoy hearing speeches given in their own fashion 
(Grg. 513c), perhaps the Athenians o f  Plato’ s day (and those o f  Cicero’ s) were simply 
pleased upon hearing the praises o f  Athens, and chose not to further scrutinize how Plato 
presents an Athens who is out o f  tune with herself.51 523
Ober notes that Plato has his Socrates use speech “not to demonstrate conformity
with and a submission to a democratic ethos that emphasized equality among citizens and
. y  . •
their collective wisdom, but as a form  o f  provocation and cultural criticism.”  But, as we
have seen, along with criticism, Plato includes exhortations to virtue, and ideas o f  his
philosophy in the Menexenus and Apology P  But couldn’ t Plato have Socrates still
critique Athens in his regular way, by means o f  a Socratic elenchus? It would not be out
o f  character for Socrates to engage in a discussion with a personified interlocutor (as the
Laws in the Crito), and i f  he directly refuted Athens (instead o f  leaving the contradictions
im plicit for the reader to discern), his critique would have more power. For example,
Socrates: M y dear Athens, do you say that there are things that adjust?
Athens: Yes, Socrates.
Socrates: W ell, then, there must also be things that are not just?
Athens: O f course.
51 Socrates comments on ‘praise’ in the Symposium (198d-e) after hearing the speeches o f  
his fellow  symposiasts. He says that to praise is not telling the truth about the object o f  
praise, but “ to apply the greatest and most admirable qualities to the object o f  praise, 
whether he has them or not; and i f  they are falsities, it’ s no big deal”  (to  ac, peyiaxa 
ávaxiGévaixq>Ttpáypaxixa icogxaKkiaxa,éávxsf|ouxcogsxovxasá v xspf|- si8e\|/eo5fj, 
oi>8sv ap' rjv Ttpaypa). In this way, by simply accepting the falsities without further 
thought, the Athenians respond to the ‘praise’ o f  Athens as they would praise o f  anything
else.
52 Ober 1998: 177-8.
53 Contrast Guthrie: “ philosophy can only be seriously pursued through oral discussion 
and living companionship”  (1975: 56-7). By showing his philosophy in the speech, Plato 
hopes the listener to contemplate him self, and consider whether he is in agreement with 
himself. Socrates is (partially) successful at achieving this goal, when he didn’ t think he 
could: he is surprised at the number o f  votes from  the jury that voted for his acquittal (Ap. 
36a-b). It appears that Socrates’ persuasiveness was greater than he knew, and that some 
Athenians were more open to his message (Ober 1998:177).
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Socrates: And we say things are just when they are good and beneficial, and unjust 
when they are bad and harmful?
Athens: Necessarily so.
Socrates: Is it possible for one to be just when they have done unjust things?
Athens: N o, for the one who is just would only do just things.
Socrates: I believe you are right to say so, Athens. Do we say that there are just and 
unjust things in war? Or is war itself just or unjust?
Athens: I think the former is true, that there are just and unjust things in war. For war 
itself can be just or unjust.
Socrates: And what is just in war?
Athens: To destroy one’s enemy when they have acted unjustly.
Socrates: And so die opposite is true for what is unjust? I mean, to destroy one’s 
enemy when they have not done anything wrong is unjust.
Athens: Yes.
Socrates: So in order to act justly in war, one must always destroy all enemies when 
they have done wrong?
Athens: Not quite, Socrates. It is not just to destroy one’s fellow-Greek speakers, 
only to destroy barbarians. For that is just.
Socrates: So, then, to be just in war, one must fight barbarians to destruction, and 
feilow-Greeks only to, I suppose, a point o f victory?54
Athens: Yes, you’re right now.
Socrates: So when you acted against the Persians when they attacked under Darius 
and Xerxes, and drove them out o f Greece, you acted justly?
Athens: Entirely so, for they were unjust to attempt to enslave us and take what does 
not belong to them.
Socrates: And when you captured the Spartan generals at Sphacteria, you acted 
justly because you did not kill them, but instead made peace and returned 
them still living?
Athens: Yes, for we had won our victory justly, and there was no need to destroy the 
generals. X
Socrates: Then what are we to say o f your allying with the Great King against the 
Greeks?
Athens: W ell, that’ s different...
Socrates: But according to your earlier definition, you did not act justly in that 
situation.
Athens: What? How?
Socrates: I f  you were acting justly, you would have fought against the barbarians, 
no?
. Athens: Socrates, you’re talking nonsense...
I f  Socrates (and Plato) had wanted to, it would have been just as easy (if  not easier) to 
show Athens’ contradictory actions by means o f  a Socratic elenchus either with a 
personified Athens, or a character who strongly believed in the ‘ ideals’ o f  the city and 
who saw her as just in every way. So why does Plato choose to declaim against Athens
54 Cf. Mx. 242d ..
by means o f  oratory? In the case o f  the Apology, the historical situation presented the 
opportunity for Plato to write the speech o f  Socrates (or, more likely, a speech fo r  
Socrates, based on his actual words).55 56Since the genre o f  the epitaphios held so much 
(political) currency in Classical Athens, perhaps in the case o f  the Menexenus, Plato was 
hoping to draw upon its status as contributing to the ‘ official rcôXiç tradition’ . For most 
Athenians, the yearly epitaphios presented the only opportunity to hear o f  the exploits o f
56 /  'Athens’ history. There would be more importance to hearing this particular type o f  
speech than just another political oration on which architect ought to be chosen for the 
next building project. A lso, since the epitaphios and forensic orations were specifically 
directed at the îiôXiç as a whole,57 perhaps Plato is hoping to reach a wider audience than 
his private Socratic dialogues would have.
I f  Plato is using these Athenian genres as a means to criticize Athens, does that 
automatically mean that we can classify the Menexenus and Apology as parody, satire, or 
irony? Bakhtin defines the use o f  inserted genre as parody \vhen4he inserted genre “ is a 
com pletely passive tool in the hands o f  the author wielding it. He takes, so to speak, 
someone else’ s meek and defenseless discourse and installs his own interpretation in it, 
forcing it to serve his own new purposes.” 58 However, the inserted genre is not parodie
88
55 W e must always remember that even though Socrates was a historical figure, o f  whom 
Plato had first-hand knowledge, the Socrates is the dialogues is a character, com posed 
and constructed by Plato. I f  the Apology o f  Socrates was billed as a live-action drama, or 
re-enactment, perhaps we would be wise to add the disclaimer “ based upon a true story” .
56 Thomas 1989: 235. She notes, “ this could be crucial.... Individual traditions gain their 
place in wider polis history by being attached to polis traditions—  The funeral speeches 
propagated both the official traditions o f  Athens and a powerful group o f  ideals about 
Athens which determined the picture o f  history found there.”  (235-6).
57 Noting that the jury is supposed to be representative o f  the entire civic state (Dodds 
1959:202).
58 Bakhtin, M .M . 1984. Problems o f  Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 197
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when the “ author grants the alien59 genre full semantic autonomy.”60 The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines satire as: “ A  poem, or in m odem  use sometimes a prose composition, 
in which prevailing vices or follies are held up to ridicule. Sometimes, less correctly, 
applied to a com position in verse or prose intended to ridicule a particular person or class 
o f  persons, a lampoon.”61 Vlastos makes a distinction in Socratic irony between “ simple”
and “ com plex”  irony: “ In ‘ simple’ irony what is said just isn’ t what is meant: taken in its
/
ordinary, com m only understood, sense the statement is simply false. In ‘ com plex’ irony 
what is said both is and isn’ t what is meant: its surface content is meant to be true in one 
sense, false in another.” 62 From my previous arguments about the Menexenus and 
Apology, it is clear that all o f  these terms cannot be completely applied.
Many scholars fail to see any serious aspect to either the Menexenus or Apology, 
mincing terms between ‘parody’ , ‘ satire’ , and ‘ irony’ , at times seemingly employing 
them without distinction.63 To take Bakhtin’ s definition o f  parody o f  an inserted genre, 
we can see that Plato does indeed use these genres to a different end, to communicate 
philosophy, but that is not the only way in which he uses them. Indeed, the Apology is a 
defense speech for Socrates (though unsuccessful), and the Menexenus fulfills the 
requirements o f  the epitaphios genre. It must be noted that “parodies cannot be so close
59 That is, ‘ inserted’ genre.
60 Nightingale 1995: 148.
61 OED, Second Edition (1989, online 2010), satire [I. l.a ].
62 Vlastos, G. 1991. Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, p. 31
63 On the Menexenus: Dodds 1959 (cf. p. 24 n.2, where only the “ stupidest”  reader would 
take the Mx. seriously); Henderson 1975; Guthrie 1975 (p. 320, the Mx. “ is o f  no great 
importance save as an illustration o f  Plato’ s versatility” ); Thomas 1989 (esp. a parody o f  
Lysias’ epitaphios)', Yunis 1996; et al. On the Apology: Burnet 1924; Feaver & Hare 
1981; Seeskin 1982; Leibowitz 2010 (focusing on the ironic aspect); et al.
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as to be indistinguishable from what they parody.” 64 W e can say, then, that these genres 
are not only “passive tools”  for Plato, since they are still allowed to retain their regular 
purposes as well. W hile Plato does include critical commentary on Athens in both works, 
he is not mocking the 7toX.i<; by any means. I f  anything, the exhortations to philosophy 
make these uses o f  inserted genre more protreptic (i.e., designed to instruct and
persuade)65 than satirical. W e cannot, then, simply take these works as satires o f  the
/
epitaphios and forensic oratory genres either. Does this mean that we are to read both the 
Menexenus and Apology as purely serious works? There are few  scholars who do believe 
these two works to be meant seriously, and in earnest by Plato.66 Indeed, we have 
evidence that the ancient critics o f  these works read them as serious: both Dionysius o f  
Halicarnassus (end o f  first century bce) and Hermogenes (second century ce) read the 
Menexenus as a genuine funeral oration,67 and the Apology was obviously taken seriously 
i f  defense speeches o f  Socrates became, in a way, their own genre. In matter o f  content 
and context o f  the two orations, the issues at hand are very serious; a eulogy for the
deceased and a capital trial are not occasions for meaningless jokes, mockeries, or jesting.
\
So how do the scholars end up at opposing interpretations o f  the inserted genres in 
the Menexenus and Apology ? Indeed, none o f  the opinions are held without their reasons, 
but the fact that the same evidence can give rise to polar opinions is striking. I believe
64 Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 51.
65 So Kahn (1963:225-6) thinks o f  the Menexenus.
66 Kennedy (1963:159, 162) understands the Menexenus to be serious, and Brickhouse & 
Smith (1989) interpret the Apology as serious, and argue that Socrates must be careful 
and avoid any irony, since it could possibly be misinterpreted by the jurors (1989:41, 
43).
67 Allen 1984: 3 2 1 .1 would cite also the evidence from  Cicero presented above that the 
Athenians o f his day (first century bce) took Plato’ s epitaphios as serious. W hy would 
they use a mocking parodic work to honour their deceased at the annual celebrations?
that the singularly exclusive opinions o f  parody/satire/irony versus seriousness are based 
on misunderstandings o f  Plato’ s intention in these works and o f  his view o f  the 
philosopher in general. I have mentioned before that the Platonic dialogues are, by their 
nature, serio-com ic works. Time and time again throughout the dialogues, Plato shows 
serious and playful aspects side by side. The Sixth Letter closes by encouraging the 
addressees to swear an oath a7rooSfi xe apa pf) dpoiiacp Kai xfj xfjg O7iou8fi<; aSsXxpfj 
7tai5 ia (with an earnestness that is not out o f  tune, and with the playfulness that is the 
sister o f  earnestness, Ep. 6 . 323d).68 For Plato, play “had its place in the serious world,”  
since children ought never to be forced to learn, play was educationally valuable.69 
Perhaps the most pervasive image o f  seriousness and play in the dialogues is the 
philosopher himself. Although the philosopher is most definitely in earnest about his 
pursuits, he does not appear to be serious and respectable to those who do not know 
philosophy. In the same way that Callicles says Socrates is a laughingstock because he 
pursues philosophy beyond the appropriate age (Grg. 484c-e); Sqcrates admits it too: oi
ev xdu; (piloaocpiaig noliw  %povov 8 iaxpi\|/avx£<; si<; xa Sncaaxiipux iovxs<; ye^oioi
\
(paivovxai pfjxopsg (M en who have spent a great amount o f  time in philosophical pursuits
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68 O f course, as is the case o f  nearly all the letters, authorship is an ever present issue. 
However, with regard to the Sixth Letter, Guthrie notes, “ I f  this letter was not written by 
Plato, I wish w e had more work by its unknown author. He was capable o f  writing like 
Plato at his best.”  (1975: 62 n.3)
69 Guthrie 1975: 61 (cf. R. 536e, yoxtI 8s (3iaiov ouSev sppovov pd&npa.-M riGfi, equp-- 
Mf| xoivov pig, eurov, cg apiaxe, xoug naldaq ev xoiq paGrjpamv a lia  Ttai^ovxa«; xpscps, 
Socrates'. Nothing learned by force remains in the soul. Glaucon: That’ s true. Socrates'. 
Then, my good man, do not use force to train the children in these subjects, rather use 
play instead.)
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appear ridiculous when they appear as orators in the law courts, Tht. 172c). This is, in a 
way, the essence o f  Socratic irony (eipoveia): a “ curious blending o f  crcouSfi and roxiôià, 
o f  assurance and self-deprecation, o f  exquisite manners and a delight in almost vulgar 
illustrations o f  his ideas” .70 1 It is only the philosopher who is able to embody these two 
aspects at once:
“We may recall that the philosopher alone knows the nature o f the noblest and 
best life, so that he alone can knowingly imitate it in logos. Since such a life 
will inevitably appear comic to the multitude, his tragic figure will just as 
inevitably be popularly comic. Thus he creates at once true tragedy and 
popular comedy, and is the only one capable o f doing so by knowledge or 
techne.”72
For Socrates, îtaiÇeiv is the “ mask”  o f  philosophy, whereas for a character like Meletus, 
7taiÇsiv conceals cleverness. Socrates is mistaken for a “jester because he is the jester’ s 
mirror image.” 73
I f  the philosopher is characterized by both seriousness and play, and Plato 
presents Socrates elsewhere as joking in earnest about things, can we not apply the same
serio-com ic label to Socrates as an orator in the Menexenus and Apology! To return to the
quote from  the Gorgias that I cited in the Introduction,74 when Callicles asks, erne poi, to
\
Xaipetpcov, orcouSa^ei Tania £coKpdrr|c; ij 7tai£si; (tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates serious 
about these things or is he joking? Grg. 481b), are these our only two options? In view  o f
70 Cf. Tht. 172c-175b for the full discussion between Socrates and Theodoras on how  the 
philosopher appears to the ignorant, and how  he shines over and beyond the ignorant 
when there is an issue to be dealt with o f  a non-practical nature (e.g., “ is a king happy?” ).
71 Strycker 1994: 73 (quoted in full, above Chapter Two pp. 65-6). Cf. also Guthrie 
(1975: 60-1), “ A long with the accusation o f  eironeia against Socrates went the complaint 
that he was always playing, never serious. Here we begin to see that Plato can use the 
word ironically, not him self implying any criticism, since he certainly did not think o f  
Socrates as a frivolous person.”
72 Patterson, Richard. 1982. “ The Platonic Art o f  Comedy and Tragedy.”  Philosophy & 
Literature 6 : 76-93. p.84
73 Crooks 2009: 110.
74 See Introduction p. 5.
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the serio-com ic nature o f  the dialogues, it becom es clear that Callicles, not knowing 
philosophy, does not understand the nature o f  the philosopher and instead only sees the 
‘jester’ . This is in direct contrast to Chaerephon’ s response, êpoi pèv Soksî, © 
KaMdicXsiç, vjtepyvôç onovôâÇeiv (he seems to me to be exceedingly serious, Callicles, 
481b). Chaerephon, a long-time companion o f  Socrates, understands his philosophical
ways75 and knows that Socrates, even i f  ‘playing’ , is always serious. The antithesis does
/
not hold true for Socrates, rather Callicles “ fails to see that you can jest and build up 
paradoxes and create fantasies while still being, on another level, very serious about what 
this kind o f  ‘play’ implies or serves to convey .” 76 7In the Apology, Socrates hedges his 
actions by repeating his serious intentions, even though he knows the jurors will laugh at 
him like Callicles (e.g. Ap. 20d). To the jurors, he appears as the philosopher in the 
Theatetus. Likewise, in the Menexenus, Socrates is hesitant to deliver Aspasia’ s 
epitaphios lest Menexenus laugh at him i f  he seems to play (M r. 236c). Menexenus’ 
reply, pr|ôapœç (not at all), signals to the (inform ed) reader that Menexenus, like 
Chaerephon, is familiar with Socrates’ ways. The epitaphios itself is a difficult genre to 
place: “ the character o f  the epitaphios, its form  and conventions are very strange to our 
eyes, stilted and highly artificial, as well as excruciatingly smug and congratulatory.”  In 
addition to the com plex nature o f  Plato’ s philosopher, the difficulties o f  the inserted 
genres themselves have added to the difficulty in interpreting Plato’ s intentions with the 
Menexenus and Apology.
75 Chaerephon is so well acquainted with Socrates’ methods that he understands what 
Socrates means when he is directed to begin questioning Gorgias at the start o f  the 
dialogue (447c-d).
76 Rutherford 1995: 157.
77 Thomas 1989: 208. Cf. W ickkiser (1999: 71), who notes that out o f  context, the 
epitaphios can seem “ contrived and ineffective” .
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It is clear that these two works are not merely parody, satire, or irony, or indeed 
purely serious. M ore recent scholarship has begun to see that in the case o f  these two 
inserted genres,78 there is a presence o f  both cmou5f| and 7tai8ia .79 80Since we cannot apply 
these labels o f  ‘parody’ and the like, how are we to describe oratory in the Menexenus 
and Apology? I believe Schofield is the closest to defining this oratory. In regards to the 
Menexenus, he labels the epitaphios a “pastiche”  in that it is a “ eulogy o f  Athens and its
^  sn
history, employing the full range o f  the stock tropes o f  the genre.”  It is possible to draw 
the same conclusion with respect to the Apology, since I have argued that Socrates does 
em ploy various topoi o f  forensic oratory, and delivers a speech that (for the most part) 
adheres to the rhetorical expectations o f  the audience.81 ‘Pastiche’ is a good term for the 
use o f  inserted genre in these two works, since Plato does imitate the style o f  the orators. 
Imitation itself, however, is a form  o f  rcaiSia that is not to be taken seriously (on cntoodii, 
R. 602b). Likewise, these works display elements o f  Plato’ s philosophy, which is by 
nature a mixture o f  anouSij and rcaiSid. ‘Pastiche’ in and o f  itself while better than 
‘parody’ , ‘ satire’ , or ‘ irony’ alone, does not encompass all the aspects in play when Plato 
is inserting these two oratorical genres. I propose to define the Menexenus and Apology
78 Plato, o f  course, does use other genres for parodic purposes, e.g. Attic tragedy in the 
Gorgias (see Nightingale 1995, Chapter 2, “ Use and abuse o f  Athenian tragedy” , pp. 60- 
92). But not every inserted genre is used for parody: at the end o f  her discussion, 
Nightingale notes, “ ‘Philosophy’ w ill illuminate and be illuminated by different genres in 
different ways. Each instance where Plato incorporates poetry (or rhetoric) into his 
dialogues, then, deserves a separate investigation.”  (p. 92 n. 84).
79 Salkever (1993) and Collins &  Stauffer (1999) believe that the Menexenus cannot be 
labeled as one or the other, but is both com ic and serious; likewise Strycker (1994) sees 
the blend o f  arcoudij and muSia in the Apology.
80 Schofield 2006: 72-3.
81 Discounting, o f  course, his refusal to seek the pity o f  the jurors and appeal to their 
emotions, and way o f  speaking in his accustomed manner. But, such refusals (on their 
surface, not as Socrates defines them) are also commonplace in courtroom oratory.
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as examples o f  an ‘ ironic pastiche’ , provided that ‘ ironic’ is understood to mean (along 
with Strycker), eipcoveia as a combination o f  0710081) and rcaiSia. An ‘ ironic pastiche’ 
then, is a serious imitation o f  the epitaphios and forensic orations, which sometimes 
com es across (to the uninformed Platonic reader) as playing and jesting; however, we 
must understand that Plato is only using com ic means to a serious end.
Having established the use o f  oratory in the Menexenus and Apology as
/
(playfully) serious, w e must now return to the relation o f  this oratory to the 7toXig. 
Elsewhere in the Platonic corpus when oratory is used as an inserted genre, specifically in 
the Phaedrus and Symposium, 8 2  the topic treated is a universal topic: love .83 However, 
when Plato uses these two Attic genres o f  oratory, the epitaphios and forensic genres, his 
intended audience is none other than the Athenians themselves, and treatment o f  Athens 
is brought to the fore. M onoson notes that Plato “ appropriates”  part o f  the “ intellectual 
mission”  o f  the funeral oration for philosophy.84 W hile I agree with M onoson, I would 
perhaps assert that it is more proper to say that the epitaphios, like Socrates’ forensic 
defense, has been subordinated to becom e a further tool o f  philosophy. Plato’ s new use o f  
oratory allows him to em ploy these Attic genres to aid his (and Socrates’) ultimate goal 
o f  encouraging anyone who he encounters— with the text in this case— to care for their 
soul and pursue virtue. Plato thus uses Attic oratory to communicate his philosophy 
directly to the itohc, on a grand and public scale. By using genres outside his normal
82 Both are examples o f  the epideictic oratory genre.
83 In the Symposium, the revelers take turns giving speeches in honour o f  Love (the god). 
Coincidentally, the proposer o f  the topic is none other than Phaedrus. In the Phaedrus, he 
and Socrates exchange speeches on erotic love.
84 M onoson 2000: 205.
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genre o f  the Socratic interview, he has obtained the audience for his philosophy that truly 
needs to heed the critiques o f  the 7tóXiq: the Athenian citizens.
A ll o f  this effort on Plato’ s behalf, to appropriate oratory for his own (redefined) 
use, is in order to prove that oratory is not only the tool o f  the politician, but that 
philosophy too can be capable o f  politics when it uses the appropriate mediums. I f  we
believe C icero,85 86the Menexenus achieved success in the 7tóki<; by being recited yearly.
/
Socrates’ defense too, was more successful than he believed it could be, judging from his 
surprise at the number o f  jurors who voted for his acquittal (Ap. 36a-b). Loraux and 
M onoson rightly agree that the Menexenus is a “ minor”  dialogue only i f  one fails to see 
the epitaphios as characteristic o f  civic discourse. Those who wrongly dismiss the 
importance o f  the Menexenus for the Platonic corpus because o f  its apparent lack o f  
philosophy,87 its lack o f  a proper elenchus, and its use o f  oratory, could also dismiss the 
Apology on those grounds as well. However, since the Apology presents Socrates’ trial, 
an event we can definitely say is historical,88 and gives an account o f  his life, it is 
(rightly) given great significance for the Platonic corpus. But both o f  these examples o f
85 A s I do— that the Athenians centuries later would still practice the annual rites in 
honour o f  their (familial) deceased is fairly certain. Why would they not also include a 
part o f  the Patrios Nomos, from  the classical glory days o f  their noXiq? Even i f  Plato’ s 
epitaphios is a literary record, not actually performed in Plato’ s day, it would make sense 
to choose a renowned author (even i f  he is known for his philosophy), one who was 
clearly Athenian (Lysias’ speech also has a similarly detailed history o f  Athens, but he 
was a m etic). After all, as mentioned elsewhere, Plato’ s speech brilliantly achieves the 
requirements o f  the genre: Athens is eulogized in all her glory, her history is presented in 
the most favourable way, and the survivors are consoled after the encomium o f  the war 
dead.
86 Loraux 2006: 312, M onoson 2000:202.
871 argue against this view  in Chapter 1.
88 For all we know, nearly all the other Platonic dialogues, perhaps excluding the Phaedo, 
could be mere constructs o f  Plato’ s authorial imagination, and not simply recollections o f  
discussions during Socrates’ lifetime.
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inserted genre have greater significance for Plato as an author, than they do for our
understanding o f  the historical Socrates: they are demonstrations o f  Plato’ s interaction 
with the civic actions, policies, and beliefs o f  the Athenians. He consciously chooses to 
communicate with the Athenians through the mediums that they would identify with: the 
funeral and forensic orations. By means o f  discourse that was familiar to the Athenians,:
Plato hoped to communicate the benefits o f  the philosophical life spent in pursuit o f
. / .  , .
virtue and knowledge.
In the Seventh Letter, Plato writes:89
Kal xou psv oKOTiefv pf| ajiocmjvca jiij 7toxs Spstvov fiv yiyvoixo rcspi xs onk& 
xaika Kai 8f| Kal 7tepl xfiv Jtaaav Ttotaxeiav, xou 5s 7tpaxxsiv at) rcspi pevsiv ad 
Kaipou?, xsXeoxc&vxa 5e vofjaat rcspi rcaacov xrav vuv rcoXscov oxi kokco? . 
ouprcaoai rcoXixsuovxai... xauxbv 8fi Kal 7t£pi rcoksax; auxou Siavooopsvov 
Xpf) £fjv x6v epcppova- Asysiv pev, si pfj KaX&q am& (paivoixo Jiô ixsusaGai, si 
piAAot ptixs paxaicoq ¿pdv prjxs dno0avsTo0ai Xsycov, piav 8s 7taxpi8i 
7toA,txsia(; psxaPoA,fi(; pfi tipoatpipstv...
And though I did not cease to reflect how an improvement could be brought 
about in our laws and in the whole constitution, yet I refrained from action, 
waiting for the proper time. At last I came to the conclusion that all existing 
states are badly governed...This is the principle which a wise man must 
follow in his relations towards his own city. Let him warn her, if he thinks her 
constitution is corrupt and there is a prospect that his words will be listened to 
and not put him in danger of his life, but let him not use violence upon his 
fatherland to bring about a change of constitution. (Ep. 7.325e-326a, SSlc-d)90
W e know that although Plato was w ell aware o f  the political activity in his native city o f
Athens, he did not endeavour to partake in the management o f  the ttô u;  (unlike some o f
his relatives).91 It is possible to assume that Plato, like Socrates, still partook in certain
89 “ A  com m on view  is that i f  Plato did not write the letter himself, the writer must have 
been someone close to him, probably an associate in the Academy, so that we can trust 
the broad lines o f  his narrative.”  (Schofield 2006 :19)
90 Translated by Glenn R. M orrow, in (ed.) Cooper, John M . 1997 Plato: Complete 
Works:
91 Vlastos (1994. Socratic Studies. Pp. 128-131) sympathizes with Socrates (and likely 
Plato as w ell) for not being more involved in the politics o f  his day.
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civic activities.92 93Although in the Seventh Letter, Plato says that he was waiting for the 
right moment to engage in politics, it would appear that the right moment never came 
along. However, in the second passage that I have quoted from  his letter, he 
acknowledges that there is a safe way for the wise man, i.e., the philosopher, to contribute 
to his 7co>a<;. I f  there is a chance that the city may heed his advice, he should warn his city
in a way that does not involve (or cause) violence. From the arguments I have presented
• /
above, it is clear that this is how  Plato intends his use o f  the inserted genres o f  Attic 
oratory. By using the regular channels o f  discourse for the 7t6Xk;, Plato is speaking to the 
Athenians in order to convince them to adopt the proper way o f  managing the city and to 
pursue virtue daily. By criticizing (and thus warning) the Athenians o f  the contradictions 
present in her actions, and attempting to show her that she is out o f  tune with herself,
i
Plato was attempting to contribute to state politics by means o f  the oratory in his 
dialogues. In the most general terms, the pqxopei; o f  Athens were the politicians who 
attended meetings, brought lawsuits, ran the councils, and advised the city on the right 
course o f  action. By dramatizing Socrates as an orator, Plato has (by proxy) provided his 
own advice to the Athenians, and thus his Socrates, who also claimed to lead the private 
life, becom es the true politician,94 since he alone can truly advise the 7c6X,k;  on the just 
and virtuous path.
Scholars have speculated on what led Plato to use these inserted genres in his 
works. O f course it was not simply to beat the orators at their own game, as some would
92 He appears to have knowledge o f  the Eleusinian Mysteries (e.g . Euthydemus 277d).
93 Rutherford 1995:153.
94 Cf. Grg. 52Id, olpai psx' okiym  AGqvaicov, iva pfj eitko povog, S7nxeipstv xfj dx; 
aXr|0(S<; 7toXmicfj xsxyfl *ai 7tpaxx£tv xa 7coXixuca povoq xcov vuv (I believe that I am one 
o f  a few  Athenians, I won’t say the only one, but the only one o f  the contemporary 
Athenians, to take up the true political techne, and to practice politics.)
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believe,95 rather it is more likely that he had a specific purpose in mind, as argued above.
It is likely that the Apology, since it appears to have been written not too long after the
actual trial o f  Socrates, came about because o f  the outcome o f  that trial: “ a travesty o f
justice and an appalling indictment o f  the political and educational system which made
such a misunderstanding or misrepresentation o f  a good man and a philosopher
possible.” 96 97There is no doubt that the execution o f  Socrates left a great impression on
/  Q7
him. He was still a young man when Socrates died, and Socrates was obviously a man 
who played a large role in his life. But what spurred Plato to again insert a genre o f  Attic 
origin into his dialogues with the Menexenus is much more difficult to determine. It has, 
perhaps rightly, been interpreted as an “ occasional piece designed to comment and reflect 
on a particular political event.” 98 What that “ occasion”  would be has been guessed at: 
Kahn believes that the conclusion o f  the K ing’ s Peace (386 b c e) was the significant event 
because it confirmed everything Plato believed about the disastrous consequences o f  
dem ocracy,99 whereas Huby believes the Menexenus to be a sort o f  ‘pamphlet’ in 
response to the threat o f  “ making econom ies in [Athens’ ] provisions for the dependents
V
o f  those who had fallen in war.” 100 Whether or not we can be so specific, it was likely 
spurred in part by current circumstances that we can no longer identify without further 
evidence.101 This fact alone reinforces the fact that Plato was aware o f  current events in
95 Vickers 1988:137.
96 Rutherford 1995: 35.
97 I f  one follow s the traditional dates o f  Plato’ s life, he would have been 28/29 in 399 
b c e , i f  one follow s the prosopography presented by Nails (as I do, her argumentation is 
very thorough and convincing), Plato would have only been 25 years old.
98 Schofield 2006: 74.
99 Kahn 1963: 226-7.
100 Huby 1957:107.
101 Guthrie 1975: 317.
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his city, and that he did respond to the Athenians and partake in a civic discourse, albeit 
in a way that was completely different from  the other politicians o f  his day.102
The study o f  Plato and inserted genres is an investigation that is far from complete 
or thoroughly explored in current scholarship. Platonic scholarship is often very specific:
examinations o f  individual dialogues (or thematic groups o f  them), studies o f  Plato’ s
/
political theories, or explorations o f  particular aspects o f  Platonic philosophy. It is more 
difficult to find a scholar who is attempting to take into account all aspects o f  Plato’ s 
works,103 including the philosophical political theories, along with knowledge o f  Plato as 
an author o f  a particular genre and the characters portrayed, and placed within the 
context o f  knowledge o f  the Athenian itokiq. Fortunately, some scholars are pursuing 
Plato and his Socrates along these lines (Andrea Nightingale, Sara M onoson, among 
others), and we are beginning to gain a greater understanding o f  Plato’ s dialogues in their 
full context. In this examination o f  Attic oratory in the Menexenu$ and Apology, I have 
attempted to take into account all o f  these aspects. I have argued that the Menexenus is 
squarely in line with the philosophy o f  Plato expressed in other dialogues, and that it is 
able to enhance our understanding o f  Plato’ s philosophical ideas instead o f  simply being 
a small on e-o ff dialogue. I also argued that the inserted genres o f  Attic oratory are in 
keeping with the other examples o f  funeral and forensic orations, and we are able to
102 Yet again, Plato has ‘ redefined’ the terms for him self and his engagement in Athenian 
politics.
103 And also attempting to take into account the entire corpus o f  Plato in their arguments. 
I sincerely believe that Plato intended his works for an educated reader, for i f  the reader 
was not educated and already knew o f  the philosophies, his written works would not be 
o f  much use to them (cf. the Theuth myth in the Phaedrus and the accompanying 
discussion o f  writing, 274c-277a).
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better understand Plato as an author when we do not confine these inserted genres to 
parody, satire, or irony. Plato very deftly uses these two types o f  orations as ‘ ironic 
pastiches’ , the character o f  which is in keeping with his portrayal o f  the philosopher and 
his philosophy: a fine blending o f  cmoodrj and 7rai8iá, which has unfortunately been 
hitherto misunderstood by scholars who wish to place the oratory in Plato as completely
different from  his philosophical elenchi. I have, in fact, shown that these inserted genres
/
are used in order to communicate Plato’ s philosophy to the Athenian 7tó)a<; as a whole, 
that by using Attic oratory, Plato is playing to his audience, who would love to hear 
speeches given in their own manner.104 In this way, I have not held Plato as isolated, 
writing alone in his Academy, but I have placed him in the living, active city o f  Athens, 
accounting for the social and civic factors which bore influence upon his work and his 
life. By approaching Plato holistically, considering not just singular aspects, I believe that 
my conclusions from this thesis have presented the image o f  a Plato who by his own 
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